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1. Introduction 
How are the people in two Himalayan mountain villages capable of maintaining their water 
supply in a context of global and local changes? Recently the alarm bells have been ringing 
over the possibility of Himalayan glaciers melting away, drying out some of the most 
important rivers in the world. At a micro scale this problem is also urgent. A drier climate in 
the mountains would alter the livelihood conditions dramatically for the affected 
communities.  
Due to the marginal livelihood conditions that high mountain environments give, 
migration is a common phenomenon in high mountain communities. Migration transforms 
communities both socially and spatially, and might change the ability of the communities to 
utilize various natural resources. Also, new technology changes the communities’ ability to 
utilize natural resources. It can make it possible for the communities to meet the challenges 
from climatic change and migration, given that the communities are able to change their 
institutions and practices in order to adapt to the new technology.  
The processes mentioned are all affecting the water supply in the two communities 
studied in this thesis. The setting is the Manang District in Nepal (see map 1.1). It is a high 
mountain area, with settlements situated on altitudes between 3200 and 3800 meter above sea 
level. The objectives of this thesis are to study how the actual communities are able to sustain 
their water needs in a context of climatic change, migration and technological change; and 
why there have been differentiated developments in the two villages. 
The findings are informed and analysed by applying theoretical perspectives from the 
Common Property Resource approach (CPR approach), contemporary social theory and 
comparative analysis of the two villages.  
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1.1 Background of the study 
All over the Himalayas, communities experience both climatic and social change. This is not 
a new situation; in high mountain communities life has always been precarious. Mountain 
people have always had to tackle harsh climatic conditions, unstable slopes, floods and 
isolation. 
The Himalayas is the most recently formed mountain range on the earth and is still 
tectonically active. This makes the region prone to natural hazards. The precipitation is 
unevenly distributed during the year due to the monsoon, and this is contributing to the scope 
of the hazards. In the high mountain regions above 3500 m a.s.l., this implies snow 
avalanches and glacial lake outbursts, while the middle mountains between 500 - 3500 m 
a.s.l., have to cope with landslides, floods and debris flows.  
And then there is the human impact on the environment. The Himalayan region has 
been subject of vast amounts of research on these matters (Ives & Messerli 1989). During the 
seventies and eighties, the alarm bells were ringing over the predicted environmental disaster 
which was expected to occur in Himalaya. The non-sustainable use of land, rivers and forests; 
population growth and political problems was formulated in the theory that Ives and Messerli 
called “The Himalayan Environmental Degradation Theory” (ibid).  However, later research 
Map 1.1: Nepal, districts 
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has shown that the processes behind the so called disaster is way more complex than first 
assumed, and the Degradation theory is now dismantled (Ives & Messerli 1989, Chapman 
1999) 
Now the alarm bells are ringing again, this time over the overall threat to the water 
supply of the region. Population growth, intensified agriculture and the breakdown of 
traditional water harvesting practices are all trends that point toward a crisis due to lack of 
sustainable water management (Chalise 2000). And not to mention the most frightening 
scenario, the possibility that the glaciers of Himalaya, the water towers of Asia, are going to 
disappear due to global warming (Hasnain 1999 (in Vetaas 2002)). This scenario I hereafter 
call the “Meltdown Narrative”, as this scenario also is controversial. 
Introduction of new technology and infrastructure development alter the traditional 
resource management practices, and some researchers (Banskota et al. 2000) fear that the non-
sustainable use of natural resources, most notably forests and fresh-water, are threatening the 
very existence of many mountain communities. The worsening of the livelihood conditions 
leads to migration that fragments traditional communities and deprives them of the ability to 
cope with the challenges that they meet (ibid).  
This is the backdrop to this thesis. The next sub-chapters present the contextual 
changes that are likely to influence the water supply in the two selected villages. 
 
1.1.1 Migration 
Different kinds of migration are always present in high mountain communities. In places 
where human existence is precarious, people have to move in order to adapt to changes in 
their environment. It could be seasonal migration, work migration or permanent resettlement.  
Migration is permanent or semi-permanent resettlement by a group or individuals 
(Johnston et al. 2000). Together with the fertility and mortality of a population, it is 
determining the size of a given population, its growth and structure.  
Groups living in mountain regions have traditionally been viewed as marginalized 
groups, they are poorer, less educated and have poorer health than lowland groups (Ives & 
Messerli 1989). For marginalized groups, the mountains are viewed as shelter, a place to take 
refuge from war, diseases or starvation.  
In the high mountain communities, seasonal migration has been a strategy to avoid 
harsh winter conditions, while trade ventures have been a strategy where farming did not 
yield enough for households to sustain a living through out the year. Permanent resettlement 
becomes the option when population growth exceeds what the arable land can support. 
Introduction 
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According to Banskota et al. (2000), climatic change leads to decreased productivity in many 
mountain communities, which again makes people migrate down from mountain areas. 
Additionally, there are various place specific reasons why peoples in mountain communities 
migrate. 
 Migration also has social, cultural and spatial consequences both for the places that 
experience out-migration and the places that experience in-migration.  When a community 
looses many of its members, it may fail to sustain various social and physical structures due to 
lack of labour, while a community that experiences in-migration might become heterogeneous 
and fragmented. 
 
1.1.2 Technological change 
All over the Himalayas, modern water supply techniques are to different degrees and extents 
replacing traditional water harvesting techniques (Banskota et al. 2000, Agrawal & Narain 
1997). Traditional water supply methods are not sufficient to meet increased demands from a 
growing population (Banskota et al. 2000). The single most important component in modern 
water systems in remote mountain areas is the plastic pipe, the “black revolution” of water 
supply. Pipes make the water supply a lot more reliable, increase the overall supply and make 
it possible to lead water from sources that previously were impossible to exploit. But pipes 
require different management systems than the traditional water harvesting techniques. 
Maintenance of the new water system might often be problematic. In places where the 
government or Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have provided modern water 
systems for free, it makes people abandon their original water systems, which then deteriorate 
(Agrawal & Narain 1997). One reason for this can be that villagers give priority to rent 
seeking, which mean investing more effort to try to persuade the government to provide new 
water systems for free instead of maintaining their existing systems (ibid). And then if the 
water stops coming out of the pipes, entire villages might end up without water, because their 
traditional water systems are abandoned (ibid). 
 
1.1.3 Climatic change 
 Global warming and climatic change is taking place in Himalayas like in the rest of the 
world. The climate change has led to more extreme weather, change in precipitation patterns 
and higher frequency of climate related natural disasters (IPCC 1997). In the Himalayas, 
temperature rise has also been recorded for high altitude sites in Nepal (Shresta et al. 1999 (in 
Vetaas 2002)).  
Introduction 
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The glaciers of the Himalayas make up the largest amount of snow and ice outside the 
polar ice caps. The Himalayas is the source of some of the world’s largest rivers like Ganges, 
Brahmaputra, Indus and Yangtze. A substantial part of the water in these rivers is melt water 
from glaciers. The glaciers in the Himalayas have been shrinking since the end of the Little 
Ice Age, a climatic recession that lasted from 1350 AD to 1850, with the glaciers reaching 
maxium in 1850 (Mayewski & Jeschke 1979 (in Vetaas 2002)). Since the 1970ies, the pace of 
the retreat has increased, and according to the Working Group on Himalayan Glaciology, the 
glaciers in the Himalayas may disappear during the next 30 years (Hasnain 1999 (in Vetaas 
2002)). A report from The International Commission on Snow and Ice (ICSI) supports this 
prognosis; it states that the glaciers in the Himalayas are disappearing faster than anywhere 
else in the world (Vetaas 2002).  
This prognosis has been heavily criticised by other researchers, some predicting 
growing glaciers due to increased precipitation (Bush 2000 in (Vetaas 2002)). The 
development of the glaciers and its connection with positive and negative feedback 
mechanism to the climate and vegetation are uncertain and difficult to model and predict. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC) has predicted that the Himalayas in 
general will get higher annual mean temperatures, more annual precipitation, increased 
monsoon rainfall and shrinking areas under snow, ice and permafrost (Chalise 1994 (in 
Banskota et al. 2000)). 
The precipitation over the Himalayas is very unevenly distributed. The monsoon effect 
decreases to the West, and some regions are also situated in the rain shadow of the greater 
ranges and massifs, and are therefore less affected by the monsoon. Trans-Himalaya, the 
region situated north of the highest peaks, is semi-arid or cold desert. The same is true for the 
Tibetan plateau.  
Recent reports indicate that in dry areas, high mountain farming is experiencing an 
increasingly dry environment (Chalise 1994 (in Banskota et al. 2000)). This is probably 
related to less snow in wintertime and retreating glaciers (ibid). As a result, the livelihood 
conditions get harsher in many places and people are migrating out from the mountain valleys 
and down to urban areas (Banskota et al. 2000). However, due to lack of research, there are 
great uncertainties regarding the change in precipitation patterns in the high mountain regions 
of the Himalaya. And there is still uncertainty with regard to the relation between the amount 
of water in streams and snowmelting, meltwater from glaciers and groundwater. 
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1.2 Selection of study area and research topic 
I have chosen to study water management in the two villages of Manang and Ngawal in 
Upper Manang. Upper Manang is semi-arid and has an average altitude of the cultivated land 
at about 3500 m a.s.l. Agriculture and survival have therefore traditionally been precarious. 
Historically, water has probably been the most important single component in securing a good 
harvest (Rogers 2004). With so much depending on the availability of water, the villagers 
have tried to reduce uncertainty through different strategies. One of the objectives of this 
thesis is to investigate these strategies. 
A pilot study carried out by a research team from the University in Bergen in 2000 
found that the agriculture in Upper Manang was heavily dependent on glacial melt water 
(Vetaas 2002). To have a closer look at this assumption is also one of the aims of this thesis. 
The task of securing the water supply is influenced by changes and events outside the 
water system itself. I have chosen to focus on migration, new technology and climatic change. 
These factors alter the conditions for the water supply, make old strategies and options 
irrelevant at the same time as new opportunities arrive. Out-migration makes maintenance and 
construction of irrigation canals and pipelines more difficult, and previous reports suggest that 
the irrigation system deteriorates due to lack of labour (van Spengen 1987). Similarly, plastic 
pipes have during the last 20 years reduced the need for labour for securing irrigation. But the 
farmers experience a drier climate. There have now been several winters with little amounts 
of snow, which gives low snow melting in the spring and early summer, and again creates a 
problematic water situation even in the village that recently had improved its water supply 
with new pipelines.  
During my fieldwork I found out that when there is not enough water in the irrigation 
canals and pipelines, praying and religious rituals for water remain a rational option for the 
villagers. In one of the villages, introduction of pipes has created a much more stable water 
supply, which has lessened the labour-burden especially on women, and made people less 
concerned with prayers and rituals for water. In the village without pipelines, lack of rain 
remains critical, and rituals and prayers for water are more frequently performed in this 
village than in the village supplied with piped water. In order to have a broad approach to the 
study of which factors that influence on the ability for the two communities’ ability to sustain 
their water needs, I also have to include the importance of religion and rituals in the analysis. 
With the term water supply I mean the actual supply of water to the villages, while the 
term water system refer to all physical and social structures involved in supplying the water to 
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the villages. The water system consists of the irrigation system and the drinking water system. 
The irrigation system consists of irrigation canals, pipelines and tanks, as well as rules and 
conventions for maintenance and rights to use the water. The irrigation system is managed as 
a common, and a central question for this thesis is how its users are able to manage this 
system without facing breakdown of infrastructure and non-abeyance to the water-sharing 
rules. This task also includes investigating the actors’ ability to undertake collective action in 
order to meet the challenges faced by their water supply.  
The research topics and objectives of this thesis can be formulated as a set of research 
questions: 
 
 Main research question: 
 How do the villagers in Manang and Ngawal sustain their water needs in a context of 
migration, climatic change and technological change? 
 
Sub questions: 
1) What are the social and physical characteristics of the water systems?  
2) How do migration, climatic change and technological change affect the 
management of the water systems?  
3) How do religion and culture affect the management of the water systems? 
 
 
As mentioned, I choose two different villages as cases for my study, because I had the 
hypothesis that their water supply situation was different. I therefore wanted to find out what 
factors that eventually lay behind those differences. This can be formulated as a 
methodological, comparative question: 
 
4) Which factors can explain the differences between how Ngawal and Manang 
sustain their water supply? 
 
This question serves to highlight the factors and processes influencing the ability for the 
inhabitants in the two villages to sustain the water supply. 
 The next chapter introduces the theoretical approaches used to inform the empirical 
findings from the field study. 
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1.3 Developing a theoretical platform 
In the villages in Upper Manang, water for irrigation as well as natural resources like forests 
and pastures are managed as commons. Studies of commons inevitably give associations to 
Garret Hardin’s article “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968), which describes how over-use and 
deterioration is the result when several users have free access to a limited resource. “The 
Tragedy of the Commons” has become a powerful narrative, and has coloured research on 
commons since it was published in 1968. Together with other classical models from game 
theory and institutional economics, like the “Prisoners Dilemma” and the “Free-rider 
problem”, it gained huge influence on policies for natural resource management (Ostrom 
1990, 1994; Edwards & Stein 1999).  
The dominance of The Tragedy narrative stirred a massive research effort on self-
governed commons, and a huge pile of successful cases was displayed. These were followed 
by a development of theoretical frameworks for self-organised commons management, like 
Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990) and Balland & Platteu (1996), which is called the Common Pool 
Resource approach (CPR approach) to natural resource management. The CPR approach 
discusses which factors and conditions that enable users to take collective action for a 
sustainable use of a CPR, as well as presenting principles for sustainable management 
institutions of CPRs. I have found the CPR approach useful for analysing the management of 
water systems in Upper Manang, and have chosen to use Ostrom’s framework (1990) for the 
analysis of the water management system in Manang and Ngawal. I chose to use Ostrom’s 
framework because it seemed to be the most comprehensive approach, and the most 
influential one according to related literature (Edwards & Stein 1999, Steins et al. 2000, 
Agrawal 2001, Pedersen 2002) 
 But my research questions also deal with how processes of social change affect the 
ability of villagers to sustain their water supply. In order to discuss this aspect and for 
analysing the importance of the contextual changes mentioned, Ostrom’s framework does not 
suffice. The CPR theories are founded on new-institutional economics and rational choice 
theory, which are criticised for giving little emphasis on social and cultural matters (Agrawal 
2001; Edwars & Stein 1999, 2000; Mehta et al. 1999; Cleaver 1999, 2000) and on non-local 
contextual factors (Agrawal 2001, Steins et al. 2000).  
Irrigation is a way for humans to adapt to the environment, and from this perspective 
this study can be said to be one of human ecology.  Human ecology can be defined as the 
study of: “The role of physical environmental factors in shaping, limiting or determining 
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various forms of group shaped behaviour and the regularities which lie behind them” (Berry 
1976, 10 (in Coward 1986)). The aim is to avoid viewing social processes as independent 
from the physical setting in which they occur.  
I find the CPR approach useful for analysing water system management, but in order 
to extend the analysis to cover how social and physical changes affect the communities’ 
ability to sustain their water supply, I found it necessary to include concepts from an 
ontological foundation different from the rational choice logic and methodological 
individualism underlying the CPR approach. I have chosen to apply local dialectics (Aase 
1998), which can hopefully clarify how changes in praxis, institutions and culture are 
interrelated trough a dialectic process (ibid). I will apply the concepts from local dialectics 
when discussing how contextual changes influence on the two selected communities’ ability 
to maintain their water supply. 
These theories will not be applied uncritically to the empirical material; rather, their 
validity for my purpose will be tested. Thus, two theoretical research problems can be 
formulated in addition to the empirical ones: 
 
Theoretical Research Questions 
1) Is CPR theory in general, with emphasis on E. Ostrom framework (1990), suited for 
analysing the management of water systems in Manang and Ngawal? 
2) Is it useful to apply the concept from local dialectics (Aase 1998) to study the effects of 
contextual changes on the water supply situation in Manang and Ngawal?  
Introduction 
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Pic. 1.1: Farm house in Manang village. Annapurna II (7937) in the background.
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2 The study area - Upper Manang and its people 
 
This chapter introduces the geographical setting of the study area and the people who inhabits 
it. The history of the people of Upper Manang and especially the development in the latter 
half of the 20th century has great importance for the research topic of this study. This 
especially concerns the contextual changes underlying the out- and return migration in the 
area, the importance of the international trade in Upper Manang, and then the rise of Upper 
Manang as a tourist destination. 
 
2.1 Geographical setting 
North of the high mountain ranges of Annapurna, where the vast highland of Tibet begins, is 
the upper part of the Manang District (see map 2.1 and map 2.2). It is a highly mountainous 
area, with only one valley of arable land and settlements, the Marsyangdi Valley. The 
elevation of the area extends up to the peak of Annapurna 1 at 8055 m a.s.l., and the 
settlements are situated on altitudes between 3200 and 3800 m a.s.l. 
The Manang District can be divided into three areas: Lower Manang, which consists 
of the lower Marsyangdi Valley and its branches; the Nar-Phu area, which consists of the Nar 
and Phu valleys; and Upper Manang, which also is called Nyesheng, which is the northern 
Marsyangdi Valley and its tributaries.  
Upper Manang can also be defined in respect of climate, because it differs 
significantly from the lower part of the district. Where Lower Manang ends, and Upper 
Manang begins, the Marsyangdi Valley makes a turn westwards, north of the Annapurna 
Range. The major cloud systems are coming from the South or West, and Upper Manang is 
therefore in the rainshadow of the Annapurna Range. The area receives little rainfall, and can 
be characterized as semi arid. 
 Upper Manang can also be defined through access. Until the sixties, the trail down 
along the Marsyangdi had some exposed and difficult sections in gorges. This made the use of 
pack-animals impossible. The monsoon regularly swept away the trail, and left the Upper 
Manang isolated from the South, with exceptions from the Kang La pass to the neighbouring 
Nar valley at 5321 m a.s.l. 
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Map 2.2: Upper Manang 
Map 2.1: Manang and surrounding districts
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Due to the altitude and the dry climatic condition, vegetation is steppe-like, but varies 
considerably with altitude, sun exposure and microclimatic conditions. Pine is the dominant 
tree, and there are some stands of birch. Birch make out the timber line at about 3900 m a.s.l 
at north facing slopes, and at 4500 m a.s.l. at the south facing slopes. Juniper is common in all 
altitudes up to 4500 m a.s.l. 
 
2.2 The peoples of Upper Manang 
Upper Manang can also be defined by the people who inhabit it. They are called Nyeshengba 
or Manangba. Manangba is the term used by other ethnic groups in Nepal, while Tibetans 
refer to people from Manang as Nyeshengba. Hereafter, I will term people from Upper 
Manang as Nyeshengba, and people from the village of Manang as Manangis. The seven 
villages in Upper Manang are all inhabited by Nyeshengba. The villages of Upper Manang 
are Manang, Tenki Manang, Brakha, Humde, Gyarhu, Ngawal and Pisang. Tenki Manang and 
Humde are inhabited by people from Manang village. Manang, Brakha and Ngawal are the 
oldest villages in Upper Manang. These settlements have probably evolved around Buddhist 
monasteries. Manang is probably a resettlement of an older site, Bodzo, where the most 
important monastry in Upper Manang still is situated. The establishment of the early 
monasteries is surrouned by myths, but they were probably established in the 15th century 
(van Spengen 1987). 
 The border between Nepal and Tibet does not follow the Trans-Himalayan range. 
There are a number of valleys stretching north from the greater massifs and into the Tibetan 
plateau, with high mountain passes. These valleys have therefore been inhabited from the 
north and came to belong to Tibet culturally and, at some point in history, also nationally. In 
some way this is also true for Upper Manang. It has no easy entry into Tibet, but it still 
belongs culturally to Tibet.  
According to what Manangi informants say, they came from a place not far from 
Lhasa in Tibet to Upper Manang 300- 400 years ago. At that time, the area had already been 
inhabited for a long time, by other groups of people from Tibet. According to Jackson (in van 
Spengen 1987), it is likely that the first settlements of Nyesheng date back to the 7th century, 
looking to what is known of the earliest settlements of neighboring Mustang and the 
migration of the Gurungs from Tibet southwards. The first known settlement by a Tibetan 
group, the Gurungs, took place in the 12th century, and they moved in from Tibet via the Nar-
Phu valleys (ibid). In 14th century, Ghale clans moved in from Tibet and settled in the Nar-
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Phu valleys, and from there into the upper Marsyangdi valley. The Ghales established a 
kingdom in Ngawal, and after a while the Gurungs and the Ghales mixed (ibid). Then in the 
16th or 17th century the Nyeshengba migrated into the area, and they probably gradually mixed 
with the Gurung and Ghale population, according to Manangi informants.  
 
2.2.1 Etnicity and Religion 
Most Nyeshengba today prefer to call themselves Gurung or Ghale, and many also claim to 
belong to the Gurung ethnic group. On the other hand, they also claim to be an ethnic group 
on their own. However, the Gurungs do not recognize Nyeshengba as Gurungs. Neither do 
other Nepalis (Aase 2002). So it is difficult to find the indicators that define the Nyeshengba 
as an ethnic group. Perhaps the most important indicator they have, their own language. It has 
been classified as belonging to the Tibeto-Burman family of Sino-Tibetan languages 
(Mazaudon 1978 (in Rogers 2004)), and is a mix between Tibetan and Gurung language.  
The Nyeshengba practice Tibetan Buddhism. Buddhism came to upper Manang with 
the Ghales in the 15th century, but coexisted with the animistic Bon religion up to present 
time. The Bon religion is an animistic religion that worships spirits in nature. Bon 
worshippers have traditionally practiced blood sacrifices. According to the Lama in Manang, 
there are black and white bon. Black bon is the direction that practices blood sacrifice, and 
this is not welcomed by Buddhists. White bon does not practice blood sacrifice and can very 
well coexist with Buddhism. According to the lama, no one has practiced black Bon in 
Manang for 20-30 years. Religion has always had a very important part on life in Upper 
Manang. The days are filled with different rituals and prayers. 
The Nyeshengba have their own hierarchical system. The highest-ranking families are 
those who can trace their lines back to Ghale clansmen. Secondly come the Gurungs. Further 
down are people that more recently have immigrated from Tibet, and at the bottom is the 
blacksmith caste. The younger informants in Manang claim that this caste system is 
dissolving, and everybody seem to agree that today, wealth is the most important contributor 
to social status. This is also mentioned by van Spengen (1987). Parents want their children to 
marry other Nyeshengba, of Gurung or Ghale descent. Several younger Nyeshengba I have 
met had married Tibetans, but in all instances that had happened against the will of their 
parents, they said.  
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2.2.2 Traditional livelihood strategies 
The people in Upper Manang have traditionally relied on farming and trade to sustain their 
living. In the relatively harsh climatic condition in Upper Manang it has never been possible 
to sustain a living for a whole year from what can be harvested on the farms. Traditionally, 
labour is the critical input factor in high mountain agriculture, but in the semi-arid Upper 
Manang lack of irrigation has probably been the major obstacle to agricultural productivity 
(Rogers 2004 and local informants).  Even when the arable land around the villages was fully 
exploited and hired non-local labour were used in parts of the season; farming activities has 
only been able to sustain the communities for approximately eight months during the year. 
Different strategies to cope with this situation were adopted. Trade and seasonal migration in 
wintertime were common, as it still is. Strategies to keep the population growth under control 
were also adapted. According to informants in Manang and Ngawal, until thirty years ago, an 
average couple would have about ten children. It was customary that the oldest son should 
leave the village when he became 16 years old and seek success in business outside the 
valley. The second eldest was sent to a monastery to become a monk. If most of the children 
were daughters, one of them could also be sent away to a monastery to become a nun. When 
these children were removed from the household, there were fewer mouths to feed. Also if the 
children who were sent to monasteries became monks and nuns, they would rarely move back 
to the village, get married and have their own family. Population growth was also reduced in 
more macabre ways.  Until the sixties, twelve young women were killed as a sacrifice every 
third year. Aase (unpublished) writes that this tradition, irrespective of its cruelty, had a 
demographic function.  
The food supply was dramatically improved by the opening of a new trail along the 
Marsyangdi River between Chame and Bratang in Lower Manang in the late sixties. Before 
this new trail was blasted out of the cliffs in the river gorge, the trail was so difficult that 
horses could not go to Upper Manang, and during the monsoon the trail could be totally 
damaged by landslides, leaving Upper Manang isolated from the south. When the new trail 
was finished, it meant that mule caravans could reach the villages of Upper Manang (Rogers 
2004, local informants). Then rice emerged as the staple food in Upper Manang, according to 
Manangi informants. The new trail, as well as other remarkable development achievements 
were to a large extent the accomplishment of one man from Manang that represented the 
Manang District in the National Parliament in the seventies. According to Manangi 
informants, it is thanks to him that Manang has become a tourist destination. It was 
supposedly his achievement that the airstrip in Humde was established, which dramatically  
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reduced the isolation of Upper Manang. And almost more remarkably he persuaded the 
villagers in Upper Manang to give up their weapons. In the seventies, Upper Manang used to 
be full of guns, and was a place not welcoming to outsiders. After the Chinese invasion of 
Tibet in 1959, the Khampa rebels who fought the Chinese occupants took hideout in Upper 
Manang and other places nearby the border. They were also terrorizing the native population, 
and therefore the Nyeshengba armed themselves. After the Khampa resistence ended in 1975, 
the Nyesengba still kept their guns. Rival gangs were fighting, and the first trekkers who 
arrived were kidnapped and ransomed (Stevenson 1997). The situation was not very 
welcoming for outsiders. This was the situation when the Parliament member persuaded the 
villagers to voluntarily hand over their guns to the Royal Nepal Army.  
With the population unarmed, eased access due to the new trail and the airstrip, things 
were prepared for the rise of Upper Manang as the tourist trekking destination it has become 
today. But there are more factors behind this development, most notably the remarkable 
history about the traders from Upper Manang. 
  
2.2.3 The Nyesheng traders 
Trade has always been a livelihood strategy among the peoples living in the Trans-Himalaya, 
due to the marginal farming output. But the Nyesheng traders have over time become among 
the most successful businessmen in Nepal. Here follows a short version of the history of the 
Nyesheng trading tradition: Traditionally, Nyeshengbas used to move down from Upper 
Manang when the winter arrive. In earlier centuries, they brought herbs, gems and scented 
Pic. 2.1: Traditional 
agriculture in Upper 
Manang: The man 
uses the plow while 
the women goes 
behind and set 
potatoes 
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glands from musk deer from Manang and Tibet down to the hills and the Terai, and brought 
grain and household necessities back.  
 Due to some reasons that are still not known, the raja of Lamjung granted the 
Nyeshengbas special trading privileges in 1784 (van Spengen 1987). The privileges granted 
the Nyeshengba traders right to bring their stocks freely over the border. These trading 
privileges were confirmed and continued by later kings and courts until 1976, when they lost 
their custom privileges.  
 The Nyeshengba traders were enterprising, and from small trade in gems and herbs on 
the Ganges planes of India in the late 19th century, they soon spread their trading activities 
through all bigger cities in the South East Asia. The King Mahendra of Nepal granted 
passport to the Nyeshengbas in 1962 and extended their duty free trade privileges (van 
Spengen 1987). In the seventies, the Nyeshengba traders started to invest their accumulated 
trade profit in Kathmandu. They built or bought themselves homes in the city, and started to 
run cafes and hotels. It was in the Thamel area of Katmandu that most Nyeshengbas preferred 
to settle at that time (Aase 2002). Due to their special passport privileges, the Nyeshengbas 
used to be the only Nepali ethnic group who regularly traveled abroad. So when Nepal 
became popular among Western tourists, the Nyeshengbas knew exactly how to make cafés 
and hotels with an international atmosphere where the tourist felt at home.  
The global connections of the Nyeshengba traders had consequences for life in the 
villages of Upper Manang. The traders brought home impulses and items from abroad, like 
kitchen equipment and fancy clothing. They also brought money, and in Upper Manang, 
prices were set by local conditions, and had little to do with the prices in the rest of Nepal 
(Rogers 2004). The Nyshengba require wages that are far higher than in rest of Nepal, and 
they therefore do not bother to do work that hired labour can do at a cheaper rate, like 
portering and construction.  
From the late sixties and until the beginning of the nineties, there was a steady out-
migration from the villages of Upper Manang to Kathmandu and Pokhara. There became a 
growing Nyesheng community in Kathmandu, due to the business opportunities there. 
Similarly, land and houses were abandoned in Upper Manang. van Spengen (1987) described 
communities that have problems to sustain the traditional agriculture, with deteriorating 
irrigation canals, terraced fields and houses. Similarly, the increased income among many of 
the farmers in Upper Manang made it possible to employ more labourers from Lamjung and 
Gorkha, as well as consuming imported food like rice. The dependency from farming 
activities undertaken by Nyeshengbas themselves decreased. Some of the abandoned farms 
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were taken over by immigrants from the near-by valleys in Nar-Phu and Dolpo. The 
immigrants are not allowed to buy the land or the houses, but have to rent it from the native 
owners who typically reside in in Kathmandu or Pokhara. 
 
2.2.4 The emergence of Upper Manang as a tourist destination 
In the mid- nineties, the net out-migration in Manang and most of the villages in Upper 
Manang seemed to decrease, and some villages, most notably Manang, experienced a return-
migration that increased the number of people living in the village. The 2001 population in 
Upper Manang was 2284 according to Nepal Government Census, while it was 1846 in 1991 
(Rogers 2004) There are two major reasons for the return-migration: The first is that most of 
the countries in South East Asia impose strict visa regulations on Nepali travelers, thereby 
making the opportunities for international trade difficult for the Nyeshengba businessmen. 
The second reason was the increased business opportunities in Upper Manang. The Nepali 
Governent opened up Upper Manang for tourists in 1979, and Manang slowly started to 
attract tourists, who mainly went for the Annapurna Circuit trek. In 1994, the Annapurna 
Conservation Area Project (ACAP) was launched, which among other things supported the 
development of environment friendly tourism. Nyeshengba settled in Kathmandu saw the 
increasingly difficult situation for international trade, and the increasing numbers of trekkers 
visiting Upper Manang. And many of them moved home to their village in Upper Manang 
and built hotels, trekker supplier shops or just tea shops. Funding was arranged through an 
already long time existing financial network within the Nyeshengba community (Rogers 
2004). A tourism agency, Destination Manang, has been established, which promotes Upper 
Manang as a tourist destination. The return-migration and growth in tourism related activity 
have been greatest in the villages along the main trail, as Pisang, Humde and Manang.  
 These patterns of migration that are described in the three last sections, affect the 
communities both socially and physically and alter the villager’s ability to sustain their water 
supply. These processes I examines more thoroughly in section 7.2.3 by concepts and 
methods from local dialectics.   
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2.3 Governance 
The State of Nepal has four administrative levels: Development regions, zones, districts and 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) or municipalities. The VDC means both the area 
governed by the VDC, as well as the committee itself. The VDC is the smallest administrative 
unit in the Nepali state. The VDC is elected and consists of a chairman, a vice chairman and 
elected representatives whose number depends on the size of the VDC.  
Due to the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, there has not been held local elections since 
the last period expired. In Manang, the VDC is therefore headed by an appointed group of 
five persons. The area occupied by the village of Manang is divided between two VDCs, 
Manang VDC and Tenki Manang VDC. Because of the postponed elections, the VDCs are 
joined together and the VDC chairmen are not formally elected. The current chairmen were 
appointed during a village meeting, called the Panch Chong. For all kinds of matters of 
importance for the community, the men of the village gather in Panch Chong. This regards all 
kinds of natural resource management or thing regarding the governance of the VDC, like for 
instance change of irrigation rules or punishment of serious poaching. These meetings are 
held on an ad hoc basis and not on a regular basis. Due to tradition, seniority and clan 
relations give the highest influence to the participants on these meetings.  These meetings are 
also a part of what the Manangis call the manange parampara, or just parampara, the nepali 
word for traditions. Parampara governs for instance most of the schedule in the agriculture, 
like what time the farmers shall do the harvest and what time the cattles can be taken down 
from the pastures.   
The VDC is the most important formal institution regarding governance. It works as 
an inheritor of the traditional governing system of the Nyeshengbas. This system followed the 
parampara, and at that time a headman called Khamba governed the village. The Khamba 
had a vice chief called Lensing and advisors called Falasing. The Khamba was appointed by 
the villagers on the basis of seniority, for one year at the time. The Falasing had a more 
permanent position and could sit for a long time if he did a good job. Informants in Manang 
said that the VDC system could be compared to the traditional system, with the chairman as 
the Khamba, and the Vice Chairman as the Falasing. But the VDC system is better, they said, 
because now they could elect a chairman by skills and not age.  
 My impression was that village men who had been successful in business got a high 
influence in the village when they returned, even if they had been absent from the village 
most of their grown up life. All of these had started a lodge, café or trekker shop. 
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The VDC receives a small sum of money from the government for different kind of 
development work. Schools, healthpost and other services are not the responsibility of the 
VDC, but are the responsibility of different Governmental Offices represented at the district 
level. If the villagers want any action from the government, they do it through the VDC.  
 
2.3.1 The Annapurna Conservation Area Project 
In 1997, the Manang District became part of the Annapurna Conservation Area Project 
(ACAP). ACAP is an alternative to the national park model for nature conservation and its 
goal is to conserve nature and promote rural development at the same time through education 
and training of the inhabitants of the ACA. Instead of using national park rangers, ACAP 
trains village committees in nature conservation. ACAP has introduced solar heated showers 
to the hotels, as well as kerosene- and propan stoves to both hotels and teashops, to decrease 
the use of firewood. ACAP works through several village level committees that they establish 
themselves. These committees are: The forest management committee which manage the 
forest of the village; the mother group consisting of village women, which work with social 
issues; and the village conservation and development committee (VCDC), supposed to be the 
most important one, which is the link between ACAP and the village population. If something 
does not work well in a village, the VCDC may request assistance from ACAP.   
 Local people have diverging opinions of ACAP. They see that ACAP contributes to 
the communities in some ways. On the other hand, people do not care about the regulation on 
natural resource management that ACAP is trying to impose. One informant told me that 
“ACAP is just like the old system of Manang, we also used to conserve forest and wildlife” 
(Manangi farmer and lodge owner). In Manang and to a greater extent in Ngawal, many of the 
informants were very disappointed with ACAP, because they had believed that ACAP was 
supposed to provide more development facilities than it was actually doing at the time. 
 
 
2.4 Farming system and irrigation in Upper Manang 
Agriculture is the dominant occupation in Upper Manang, and most households rely heavily 
on subsistence farming. The farming system is low-intensity and paleotechnological, 
according to Turner & Brush’ classification system (1987); with little interaction with markets 
and low input of technology and green revolution components like fertilizers, pesticides and 
high-yielding varieties of grains. A farming system is “any level of units engaged in 
agricultural production as it is wedded in social, political, economic and environmental 
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contexts” (Turner & Brush 1987, 13). A farming system then can be said to consist of several 
sub-systems. According to Ruthenberg (1971), each must be examined in order to analyse the 
farming system as a whole. An irrigation system is also a sub-system of a farming system, and 
is what I will present more thoroughly later in the thesis.  
The conditions for agriculture in Upper Manang are probably among the most difficult 
in the world. Manang District has the highest proportions of steep slopes in the country of 
Nepal, the lowest proportion of cultivated land and the lowest amount of cultivated land per 
person (Zurick & Karan 1999 (in Rogers 2004)). Due to the rain shadow, the climate is dry, 
and irrigation is necessary to secure the harvest. There exists no precipitation data for Upper 
Manang, but the annual rainfall is probably around 300 mm, with 50 to 100 mm deviation 
(van Spengen 1987). The farming season lasts from the beginning of April to the beginning of 
October. 
The fields are situated on terraces and alluvial fans, all south-facing or situated on the 
riverbank of the Marsyangdi River, and all are situated around the villages.  Due to the 
altitude, there are no fields at places where there is little sun, and therefore there are no fields 
on north-facing slopes. Further is access to irrigation an important factor regarding the 
location of the fields.  
 In Manang, most households have between 6 and 15 plots of land, while the number is 
slightly lower in Ngawal. There exists no terminology to describe the size of the plots, but   
they tend to be quite similar in size. The land is managed in terms of ownership or rent. The 
land management follows the parampara. Only people from the village may own land, and it 
is therefore not allowed to sell land to someone from outside the village. There is a huge 
surplus of fields due to the out-migration in the past, and many households are share croppers, 
paying a share of the harvest to the out-migrated land owners. The size of this share is 
normally one third of the harvest. Share croppers are mostly immigrants, who are not allowed 
to own land.  
 The most important cultivated species are wheat (shou), buckwheat (kepra), barley 
(kahru) and potatoes (alo). Besides from this, most farmers cultivate a wide selection of 
vegetables. Due to the climate, the farmers can only harvest once a year. Nowadays, rice has 
become the most important food item, together with wheat, buckwheat and potatoes. Barley, 
wheat and buckwheat are the dominating grains used for making tsampa porridge, beer 
(shying) and animal fodder. In Manang some farmers are also able to sell a little surplus of 
buckwheat to purchasers in Kathmandu. In Ngawal barley also has a strong position, but the 
cultivation has declined, as some Ngawali informants said, because compared to wheat it 
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gives less production per unit of land and is more difficult to harvest. Potatoes have become 
more popular the last ten years due to demand from tourism. Potatoes are also popular 
because they require little water and can be grown in lower quality soil. 
In Manang most households keep cows and goats, but not all households keep oxes. An 
important reason for keeping goats and cows is the manure. Besides from that, goats are 
primarily kept for trading purposes and secondarily for meat. In Ngawal, only a few 
households have goats. Cows are only milked in the autumn. In Manang, all the households 
have at least one horse, and in many households all except the smallest children have their 
own horse. In Ngawal there are some households without horses. Many households in 
Manang and Ngawal also have yaks. People who own many yaks are referred to as rich.  
All the animals are kept down in the valley from the last fields have been harvested in 
September until the sowing starts in the beginning of May. Owners of domestic animals that 
are found in the fields during this time will be fined.  
 
2.4.1 Irrigation in Upper Manang 
According to Coward, irrigated agriculture can be defined as:  
 
A landscape to which is added physical structures that impound, divert, channel or 
otherwise move water from source to some desired location. These structures are 
operated cooperatively for the purpose of producing food or fiber (Coward 1980, 18).  
  
The type of irrigation found in Upper Manang is surface irrigation (see pic. 2.2). The 
irrigation canals are leading water from nearby streams. The canals mostly consist of just a 
ditch in the soil, but in Manang, open irrigation canals have to a large extent been replaced by 
plastic pipes. In Ngawal there are almost no pipes, but some of the canals are reinforced by 
concrete. In Ngawal, hollowed out tree trunks, called wooden pipes by the English speaking 
informants, are also used as canals a few places. 
The farmers divert water from the nearest canal to their fields by using a shovel. The 
fields are prepared with a pattern of deep furs that they divert the water into. It is the women’s 
job to irrigate. But if the household has few women, the men will also do this job. In Manang 
all cultivated fields are irrigated, but in Ngawal there are still a few cultivated plots that are 
not irrigated. These are rented by immigrants.  
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The District Agriculture Office (DAO) is trying to introduce sprinkler irrigation, and in 
Manang, this kind of irrigation is quite widespread for vegetable fields. The farmers say that 
they have supplied the sprinklers themselves, not the DAO.  
 
 
 
2.5 Manang village 
Manang village is the largest village in Upper Manang, and has for long been the central 
village in Upper Manang. It is situated on a terrace above the Marsyangdi River (see map 
5.1). Manang village consist of an old part containing approximately 500 houses/farms, of 
which approximately 200 are abandoned, according to the local informants. Additionally, the 
village has gotten a new part consisting of lodges, restaurants and trekkers shops. 
 Most of the inhabitans of Manang village are native Manangis, but there are some 
Tibetan, Dolpo and Nar-Phu households. The latter two are also groups of Tibetan origin 
living in the Dolpo region north of the Daulaghiri Mountain range, and from Nar-Phu valleys 
that are neighbouring valleys to the Manang valley (see map 2.2). According to my survey, 
only one of 32 respondents asked was not native. There are many young men in the village. 
The accurate number of inhabitants is difficult to measure. The number given in official 
Nepali censuses is highly questionable. When people in Manang told the census 
Pic 2.2: Two Ngawali women are irrigating 
their field by diverting water from a canal 
into furrows. 
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Table 2.1: Population of Manang (also inclusive the Tenki, Humde and Julu 
settlements)  
 
Year 1979 1991 2001 
Population 1810 698 920 
1979 Data from village government record reffered by Cooke (1985, 186) (in Rogers 2004), assuming 
five persons pr household. 1991 data from the Nepal Governement cencus. 2001 data from Nepal 
Government data referred by Rogers (1994, 16), assuming four persons per household. 
 
officials about how many people they have in their household, they tend to include family 
members living outside the district. Most of the villagers are also migrating down to 
Katmandu or Pokhara in the winter, and some are only staying in Manang during the peak of 
the trekker season. In 1981 when van Spengen visited the village, he found that men between 
15 and 45 were absent due to trade and replaced by hired labour from the Lamjung and 
Pic. 2.3: Manang village from 
North West. 
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Gorkha districts (van Spengen 1987). This picture does not fit anymore. Nowadays, there are 
almost as many men as women in Manang, and my survey did not tell of a very high number 
of men living outside the village. In the households asked, 16 percent of the male household 
members were living outside the village, and six percent of the female. Manang has probably 
had the largest return-migration of the villages in Upper Manang, according to ACAP 
officials. In 1994, the ACAP official told, 13 families resettled in Manang, and in the 
following year there were several families moving back each year, but not in such high 
number as in 1994. But until 15-20 years ago people moved out every year, another informant 
told. There was a regular boom in the tourism business in the mid-nineties. Where there had 
only been a couple of simple lodges, there suddenly rose 13 lodges the next ten years. Today 
there are 17 lodges in Manang. The advantages of living in Manang compared to Kathmandu 
or Pokhara was first of all the cost of living, according to the local informants. In Manang 
there was no house rent, the food is much cheaper and they like the life in Manang. As an 
young informant told: “Even if you do not have any money, you can still have a good life in 
Manang as long as you work a bit on your family farm” (Manangi farm boy). All the hotel- 
and trekker shop owners had until they build their hotels been living outside Manang, many of 
them had not been living in Manang since childhood. 
All the big lodges have workers from other districts, mostly Ghorka and Lamjung. 
These workers do normally work at the lodges in the peak season, and go back to their home 
in summer time and winter times. I rarely saw any of these people working in the fields.  
Nevertheless are the Manangi farmers dependent on these seasonal workers during the 
harvest.  All the native population of Manang is engaged in farming activities in one way or 
another. Nearly all the households have their own fields and undertake subsistence 
agriculture. In Manang, a huge proportion of the households have one or more members 
engaged in non-farming activities, like having a lodge, a restaurant or a trekkers shop. But I 
also saw lodge-owners going behind the oxes ploughing the fields.  
 
 
2.6 Ngawal 
Ngawal is one of the oldest settlements in Upper Manang. It is situated on a terrace on the 
south facing side of the valley, approximately 250 meter higher than the valley floor, at an 
altitude of 3700 meter above sea level (see map 5.4). It consists of nearly 100 houses/farms, 
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of which approximately 50 are inhabited (When I was trying to map this, people said numbers 
between 70 and 40, most people saying around 50).  
 
Table 2.2 Population of Ngawal and Gyarhu 
 
Year 1979 1991 2001 
Population - 306 383 
1979 Data from village government record referred by Cooke (1985, 186) (in Rogers 2004), assuming 
five persons pr household. 1991 data is from the Nepal Government census. 2001 data is from Nepal 
Government data refered by Rogers (1994, 16), assuming four persons pr household.  
 
Ngawal have faced significant immigration from the Nar-Phu valley, and four of 26 people 
asked in my survey were from this place (all the respondents came from different 
households). The immigrants do not own the houses they live in and the fields they cultivate, 
they have to rent it from native Ngawalis who live in Kathmandu or Pokhara. One thing that 
struck me in Ngawal is how many more girls and women than men there are when I looked 
around. According to the survey (see table 5.4), it is also a bit fewer men than in Manang. Of 
the households asked, 21 % of the men were out of the village. But based on what I observed, 
it is likely to believe this number to be much higher. Particularly men between 20 and 40 year 
of age seemed to be short in number in Ngawal, and some of the households I was visiting 
consisted of only women. Informants in Ngawal also said the same; that most of the men are 
out of the village. This also fits with van Spengen’s observations from over 20 years ago 
(1987). Then the question arises if Ngawal is experiencing lack of labour. According to one 
informant, the Ngawalis used to cultivate mustard. Nowadays only a few do this, because they 
do not have a mill for pressing the mustard seeds. The mill was operated by manpower. Today 
there is not enough labour to operate the mill. 
The pattern with decreased business opportunities internationally and increased business 
opportunities at home that is found in Manang is also marked in Ngawal, but to a less extent. 
Ngawal is off the main tourist route, and has therefore not experienced the same boom in 
tourist lodging as Manang. In the peak trekkers season Ngawal also get quite a lot of visits 
from trekkers, but far less than the villages down in the valley. There are about eight lodges in 
Ngawal, a couple of restaurants and tea shops. None of these have the same standard as the 
Manang lodges. The absence of quite wealthy entrepreneurial lodge owners in Ngawal 
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 makes a remarkable difference from Manang. According to what one informant said: “(…) 
the successful have left Ngawal, just women and the poor are left” (Ngawali farmer).  
It was also more widespread to see children working than in Manang. The schoolteachers 
said that the number of students who actually showed up at school was between six to ten, but 
that it was supposed to be over 20. In Manang on the other hand, the number of students was 
approximately 130. According to the teachers in Ngawal and some informants, many parents 
did not see the point in sending their children too school, because the parents themselves were 
uneducated. 
The amount of hired labour are also lower in Ngawal than in Manang, and some of the 
villagers in Ngawal believed that the VDC did not allow hired labour on the fields. The VDC 
chairman of Ngawal on the other hand denied this. 
 
Pic. 2.4: Ngawal village from South East
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3 Method 
 
How are the research questions going to be answered? This thesis has an empirical 
orientation, which means that the data used to answer the research questions are produced 
from observation, conversation and interviews. What makes this piece of text a scientific 
thesis and just not another travel description is its use of scientific methods. This chapter 
discusses different methods and their theoretical foundations, as well as how the data for the 
thesis were collected, and how to interpret, understand and analyse the observations gathered. 
The most important source of data was the fieldwork carried out in Manang during a 
couple of months in the spring of 2004. The choice of methods is dependent on the research 
question of the thesis. With the research questions presented, it follows that the research will 
to a large extent be qualitative. The qualitative research focuses on the “how” and “why” side 
of phenomena, while quantitative methods are about variation and extent of phenomena. The 
choice of qualitative methods does not exclude quantitative methods. The methods 
supplement each other more than they compete. And as Kjeldstadlie says: “What can be 
counted should be counted” (in Fossåskaret 1997,12), and this is also the case for this thesis. 
On the other hand, due to the nature of my research questions, quantitative methods could in 
this thesis only serve supplementary and supportive roles; it would not give the answers. The 
quantitative approach requires a high number of respondents on formalised surveys, and 
observation which can be put in definite and mutually exclusive categories. The qualitative 
approach needs fewer informants, goes deeper and does not produce definite answers. 
Most of the data for this thesis were collected from conversations in the field and 
interviews, as well as observations. All these are informal sources of data. But I also used 
some formal sources, namely a formalized survey, maps, reports and literature from the area.  
 Entering the field, the goal is obviously to get answers to the research questions. But 
how to ask the questions? Who to talk to? I had prepared some general interview guides and a 
list of people to talk to. This gave useful key information, but served as much as a starting 
point for developing new questions and perspectives for the overall research project. Under 
way I found out that some of my hypotheses and research questions might not be as relevant 
or interesting for writing a thesis. This meant that fieldwork was carried out in an inductive 
manner. 
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3.1 Qualitative methods 
How to approach the task of doing fieldwork in a mountain community situated very far 
away, both in physical distance and culturally? In qualitative research, the goal is to achieve 
new knowledge about how people understand and relate to their reality, how to explain 
phenomena and the “lifeworld” of the informants.  
The research is focused on the relations between individuals, rather than upon the 
individuals themselves. The aim is to understand and explain social phenomena, and how the 
informants transcribe meaning to their reality.  When it comes to the question of 
understanding meaning, qualitative methods resemble hermeneutics – the science of 
interpretation of meaning, and semiotics – the science of signs. Both approaches are applied 
in social science and humanities. A semiotic approach in social science means looking at 
concepts as signs that re-present objects in the worlds of the actors. The task is to uncover 
what they contain and what meaning they express (Aase 2004). According to Fiske (1982 (in 
Fuglestad & Ianke Mørkeseth 1997)), meaning is constituted in the trialectic between sign, 
the object and the reader. A semiotic perspective eases the understanding of the importance of 
the researcher’s own perception of the phenomena she is studying, and the role of the 
researcher in the research process. (Fuglestad & Ianke Mørkeseth 1997). The latter aspects of 
semiotics are perhaps the most useful ones regarding this thesis. I will come back to the issues 
of interpreting categories and meaning in section 3.4. 
But how to observe and gather information? The most typical qualitative methods used 
to achieve this are observations, participation in actions, conversations and interviews with 
the informants. 
  
3.1.1 Interviews and conversations in the field 
In qualitative research, it is normal to distinguish between structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews (Dunn 2000). The first one follows strictly an interview schedule, and 
is therefore question oriented. The semi-structured interview covers the middle ground 
between the structured- and the unstructured interview. The interviewer applies an interview 
guide, but he does not need to follow it strictly. Dunn (2000) calls this a content oriented 
interview. An unstructured interview is the same as conversations in the fields, and is semi-
structured and informant oriented. The questions asked depend partly on the answers from the 
informants (ibid). Conversations in the field is like the “the ordinary talk between people”, 
and the researcher may tell as much as he is listening (Fossaskåret 1997).   
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During the fieldwork in Manang and Ngawal, various degrees of unstructured 
interviews and conversation in the field were the methods I used most frequently. It counts for 
the majority of the data from my fieldwork. For instance, I walked to look at a glacier, a four-
hour walk above the village along with one local man I had made friends with. Under such a 
trip, we talked a lot about many things, and often topics related to my research questions. 
There is a continuum between the method of conversations in the field and participant 
observation that I will describe in the following section. 
 
3.1.2 Participant observation 
To do participant observation is often a desired goal of the qualitative researcher. But what 
does it imply? Often the participant observation ends up being just observation. By doing real 
participant observation, the researcher tries to become one of those he is going to study. The 
aim is to get “backstage” in the field (Aase 1997, Goffman 1959). To get backstage means 
getting access to honest opinions, beliefs and arenas of interaction. Whether or not it is 
possible to do this depends on which status the researcher gets in the community he is 
working. The status given to the researcher depends on the researcher’s behaviour. Participant 
observation is all about getting the right status, Aase argues (1997). By participating in the 
same activities as the informants, it is more likely that the researcher will be treated less as a 
stranger and more like “one of us”, and thus be trusted with more information.  
In the fieldwork carried out for this thesis, the aim was to study how the people in the 
two villages were able to sustain their water supply under a situation marked by contextual 
changes and events. In order to obtain as good knowledge as possible about the local 
conditions, to get backstage, it was necessary to get to know people in the village as early as 
possible. Just four days after arriving in Manang, an opportunity arrived. It was maintenance 
day for one of the canals. I was able to join, and I describe in the next chapter how it turned 
out. 
  
3.1.3 Doing participant observation – digging canals 
The maintenance days provided just the right opportunity I was looking for to do the long-
desired participant observation. The first day I just visited the place where people were 
working, together with a local who was going to show me the irrigation canals of the village. I 
made some question, and my guide and interpreter asked the workers for me. The next day I 
went to the canal workers lunch together with a local I had learned to know. He also asked the 
canal workers some questions for me. The third day I joined in order to work. It was after the 
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suggestion of the person I had been with the day before. I went to the work site alone, asked 
the committee leader if I could join, and he welcomed me to do so. On the way to the site I 
could see people walking to the meeting point carrying small hoes, picks and shovels. One 
was carrying a drum. At the meeting point, the starting point of the canal, the committee 
leader and another man divided the canal in pieces of approximately ten meters by using a 
piece of rope. All the workers, between 20 and 30 in total, were then divided in groups of five 
to six members which were supposed to finish one piece of the canal at the time. This way of 
organizing the work was supposed to make less workers standing idle on the side watching. 
One woman who arrived 30 minutes too late had brought a bottle of ara, the local booze. This 
was accepted, and she did not have to pay a fine.   
 People showed a positive attitude to my attendance. Some tried to make a conversation 
with me with their few phrases they knew of English, and a few were laughing and pointing at 
me. But mostly, people did not seem to care much about my attendance. My impression was 
that all the workers were native Manangis, and no workers from outside the district. People 
seemed to know how the work should be done; it was not very complicated, mostly about 
cleansing the canal for pebbles and dirt. But some were always thoroughly watching the 
depths, so that the water could flow down without over-flow. The work was finished within 
lunchtime. Then we went to the home of one of the committee-women, who had prepared rice 
and a soup of local spinach and potatoes. This was eaten together with ara and shying (local 
beer). During the lunch I tried to chat with those next to me, as much with the hands and 
Pic. 3.1: Manangi 
farmers working on 
the Mon Kyur II 
canal on the 
maintenance day.  
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mimics as words. This was participant observation, but did it get me backstage with the 
villagers? 
 
3.1.4 Just another tourist or something else – Roles and statuses and the 
question of getting backstage. 
The aim of doing participant observation was to try to establish a relation to the Manangis that 
would allow me to get access to observations and information that I needed for my research. I 
wanted to get myself a status that would allow for that. According to Aase, a status allows a 
range of different roles (Aase 1997). Within the status that is given, a person ought to act in 
accordance with the role expectations connected to that status. As a researcher in a strange 
culture, it might often be a challenge to find appropriate status for the role as researcher. The 
task is to get a status that gives access to arenas relevant for the research. If the status given 
does not do that, the researcher should try to change the status (Aase 1997). By acting in 
opposition to the assigned role expectations of the status, the people the researcher are 
studying might be forced to give him a new status, Aase argues (1997). 
How did my status and role develop in Manang? After the canal digging, I knew more 
people in the village, and if I wanted to ask some questions, it was easier because they knew 
me. I also talked with those who spoke a little English during the work. On the other hand did 
I not believe that it made a very big difference, that it really changed my status. I had not 
really learnt to know more people than those two who spoke a little English, and I had not 
learned many new things of interest for my studies. Then after staying in Manang for one 
more month, I talked about my participation in the canal digging with a young man of the 
village whom at that time I had made friends with. He said that my attendance to the 
maintenance day had made some fuzz in the village. Everybody had just learned about this 
tourist who worked at the canal, and they could just not understand why I bothered. This kind 
of action was not expected from tourists. Tourists did normally just stay in Manang for two or 
three days, I spent seven weeks in Manang. And tourists were not expected to dig canals. So 
what was my status?  At the end of my stay, I asked a couple of the villagers I had started to 
look at as friends, and according to what they told me, I was a filing, which means “white 
stranger” in Nyesheng. When people were talking about me, I was referred to as filing. And I 
was a filing during my entire stay, according to what my friends told me. But, I had become 
something more, they said, more precisely a “filing who did research”. And to those I knew 
well I was also a friend, they stressed. The action itself, the canal digging, did not put me 
backstage at once. It was an act that did not fit in the role expectation of a tourist, a filing. But 
Method 
 34 
it was a part of making the villagers aware of my presence, and it eased the task of making 
conversations, which ended up being my most important method. This was possible due to the 
large number of people who spoke reasonably good English in the village. So within the 
status as a filing researcher I both played the roles of friend, customer, guest and researcher. 
 
3.1.5 Staying in Ngawal – A lone stranger with no one to talk to  
What about my status in Ngawal, the other village I visited? I spent a considerably less 
amount of time in Ngawal than in Manang, because I knew what to ask and look for based on 
my experiences in Manang. I did not have any big hopes of getting “backstage” in Ngawal, 
because there were very few people there who spoke English, and I did not have the 
opportunity to stay there for a long time. Anyway, I spent a lot of time in a teashop in this 
village belonging to a man that spoke English well. My status in Ngawal was also as filing. 
But due to the questions I asked, a rumor was spread, my interpreters told me, that I was 
working for some kind of donor organisation that was going to build a lot of water pipelines 
for the village. This probably influenced how I was treated and how people responded to my 
questions. More of these events are described in the section 3.3.2 
 
3.2 Quantitative methods 
In qualitative research, the goal is to achieve new knowledge about how people understand 
and relate to their reality. This means mapping and measuring the extent and variation of 
phenomena and things.  
In this thesis, the quantitative methods start with mapping the extent and range of the 
water system in the Manang and Ngawal village. This I did myself on foot, often with a local 
guide. I tried to estimate how important the supply to the channels is from glacier streams, 
and tried to get an impression of the recent development of the actual glaciers. This I did by 
comparing maps with my observations.  
I also made a formalized survey, with definite answer categories. With the data from 
this I was able to make some simple statistical analysis. The number of respondents is on the 
limit of what is necessary to be used as a basis for statistics, but on the other hand the 
selection of respondents make up a large proportion of the population they are representing.  
The survey also served as an entry into the homes of the village people, and 
legitimised my status as a researcher. Through carrying out the survey, I was able to do a lot 
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of unstructured and semi structured interviews ad hoc, where it was apparent that the 
informants had something to tell me. 
  
3.3 Problems 
No matter how much method literature read, it is not possible to be hundred percent prepared 
for what you meet when arriving in field. Unexpected problems as well as expected problems 
arise. Expected problems were those of language and interpretations. 
 
3.3.1 The question of interpretators 
In Manang, most people involved in the tourism business were able to communicate in 
English, as well as a large proportion of the young people. This made it easy to make 
conversation and interviews with lodge owners and the more privileged youth who had gone 
to English high schools in Kathmandu. I was able to do interviews with several key 
informants without using an interpreter. This fact made it of course easy to stick to the 
English speaking people of Manang. But would that give me representative view on the 
different matters? Probably not. The less privileged and poor do not speak English. So doing 
small interviews with the average farmers required an interpreter. So I got one. He, 
unfortunately, did not speake as well English as the youth of the village, so I ended up using 
the English speaking people available at the moment.  
 In Ngawal, I was completely dependent on finding an interpreter as soon as possible. I 
was not able to get someone from Manang, but I was recommended someone in Ngawal. 
Unfortunately, his English was very poor. After a lot of hard gesturing and explaining, he 
understood my basic question. He ended up bringing a colleague at every interview, and they 
tended to be sitting arguing with each other about the right way to address my question, with 
me sitting there knowing nothing. They obviously found it nice to walk from house to house, 
and always being invited for some raksi or tea, now and then trying to translate small pieces 
of their conversations with the inhabitants of the houses. This process was utterly frustrating 
and tiresome for me. Returning to Manang village, I soon found out that I lacked some basic 
information, and returned with an interpreter from Manang at a couple of occasions.  
Regarding the household survey that I carried out both in Manang and Ngawal, it is 
probably very unfortunate that I was not able to get the same interpreter doing the survey in 
both villages. How could I know that they would address the questions in the same way? 
Even though I brought a written translation of the survey questions from the interpretor in 
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Manang, the interpreter in Ngawal barely seemed to understand the meaning of this 
translation.  
 
3.3.2 Student Mistaken as Wealthy Donor 
Another problem that arose in Ngawal was regarding my status. Ngawal is situated away from 
the main trekking route, but in the trekker season, there were a few trekkers in the village 
every day. By staying in Ngawal for several days, I was soon noticed. When I started to walk 
around asking questions about water and irrigation, it apparently spread a rumour that I was 
working for some kind of donor NGO that was going to give water pipelines to the village. 
And my interpreter tried to persuade me to say that my research was just for this purpose. I 
denied, and hopefully, the interpreter translated this message. Anyway, the level of 
complaints was a lot higher than in Ngawal, and some were also reluctant talking to us, saying 
“What do we get from you if we talk to you?” I could of course not give any promises of 
contributions to the irrigation system, and this I hoped should get me out of the donor role I 
had received, but it seemed to make the informants complain even more, in order to make me 
promise at least something. 
  
3.3.3 Reluctant informants 
The ever nagging question of a researcher who bases a lot of the data collection on interviews 
and conversation in the fields is the reliability of the information he gets. At what point can 
the information be turned into data? When the researcher is faced with information that 
obviously seems wrong compared with information already established as facts. Does it make 
it necessary to question the reliability of the established knowledge? Or must the researcher 
accept that there are different versions to be told about the same phenomena?  
In Manang there were certain issues that raised contradictory expressions from 
different informants. When I asked about Upper Manang’s past as an area hostile towards 
foreigners, some informants were not interested in doing anything other than insisting on that 
Nyeshengba had always been nice and hospital towards foreigners. Other informants on the 
other hand seemed to remember more of these events. Regarding questions about the caste 
system, some informants who belonged to a low cast told a complete different story than 
those of the higher ones. And when trying to figure out how power relations in the 
communities were revealed under conflict over irrigation, those who defined themselves as 
poor told a different story than those who by others were termed rich. Both these events 
displays that knowledge always is “situated” and embodied (Harraway 1991).  
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Expressions and answers that are given as responses to certain question raised by the 
researcher communicate information at different levels, whether the answers contradict each 
other or not. Contradictory expressions given as answers to the same question raise new 
questions; why do some informants obviously not want the researcher to know this or that? It 
clearly indicates that these informants do not want to have the researcher back-stage. 
Anyhow, the researcher must try to grasp the meaning of the expressions and the meta-
communication that they might contain through interpretation and categorisation (Fossaskåret 
1997). This is the topic of the next chapter. 
 
3.4 From observations to data 
I have written that I have gathered data through my fieldwork. It would be more precise to say 
produced than gathered. The data does not just lie there, waiting to be collected. What the 
researcher gets through fieldwork is observations and expressions that must be placed in 
certain categories in order to be called data, argues Aase (1997). It is a process of assigning 
meaning to the world as it appears to us: Phenomena and objects that we observe are 
meaningless until we are able to categorize them (ibid).  In qualitative methods, the question 
is often which categories to put the observations into, and to find the meaning connected to 
them. The categorization of a certain observation is totally dependent on the researchers 
interpretation.  So far I have used both the terms category and concepts.  They are almost 
synonyms, but in some cases a concept might contain several categories, like the concept 
Gender includes the categories Male and Female (Fossåskåret 1997). Aase compares concept 
and categories with variable and value. Categorisation and conceptualisation happen at 
different phases of the research process. First the researcher tries to read the informants 
expressions and actions though her own understanding. The observation gives meaning to the 
researcher when it is placed into certain categories. This is empirical research, and in 
anthropology it is called the emic phase of the research process (Rudie 1997). To do 
analytical research, which is the goal of this thesis, the data must be informed by theory, and 
then a deeper understanding of the actual social phenomena hopefully emerges. This is the 
etic phase of the research process (ibid). 
My informants and I come from completely different cultures. This makes it important 
to be aware of the very likely possibility of different content of meaning in concepts and 
categories. I must therefore be very cautious using my own categories in order to describe the 
life world of people in a strange culture (Aase 1997). This fact requires a methodological 
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approach to understand and interpret the information I gather from conversations and 
observation. “Interpretation means obtaining the categories of your informants and finding out 
which categories they are putting their observations into” (Aase 1997, 147). The question is to 
understand what meaning the informants attach to their categories. 
A category is a function of experienced objects, our senses, cognitive abilities and 
culture. The three first elements are constants that are similar to all humans, while the fourth, 
culture, is a variable (Aase 1997). Aase compares categories with containers, in which we 
place our observations. Our cognitive consciousness could therefore be compared to a matrix 
consisting of an infinite number of containers. To understand the content of meaning in 
categories used in a strange culture, I can use what Aase (1997) terms Category Analysis. 
This could also be called a life world analysis. The Category Analysis consists of four steps. I 
will present them briefly: 
1) Find out which categories the informants have about a given topic. 
2) Find out how a category is constituted – what is its content of meaning and what 
are the keywords describing it. 
3) Find which other categories a given category is related to (the context) through 
cognitive mechanisms like a) Narrative, b) Theory, c) Metaphor and d) 
Dichotomy.  
4) Find which category a given observation will be assigned to. 
 
So how to apply these methods in Manang? The scientific perspectives become distant when 
you find yourself in the role of a researcher far away from the writing desk. Communicating 
through a second language adds to the challenges. How do I know that the informants and I 
have the same connotations to the words and terms that we use? This possible confusion 
comes in addition the possibility of different denotations in categories. 
I tried to apply the insights from these methods during conversations and interviews. I 
asked the same questions to different people, and about the same topics in different ways. I 
asked for synonyms and explanations for the concepts I found most important, and not least 
the meaning in the local language and other meaning of that word in the local language. 
Through this strategy I hope I have obtained the content of meaning for the most important 
categories. I have not uncovered any larger mismatches over concepts and categories during 
translation. Nevertheless, the data are my interpretation of the observations made and 
conversations had in Manang, using my categories and concepts to describe the observations I 
made and the information I was given during my fieldwork.  
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3.5 How to analyse my data? 
One thing is to collect data, but to analyse them in order to answer the research questions is 
another and equally demanding task. Ottar Brox writes that “the process of writing (...) is the 
fundamental life process in all social research” (Brox 1990, 132 (in Fuglestad 1997)). The 
quantitative research aims to provide generalizeable knowledge, while the qualitative research 
aims to give some transcending understanding of certain social phenomena (Fossåsskåret 
1997). By categorizing the unknown, some deeper understanding of certain social phenomena 
hopefully emerges (ibid). These processes take place through the writing of the analysis, 
when the researcher is back from the field. What the researcher does is to use the observation 
gathered in the field to make some “statements about what can reasonably be anticipated in 
general” (Edmondson 1984,106 (in Fuglestad 1997)). Those statements can not aim to be 
representative in the statistical sense, to represent all similar or related phenomena. On the 
other hand, they aim to tell something more than just explain the observed phenomena 
(Fuglestad 1997). To make this statement on the basis of a limitied number of observations is 
called rhetorical induction. By applying concepts and categories from theory to the 
observations, the researcher tries to make the reader see the special in the general (ibid). 
  I have tried to analyse the observations I made in Manang by using concepts and 
analytical tools from the theories outlined in the following chapters. But at the same time the 
experiences I had from the field has also guided my choice of theory. I have found Ostrom’s 
CPR framework to be fruitful for analyzing the water management in Manang and Ngawal. 
But to explain and aid the understanding of how the communities adapts to contextual 
changes and how this has influenced on the water management required a different theoretical 
approach. For this I chose Local Dialectic (Aase 1998), a method that I will explain in the 
theory chapter.   
 
Method 
 40 
 
Pic. 3.2: Irrigation canal in Ngawal village. This canal is also used for drinking 
water if the drinking water taps are dry. 
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4 Theoretical perspectives 
 
In order to draw some general knowledge from the fieldwork carried out for this thesis, 
empirical findings have to be informed by theory. This part presents the theories and concepts 
used to analyse and discuss the findings related to the research questions presented. The first 
chapter briefly presents the classic dichotomy of the social sciences: Methodological 
individualism and methodological collectivism, and continues to introduce the key concepts 
from Giddens structuration theory (1984) that seeks to bridge the two positions of the 
dichotomy. The aim with this chapter is to introduce the premises and key concepts that the 
following theory builds upon.  
Section 4.2 presents theories of management of Common Pool Resources (CPR), with 
focus on E. Ostrom’s framework (1990). These approaches see social phenomena as the sole 
outcome of the acts and intentions of individuals, and the focus is upon factors and variables 
that affect these acts and intentions. 
Section 4.3 presents local dialectic, a method for analysis of processes of social change 
in communities (Aase 1998). This chapter also introduces key concepts to describe 
components of society by applying and criticising Gidden’s structuration theory. 
 
4.1 What constitutes society? 
A fundamental question in the social sciences has traditionally been whether individualism or 
collectivism is the basic explanation principle for social phenomena. This dichotomy is 
represented through the perspectives of methodological individualism and methodological 
collectivism.  
Methodological individualism is represented through the voluntaristic positions of 
humanistic theory, phenomenology and existentialism, as well as more functionalist 
perspectives such as neo-classical economics. Methodologically individualistic approaches 
consider social systems and society to be the sole outcome of the actions, motives and 
intentions of individuals following their free will. In rational choice approaches, individuals 
are seen as utility-maximising actors who calculate benefits and costs based on available 
information. Society is viewed as a “chimera”, something that just apparently exists, but is not 
quite real (Johnston et al. 2000). Only the beliefs and actions of individuals are real. A 
methodologically individualistic perspective makes it also possible to take a reductionist 
position and decomposing all elements of society to action and intentions.  
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Methodological collectivism is represented through the deterministic positions of 
classic non-humanistic Marxist philosophy and different structuralist positions. Structural 
Marxism developed as an independent approach that sees society as the outcome of material 
conditions and Mode of Production, which determine the other spheres of society: Culture, 
religion and social organisation.  Structuralism, originally a concept from linguistics, became 
important directions within philosophy and anthropology. Structuralism tries to look beneath 
the apparently visible features of society in order to uncover its underlying structures and 
logics (ibid). The structuralists see society as determined by structures, which constrains and 
guides the actions of individuals. The structures can therefore be seen as a causal explanation 
for human behaviour and organisation. 
The seventies saw a rise of theories confronting both the voluntaristic and the 
structuralist positions. Structuralism was criticised for not allowing any room for human 
autonomy and action, and for having a too deterministic and totalising conception of 
existence. Giddens criticized the structuralist functionalism for reducing social praxis to pure 
mechanics of structures, ignoring the free will and creativity of the individuals (Giddens 
1984). Structures do not determine action, they just influence it. Structures do therefore not 
have causal properties, the motives and explanations are to be found with the agents, Giddens 
argues (ibid). 
The voluntaristic positions were on the other hand criticised for reducing society and 
all social phenomena to the sum of the intentional acts of individuals.  Bourdieu (1977), 
Giddens (1984) and several other scholars tried to bridge the positions of agency and 
structure. These are rejecting both the voluntarism of the humanistic positions and the 
determinism of the structuralists positions, but try to bridge elements from both positions in a 
dialectic synthesis and get rid of the dichotomies. In order to do this, they provide new 
concepts that touch on both structures and agency. Just structures or just agency is not 
satisfactory explanations for social processes.  
Giddens sees agency as the capabilities held by people to do things, like to think, act 
and speak (ibid). Structures are features and forces that guide social action, consisting of rules 
and resources, where resources are the powers and assets that an agent controls in interaction 
with others (ibid). Agency is always guided by structures and the social system it is 
functioning within. A key concept Giddens use in order to bridge structures and agency is 
“the duality of structures”. The duality of structures implies that humans are both producing 
structures as well as subjected to them in their actions: “According to the notion of duality of 
structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the 
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practices they recursively organize” (Giddens 1984, 25). In this way, the duality of structures 
transcends the dichotomies of the deterministic views on structures and the voluntaristic 
views on agency. 
 The next chapter presents the CPR approach to natural resource management. This 
approach has its theoretical foundation in new-institutional economics and rational choice 
theory, and represents a methodological individualist perspective. The CPR approach seeks to 
determine what factors and conditions that facilitate cooperation among individuals that want 
to achieve collective benefits from the sustainable management of a common. 
 
 
4.2 Theories on commons 
When farmers invest labour and capital and construct an irrigation canal, they might have 
great difficulties preventing other non-contributing farmers from taking water from the canal, 
once the canal is in place. It is difficult to exclude users from the resource of an irrigation 
canal. A resource where it is difficult to exclude users can be termed a common (Ostrom 
1990). Users of commons face several problems and dilemmas, which mostly are related to 
avoiding free-riding and overuse. This chapter presents some models for how to solve the 
problems of commons, as well as a framework for analysing commons. 
 The dilemmas of commons have drawn huge amount of interest from all branches of 
the social sciences since the classic “Tragedy of the Commons” was published by Garret 
Hardin in 1968. And the never ending puzzle about how people should manage a common 
without facing overuse and deterioration continues to engage mathematicians, psychologists, 
anthropologists, geographers and sociologists.  
I will start by clarifying some important concepts, before I outline the classic models 
concerning use of common pool resources.  
  
4.2.1 What is a common? 
A common is a resource where it is difficult to exclude users. Ostrom gives the following 
definition: “Natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it 
costly, (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its 
use” (Ostrom 1990, 30). The term common does not imply any kind of ownership or rights. 
The state, an individual or a community can own a common (ibid). It is therefore necessary to 
make a distinction between a common property and a common pool resource. Common 
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property describes a human arrangement, a kind of ownership to a resource, while the term 
common pool describes resources where it is hard to exclude users (Bromley 1986 (in Ostrom 
1990)). In the following I will use the term Common Pool Resource (CPR). People making 
use of a resource system are called appropriators, while providers are those who supply 
provisions to the resource system. Appropriators and providers may very well be the same 
people (Ostrom 1990). In the forthcoming analysis, I will only use the terms appropriators, 
because the providers involved in the CPRs of interest in this study are all appropriators.  
A CPR shares many of the characteristics of a public good. A public good is a good 
where it is not possible to exclude users and where improvement is to the benefit of all users. 
What distinguishes a public good from a common is that an individual’s use of a public good 
does not influence on others individuals use. A public good is not a subtractable resource. If 
the resource is subtractable, and the use of one individual influences the use of other 
individuals, it is a CPR. Renewability is also an important attribute that determines the 
consequences of utilisation of the resource. With non-renewable resources, the task is to find 
the right intensity with which to extract the resource. There are several categories of 
renewable resources, of which the most important ones concern the degree of subtractability. 
A forest is renewable, but it is subtractable, and sometimes overuse may extinguish the 
resource. Non-subtractable resources are typically rivers, all the water may be used, but there 
will still be coming more water if the use is stopped. In this way, a river could in one situation 
be a public good, but as soon as the use of some individuals influences on others users’ 
utilisation of the river, it turns into a CPR (ibid). 
 The regulation of access to the use of the resource is also crucial for how utilisation 
affects the resource. An open-access regime means that there are no defined boundaries of the 
resource and no definition of users, which means unregulated and free access to the resource. 
Both public goods and CPRs are frequently subject to degradation and under provision due to 
open access.  Bromley also uses the presence of regulation of the use of the resource to 
determine whether a resource is an open access resource or a CPR (Bromley 1986 (in Ostrom 
1990)).  
Water resources are in many places around the world managed as a CPR. Irrigation 
system as commons are characterised by being renewable, non-subtractable and that its 
infrastructure is often a public good. Looking at an irrigation system as a CPR, the term 
resource does not only include the water, but also the infrastructure needed to utilitize the 
water.  
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4.2.2 The classic models of commons 
At the heart of all the problems facing appropriators of commons is the problem of free-
riding. A free-rider is a person who utilizes resources from a CPR or another public good 
without giving anything in return. Free-riding can take many shapes. The free-rider may 
refuse to limit his consumption of the resource in order to make it sustainable, he may not pay 
the fee that is required to keep the resource available or he may not contribute to the 
maintenance and construction of the resource. Because of the free-rider problem, no rational, 
self-interested person would contribute to a public good, Mancur Olson stated in his article 
“The logic of Collective Action” (1965). This idea was soon known as the “zero contribution 
thesis”. Together with Garret Hardin’s Tragedy narrative (1968) and the Prisoners Dilemma 
game model (PD game), it has become the classic way to model the outcome of a CPR-
situation. And these models have further been used as analytical foundations for natural 
resource management policies (Ostrom 1990).  
Probably the single most influencing text on commons is Hardin’s “The tragedy of the 
Commons” (1968), which I calls “the Tragedy narrative”. The article describes a situation 
where pastoralists have cattle on a common pasture. The pasture can sustain a given number 
of cattle. If the limit is surpassed, the fields will be overgrazed and the cattle will loose value. 
But the pastoralists will not limit their number of cattle in order to keep the grazing on a 
sustainable level. As long as they have no information about the intentions of the other actors, 
they will always let as many cattle out on the pasture as possible, because their marginal 
benefit from having one additional cow is greater than the marginal loss due to an overgrazed 
field. This is because the benefit is individual, but the loss from an over-grassed field is 
shared among all the farmers. This mechanism will inevitable lead to the tragedy of the 
common, Hardin argues. “A man locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
with no limit – in a world that is limited”, Hardin writes (1968, 1244). It will be rational for 
an actor not to restrain his use of a common-pool resource, because if he does, he will loose 
economically in comparison to those who are not restraining their use.  
Interaction within groups that utilize a resource is often complicated and involves 
different rules and customs. Approaches from game theory have come to be a popular way to 
describe behavior in common situations (Ostrom 1990). A CPR-situation was typically 
modeled as a PD-game (see table 4.1) (Pedersen 2002). The prisoner’s dilemma describes a 
situation with two prisoners, isolated from each other and with no information about each 
other’s actions. If they both keep quiet, they are both going free. If both are talking, they both 
get one year in prison. If prisoner one speaks, and prisoner two keeps quiet, prisoner one gets 
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free with a reward, and prisoner two gets two years. The option that gives the collective 
optimal outcome for both will be bad for the one who follows it if the other one do not. The 
dominant strategy will then be for both to speak. A dominant strategy is the option that is 
rational to choose no matter what the other player chooses. And when both players choose 
their dominant strategies, the outcome is sub-optimal, the third best. This paradox, that the 
individual rational choice gives a collective irrational outcome, was very fascinating to 
scholars, and by 1975 there had been written more than 2000 papers over the subject (Ostrom 
1990).  
 
Tabel 4.1: Prisoners dilemma game 
 
 Player B 
 Denies Confess 
Denies 1                            1 -2                         2
 
      Player A 
Confess 2                           -2 -1                        -1
The number at the left side of a cell displays player A’s outcome and the number on the right side 
displays player B’s outcome. 
 
The Tragedy narrative can also be formalized as a game with the same structure as the 
PD game. That it is possible to formalize the Tragedy narrative as a game model made it a 
meeting point for several disciplines like institutional economics, psychology and 
organisation theory, and this added to its popularity and use (Pedersen 2002). There are also a 
variety of other games that can be used to illustrate several dilemmas of collective action.  
The PD-games and other simple two-player games can be criticized for being 
unrealistic. There are particularly two objections that can be made. The first is that the players 
in the games not are communicating. If they did, they might easily agree to follow the strategy 
that is to the best for them both. This requires that the players trust each other. If they do not, 
a PD-dilemma situation easily occurs. The other objection is that the games are single-shot 
games. If the games were repeated, the players might base their strategies on experiences 
from the previous rounds. So if game modeling should be used as a tool for describing 
outcome of resource management situations, the games need to be more complicated, with 
more players, more options and more realistic preconditions than the simple PD-game. And 
most resource economics do model different resource management situations as games.  
(Ostrom 1990, 2000). But if not, the preconditions and details for the actual situation that is to 
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be modeled is carefully included in the game as a model, the model would be meaningless. 
And whether it is possible to model common situations as games at all is a different question. 
The popularity of the Tragedy narrative and the other classic models made it obvious 
to many policy makers that natural resources should not be managed as commons. Hardin’s 
solution was long “mutually agreed” upon coercion (Ostrom 1990). The state had to impose 
strict control over the use of commons, local governments, informal and non- governmental 
institutions were not able to develop effective ways to prevent situations that lead to tragedy. 
Similarly, building on the same assumption as Hardin, Demsetz (1964 (in Pedersen 2002)) 
and others argued that privatisation of all resources was necessary in order to sustain optimal 
utilization.  
 
4.2.3 Critique of the classic models 
The classic models of commons and the policies based on them, were heavily criticized by 
researchers with experience of CPR situations. The criticizers argued that Hardin confuses 
commons with open-access regimes (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975). A common is 
something different from an open access regime; the access to a common is under control of a 
group, while no one controls the access to an open-access regime. “Common property is not 
everyone’s property”, Bishop and Ciricy-Wandrup argues (1975, 715).  
Ostrom identifies the following premises the classic models are building on: 
- No one communicates 
- High personal discount rates 
- Little or no mutual trust 
- Everybody act independently 
These conditions, Ostrom argues, do not characterize most small scale CPRs (Ostrom 1990, 
183). Further, the models tend to assume the actors to be rational, profit maximizing 
individuals with complete information, and that profit could be traded into other kinds of 
goods on a market (Pedersen 2002). Empirical findings rather suggest that appropriators of 
CPRs not necessarily act to maximize their profits, but to satisfy their needs. The 
appropriators rarely have access to all relevant information about the CPR and the other 
appropriator’s behavior. And in many CPR situations it might not exist markets for trading 
the resources extracted from the CPR (Pedersen 2002). 
Ostrom (1990) argues that the Tragedy narrative is used metaphorically in 
policymaking. If some variables from given cases were similar to some of the variables in the 
Tragedy narrative, policymakers have tended to regard the actual case as in a condition of a 
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Tragedy of the Commons, resulting in policies based on often inadequate and limited 
knowledge. Then when the policy is carried out, the outcome is still not optimal, because 
some crucial variables were not taken into account (ibid). There are a lot of examples of this, 
like from the nationalization of forests in Nepal and several other third world countries. In 
Nepal the forest used to be village commons, then it was turned into governmental property in 
order to avoid deforestation. But after the nationalization of the forest, the deforestation rate 
just accelerated (Messerschmidt 1986 (in Ostrom 1990)).  
In addition to empirical studies, game theory studies based on experiments have shown 
that humans in collective action situations do not necessarily act as rational players in a PD-
game. Change of preconditions such as communication between the players and repetition of 
the game may produces completely different outcomes than a PD-game (Ostrom 1990, 2000).  
  
4.2.4 Towards a theory of CPR 
Why do some groups manage to use their commons over generations, solving challenges as 
they emerge, without facing degradation and tragedy, while other groups tend to overexploit 
and degrade their common resources?  
 Several scholars have attempted to make theoretical generalizations over the 
conditions under which groups manage to govern their commons without facing tragedy. 
According to Agrawal (2001) the most important of these are Balland & Plateu (1996), 
Ostrom (1990) and Wade (1988). The writers studying long term sustainable management of 
CPRs agree that the key to achieving this is the appropriators’ ability to self-organise. The 
writers do agree that ability to self-organise is mostly dependent on how much the participants 
can improve their overall benefit by cooperation (Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 1990, 1994). The 
ability to self -organise is also dependent on the characteristics of the group of appropriators 
(ibid). The next sections will present and discuss these factors and variables.  
The substantial amount of research on commons has ended up being regarded as an 
independent theoretical approach, the CPR approach (Pedersen 2002). It consists mainly of 
case studies or comparisons of case studies. It is cross disciplinary, but has its roots in theories 
of collective action and theories concerned with social dilemmas and game theory, like 
Olson’s non-contribution thesis (1965) and Hardin’s Tragedy narrative (1968). Still, few 
attempts have been made to construct a comprehensive theory. I will in the following chapter 
present what is regarded as the most thorough approach towards a coherent CPR-theory, 
Ellinors Ostrom book from 1990 (Agrawal 2001, Steins et al. 2000). This will also be the 
framework I will use when I analyses the water systems in the two villages in Upper Manang. 
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4.3 Ostrom’s modell 
How collective action for sustainable management of CPRs can be possible is the topic of 
Ellinor Ostrom’s book “Governing the Commons”. The book (1) provides basic concepts for 
descriptions of CPR; (2) identifies the main puzzles and dilemmas appropriators face when 
trying to self-organise for a sustainable use of a CPR; (3) identifies eight design principles for 
institutions for sustainable management of CPRs; and (4) provides a model that displays the 
factors and variables found important for facilitating collective action. The following chapters 
will basically present themes two, three and four, while theme one was presented in section 
4.1.1  
Ostrom (1990) bases her framework on a variety of case studies of commons, and 
analyses these with theoretical concepts from new institutional economics and game theory. 
She recognizes that institutional theory and collective action theory lacks the ability to explain 
the kind of self-organisation found in groups that are able to take collective action to achieve 
a collective benefit from a CPR, and her framework is an approach to address this deficiency. 
 It is her eight design principles that have attracted most attention in previous related 
research (Steins et al. 2000). Ostrom’s book can be viewed as an alternative to and a critique 
of the classic models on collective action and commons, as it shows how local users are able 
to manage their common resources without external enforcement of rules and without facing 
tragedy. It shows how local management institutions are an alternative to privatisations or 
nationalisation of commons.  The CPR approach to management of natural resources, where 
Ostrom’s’ work still prevails as a cornerstone, has now come to be a foundation for policy 
making within both the FAO and the World Bank (ibid). 
 
4.3.1 The puzzles of the commons 
Despite the pessimistic outcome of the classic models describing collective action, empirical 
findings show that self-organizing in order to achieve collective benefits is possible. But 
organising for sustainable management of a CPR is a complex undertaking. The appropriators 
can hardly know the extent of their impact on the resource over time, how to deal with serious 
rule infringement or how their management rules will work in time of crisis. So Ostrom 
(1990) assumes that appropriators in most cases have to do a lot of learning by trial and error 
when organizing CPR management. The time span is therefore important, according to 
Ostrom.  She reviews case studies of management systems that have lasted from 30-40 years 
to over a thousand years. Appropriators would on basis of the experiences they make have the 
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opportunity to find out that independent utilization of a CPR will produce a lower individual 
benefit than organised utilization. Besides from enough time for trial and error learning, 
shared norms are general premises according to Ostrom. If the appropriators have shared 
norms, it is also more likely that they trust each other, and that they will obey to the rule in 
order to not to loose reputation. But there are also many examples of unsuccessful 
management of CPRs, despite that the appropriators shared the same norms and that they had 
enough time for trial and error learning.  
The ability for a user group to self-organise for collective action tasks relies on more 
premises than enough time and shared norms, Ostrom concludes (1990). Ostrom sees three 
main challenges, or puzzles as she calls it, for appropriators to successfully take collective 
action: (1) Supply of institutions, (2) credible commitment to rules, (3) and mutual monitoring 
(ibid). In order to avoid free-riding, compliance to the rules is needed. Therefore the rules 
must be designed in such a way that free-riding is avoided. But how to craft these rules? Rules 
for providing sustainable use of a resource fit the characteristics of a public good; it is to the 
same benefit of all the appropriators. There is no incitement for an individual to establish such 
rules because the cost of establish them is held by the individual alone, while the benefits 
from the rules are shared among all the appropriators. And if the rules are installed, how to 
make the appropriators comply with them? If the rules are not followed, they are worthless. 
Given that the appropriators have shared norms and accept penalties if caught breaking the 
rules, monitoring of the resource is likely to ensure commitment to the rules, according to 
Ostrom (1990). But how to get the appropriators to monitor each other? Monitoring is also 
costly for the individual, while the benefit from the monitoring is collective. So monitoring 
also implies a problem of collective action. Each of the puzzles consists of dilemmas nested 
into dilemmas. Ostrom conceptualizes this into first- and second order dilemmas. First order 
dilemmas are dilemmas arising from the use of the common, like the free rider problem and 
the problem of overuse. To solve this problem, rules, compliance to the rules and monitoring 
is needed. Second order problems arise when the group is going to impose these arrangements 
on their own use of the resource. “Without monitoring, there can be no credible commitment, 
without credible commitment there is no reason to propose new rules,” Ostrom states (1990, 
45). Still many CPR appropriators have been able to overcome these first- and second order 
dilemmas. In Manang and Ngawal, the appropriators of the irrigation system also face some 
of these puzzles and first- and second order dilemmas. I will look at how these appear and are 
dealt with in section 6.1.1. 
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The task that Ostrom’s framework aims to solve is two-fold: (1) How management 
institutions should be designed in order to provide long term sustainable utilization; (2) and 
describe what factors and variables that influences on the ability for collective action. The 
next two chapters present both themes in turn. Then in section 6.1 and 6.2 I will discuss these 
aspects in relation to the water management in Manang and Ngawal. 
 
4.3.2 Institutions, nested rules and the design principles 
This section presents Ostrom’s design principles for institutions for sustainable CPR 
management. Ostrom gives the following definition of institutions: 
 
Sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in 
some arenas, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be 
used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be 
provided and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions 
(Ostrom 1990, 51). 
 
Institutions evolving through collective action are not enough to ensure sustainable use of a 
resource, Ostrom argues (1990). The institutions need to be robust. This means that the 
appropriators need to be able to change the rules.  In order to specify what a robust institution 
is, Ostrom defines it as consisting of different interconnected levels of rules: I) Operational 
rules are those at the lowest levels, which guide the everyday use of the CPR. These regard 
appropriation, provision, monitoring and sanctioning rules. II) Above the operational rules are 
the collective rules, which apply when making policy for the management of the CPR. These 
rules then indirectly affect the operational rules. III) At the highest level are the constitutional 
rules, which specify how collective choice rules should be crafted and who is authorized to 
craft them. Decisions on this level regard constitutional changes and governance of the 
management institutions. A change in a higher order rule will influence the lower order rules, 
directly or indirectly. In this sense, the rules are nested. Both changes in constitutional rules 
and collective choice rule might affect the operational rules, but not the other way around. It 
is also more difficult to reveal the upper-level rules than the operational rules during an 
analysis, Ostrom states (ibid). In Manang and Ngawal, it also was possible to identify 
operational rules in the irrigation management system (section 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.1 and 5.3.2), 
but it was more difficult to identify Ostrom’s two upper layers of rules; the collective choice 
rules and the constitutional rules. This latter problem I found to reveal a weakness in 
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Ostrom’s approach, more specific that its focus on purposive management institutions makes 
it overlook that natural resource management may happen within non-purposive institutions. 
This I will discuss more thoroughly in section 7.1.,  
So how should the management institutions be designed in order to facilitate long-term 
sustainable use of a CPR? Based on her analysis of the long enduring CPR institutions, 
Ostrom has developed eight design principles, that are essential elements or conditions that 
“helps to account for the succss of these institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the 
complaiance of generations after generations of resource use” (1990, 90). These are the design 
principles: 
 
1) Clearly defined boundaries. The CPR needs boundaries, and the appropriators should 
be defined as a group with exclusive user rights to the CPR. This principle 
distinguishes a common from an open-access resource. 
 
2) Congruence between appropriation and provision. Well-tailored appropriation rules 
that reflect the attributes of the resources, like size, resource flow and predictability of 
the resource. The rules must also specify what kind of provision the appropriators 
need to provide. And finally the rules must make the cost of provision in proportion to 
the benefits from appropriation.  
 
3) Collective Choice arrangement. The individuals have to participate in making and 
modifying the operational rules, and the institutions need to change in response to 
changes in needs over time. When the rules are self-made, the appropriators’ 
experiences can be used to make the rules as easy as possible to enforce. When the 
first two design principles are met, institutions can be supplied to a low cost. But this 
principle is not sufficient to ensure commitment to the rules alone; therefore 
monitoring and graduated sanctions are needed.  
 
4) Monitoring. The individuals should monitor each other’s use of the resource. By doing 
so, illegal appropriation will be revealed, and the appropriators will learn to trust the 
system. For monitoring to work and the second order problems connected to it to be 
solved, the cost of monitoring needs to be low. In many CPRs, monitoring could occur 
as a by-product of the resource use. For example when a farmer irrigates his field, he 
can keep an eye on the canal while he is using it. 
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5) Graduated sanctions. A crucial point for solving of commons problems is that 
sanctions need to be enforced by participants, not by external authorities. The 
sanctions need to be graduated so they match the seriousness and context of the 
violation, and initially small so that a minor rule violation does not have disastrous 
consequences for the breaker. The sanctions should act as a reminder that the use of 
the resource is monitored, and that rule violation will be discovered. Monitoring and 
graduated sanctions provide quasivoluntary compliance – the individuals will 
cooperate as long as they know that commitment to the rules is monitored, and that the 
other appropriators also are following the rules. This can also be called contingent 
behaviour. The appropriator will act in a certain way as long as he knows that the 
other appropriators act similarly. 
Ostrom also finds another reason for why the initial sanctions should be small:  
 
If an appropriator-monitor finds an offender who normally follows the rules, 
but in one instance happens to face a severe problem, the experience confirms 
what everyone already knows: There will always be instances in which those 
who are basically committed to following the set of rules may succumb to 
strong temptation to break them (Ostrom 1990, 97). 
  
This kind of rule-infringement need only a modest sanction, because the other 
appropriators might find themselves in a similar situation on a later occasion, and 
would like some understanding when the time comes when they too need to break the 
rules. But the sanctions should be graduated too, so that appropriators do not speculate 
in rule infringement.  
 In combination aims principles one to five solve the problems of commitment to 
rules and monitoring in an interrelated manner. 
 
6) Conflict resolution mechanisms. A forum where different interpretations of the rules 
can be discussed adds to the system’s stability. 
 
7) Minimal limitations of rights to organise. The appropriators must be allowed to design 
their own institutions, and the government should recognize the self-organised CPR 
management institutions and not impose their own.  
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8) Nested enterprises. (Only valid for big CPR systems) (Ostrom 1990, 90). 
 
These are the principles that characterize successful CPRs. I will discuss to what extent the 
irrigation management institutions in Manang and Ngawal meet these principles in section 
6.1.2. 
What are the characteristics of CPRs that face failure? Knowledge about why a CPR 
management system does not work is also important for explaining success cases. When 
analysing the failed CPRs, Ostrom draws upon several case studies, uses the same analysis as 
she did with the successfully ones, and finds out whether or not the characteristics of the 
failed CPRs match the design principles. Then she tries to identify probable causes of the 
failures.  
What she found was that of nine reviewed failure CPRs, (1) three of them had clear 
boundaries and membership; (2) four of them had congruent rules; (3) two of them had 
effective collective choice arenas; (4) four of them had monitoring; (5) three of them had 
graduated sanctions; (6) three of them had effective conflict resolution mechanisms; and (7) 
in two of them were the appropriators allowed and able to self-organise their CPR-use 
(Ostrom 1990). In all the success cases, all the design principles were met. Among the failure 
cases, the best met five of them. None of the management institutions in the failure CPRs 
were robust in Ostrom’s terms, and were either failed or fragile in all the cases. The most 
important characteristics of the failure cases were the situational- and regime conditions that 
affected the capacity for individuals to change their institutions. The appropriators were 
heterogeneous, had differing interests and had poor capacity to change the management 
institutions.  
As a critical closing remark, I will note that Ostrom has not given a thorough 
examination of what she means with success and failure. But from her book (1990) it is 
evident that a successful CPR is a CPR that has been managed in a way so that the resource is 
not overused and there is little problem with free-riders, and indirectly that the management 
rules are obeyed. The situation in a failure CPR will then be the opposite, with over-use, free-
riding and non-abeyance of the management rules. 
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4.3.3 How to achieve collective action? 
What makes appropriators overcome the second order problems and supply themselves with 
institutions for management of a CPR, ensure commitment to the rules and undertake 
monitoring and sanctioning? These were the questions from chapter 3.3.1. This chapter 
attempts to provide some answers.  
Ostrom uses the concept institutional supply of the process of initial establishment of 
rules from prior and incremental changes in the established rules. The incremental changes 
have a much lower marginal cost than initial institutional supply. That means that if CPR 
appropriators have been able to establish management institutions, they are also likely to be 
able to change them (Ostrom 1990). With this said, it does not follow that the management 
institutions are robust just because they are invented by the CPR appropriators themselves. 
 According to Ostrom (1990), the key-variable for facilitating institutional supply is 
the appropriator’s ability to self-organisation, or ability to undertake collective action. Still 
traditional collective action theory has not come up with a satisfying explanation for 
cooperative behaviour (Ostrom 1990, 2000). This is because the theoretical predictions based 
on game models with rational, self-interest actors, still tend to assume non-cooperative 
behavior in collective action situations. But reality tells a different story, and several authors 
have tried to bridge the gap, both with evidence from game experiments (referred in Ostrom 
2000) and from field studies (Ostrom 1990, 1994; Balland and Plateau 1996). 
The ability to self-organise for collective action is influenced by a wide range of 
different exogenous and endogenous factors. This chapter will discuss some of them. Ostrom 
finds the design principles to be a very important factor in facilitating self-organisation. If the 
rules presented to the appropriators are conforming to these design principles, it is likely that 
the appropriators will make credible commitments to the rules and undertake monitoring. 
According to Ostrom, appropriators are likely to commit themselves to rules that: 
- define a set of appropriators who are authorized to use a CPR (design principle 1), 
- relate to the specific attributes of the CPR and the community of appropriators 
using the CPR (design principle 2), 
- are designed, at least in part, by local appropriators (design principle 3), and 
- are sanctioned using graduated punishments (design principle 6) 
(Ostrom 1990, 185) 
If external authorities are interfering in the management or overrule the local 
decisions, this also seriously weakens the ability for institutional supply. This condition 
corresponds to design principle seven.  
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Ostrom views the process of agreeing on management rules as a bargaining process, 
where the participants process information about the outcome of the different options, and 
calculate expected benefits and costs (Ostrom 1994). Ostrom finds the probability of a 
successful outcome of a bargaining process over institutional supply to be influenced by 
several factors and variables.  She provides a detailed model, figure 4.1, for how these factors 
and variables are influencing this process. The following four internal factors influence the 
individual choice: (1) Internal norms; (2) Expected benefits; (3) Expected costs; and (4) the 
discount rate in use. Further she lists not less than 23 different situational variables that each 
are found to influence on this factors. I will mention some of these when I discuss each 
internal factor later. The model shows the main factors Ostrom emphasizes in her framework, 
as they are the ones that directly influence on the bargaining process. But she also mentions 
several other factors and variables that influence on the general ability for collective action: 
(5) The total number of decision makers; (6) the heterogeneity of the participants; (7) and the 
presence of participants with substantial leadership or other assets (Ostrom 1990, 2000). 
For appropriators living together in small and homogenous communities, long-term self 
interest behaviour is found to produce strong shared norms (Ostrom 1990, Balland & Plateu 
1996). This is due to their collective fate connected to the state of the resource. Shared social 
Expected 
benefits
Internal norms 
Discount rate 
Support or not 
support of 
change of rules 
Expected costs
Information about benefits of 
proposed rules 
Information about costs of 
transforming, monitoring and 
enforcing of proposed rules  
Information 
about shared 
norms and 
other 
opportunities  
Retain status quo 
rules: Previous 
strategies continued 
Aggregation rule in 
use for change of 
rules 
Change status quo 
rules: New 
strategies adopted 
Fig. 4.1: Summary of factors and variables affecting institutional choice (Ostrom 1990, 193). 
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norms are also likely if the appropriators perform other activities together. This is contrasted 
to the situation where the CPR-appropriators are not coming from the same community and 
do not know each other. Then social norms regarding the resource use are likely to be weak. 
Social norms are “shared understanding about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or 
forbidden” (in Ostrom 2000, 144). Shared norms provide thrust and reciprocity. Ostrom 
(1990) finds strong shared norms to reduce the appropriators’ discount rates. Further, strong 
shared norms reduce the cost associated with monitoring and sanctioning of the management 
rules, which also make it easier for the participators to agree upon CPR management rules.  
Ostrom assumes that the participators in a CPR system are rational actors that calculate 
expected benefits and expected costs, based on available information, when they decide to 
undertake collective action. The rules presented to the participators are crucial for how they 
evaluate benefits and cost, Ostrom finds, and this brings in the design principles, which aim to 
minimize the cost of institutional supply. Ostrom lists several situational variables that might 
influence the benefits and costs. The number of participants and the size and structure of the 
CPR influence the cost of monitoring and sanctioning. The resource characteristics, like size, 
structure and predictability, also influence how the participants evaluate benefits. 
A high discount rate among the participants does not facilitate collective action. The 
discount rate determines how many resource units the appropriator wants to extract from the 
CPR in order to satisfy his needs. The discount rate typically depends of the time-horizon of 
the appropriators. If the appropriators live close to the resource and have utilized it for 
generations they will have a much smaller discount rate than appropriators of a resource with 
no local connections and who operate on a short time span. It is also possible to see this 
difference as the difference between a utility maximizing individual and a utility satisfying 
individual. 
A small numbers of decision makers and participants in the CPR system are in most of 
the cases found to facilitate collective action, but Ostrom also mentions successful cases with 
many participants. The importance of number of participants must therefore be investigated 
on a case by case basis.   
Early works on commons tend to assume homogenous actors, but there are always some 
differences between the participants in a CPR system, Ostrom acknowledges (Ostrom 1994). 
Small, homogenous communities are in the most reviewed cases found to be more likely to 
have a successful management of CPRs, but this does not make it a rule. The level of 
heterogeneity among the participants in respect to power, endowments, ethnicity, religion, 
wealth and accessibility to the CPR are likely to influence the ability to undertake collective 
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action. What kind of heterogeneity and its implications have to be investigated case by case, 
Ostrom concludes. 
Finally is the presence of participants with leadership or other assets found to be 
important to initiate a process of institutional supply (Ostrom 1990).   
The importance of these variables vary from case to case, some are not relevant at all in 
some situations, while other variables not mentioned here might be crucial in other situations. 
In Manang and Ngawal, I have attempted to identify factors and variables that can help 
explain the inhabitants’ ability to manage their water resources. This I will discuss in section 
6.2.  
But even if the community is capable of successful self-organisation, all organisations 
are vulnerable to threats. In a paper from 2000, Ostrom cites findings from empirical literature 
that lists different contextual variables found to threaten the ability to sustained collective 
action (referred in Ostrom 2000). These are not included in her framework from 1990. The 
following factors seem relevant for the cases of Manang and Ngawal: 1) Migration; 2) rapid 
change in technology; 3) and frequently turning to external sources of help (Ostrom 2000). 
All these phenomena take place in Manang and Ngawal, and in addition to the analysis of 
collective action in section 6.2, point 1) and 2) will be discussed separately in section 7.2.1 
and 7.2.3. In-migration as well as out-migration might destabilize a CPR management regime. 
Out-migration may do so by the loss of those who provide necessary contribution to the 
resource and in-migration may yield a high number of resource users who do not share the 
same norms regarding the resource use as the native inhabitants (ibid). Rapid change in 
technology might alter the need of provision and the availability and regularity of the resource 
flow, thereby making the operational rules inappropriate. Turning to external help may render 
the resource users passive regarding the contribution to the resource, and keep them occupied 
with rent-seeking activities. Rent-seeking is a phenomenon that occurs where actors use 
resources to develop different strategies to extract benefits from a perceived generous state, 
NGO or other donors, instead of using their resources to be productive.   
  Ostrom bases her conclusions on a basis of game experiments and evidence from the 
field, and assumes self-interested rational actors that maximize utility.  Still she acknowledges 
that individuals rarely possess exact information and that they therefore are not able to do 
exact calculation of benefits and costs. “Benefits and costs have to be discovered and 
weighted by individuals using human judgment in highly uncertain and complex situations,” 
she states (Ostrom 1990, 210). 
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With the conceptualization of the CPR situation, its puzzles and dilemmas; the 
conceptualization of institutions as nested rules; the design principles; and finally the factors 
and variables that influence on the ability for collective action, Ostrom provides a framework 
that fruitfully can be applied for analysis of the water management in Manang and Ngawal, 
especially the irrigation systems. Nevertheless, the framework has been criticized for its 
economistic, “rational man” views on human behavior, its functionalistic views on 
institutions, its methodological individualism and neglect of contextual factors outside the 
local community (Steins et al. 2000, Mehta et al. 1999, Agrawal 2001). I will discuss some of 
this criticism in light of the findings from the Manang Valley in chapter 6.   
 
 
4.4 Local dialectics 
The scope of this thesis is beyond just analysing the water management systems of two 
selected villages in Manang Valley. It aims to discuss how the communities are able to sustain 
their water supply in a context of climate change, migration and technological change, as well 
as how religion is influencing upon the water management. This means to study how 
Pic. 4.1: Aqueduct made of wooden pipes at the start of the Teng Kyur pipe/canal. To maintain 
these kinds of structures is labour intensive, and requires well-functioning appropriation rules. 
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processes of social change in the communities take place and the role of contextual changes in 
these processes.  
Aase (1998) suggests a method he calls Local Dialectics to study social change in 
communities. It is formulated as a methodology rather than an ontology or epistemology, 
which aims to display how social changes take place as a dialectical process between social 
organisation, social structures and meaning, over space and time. 
Instead of maintaining the two analytical levels of agency and social structures as the 
basic components of the society, known from Giddens structuration theory (1984), Aase adds 
a third level – the level of meaning. According to Aase (1998), social formations are shaped 
in the intersection between praxis and meaning. Behaviour is what can be observed, it is the 
social organisation, agency or praxis. This is the first analytical level.  Behaviour is 
constrained or enabled through social structures, which is the next level. Social structures 
consisting of norms and rules are created and maintained through social organisation, because 
people to a certain extent agree upon them. The reason why people reach consensus over the 
structures is because they find meaning in them. No structures will be maintained if they do 
not give meaning, Aase argues (ibid). People obey to structures not only because they do not 
want to be sanctioned by others, but also because it gives meaning to do so. This common 
meaning in a society is called culture, and is the third level of analysis. In addition to give 
meaning to structures, culture contains conceptions of “the good life” (ibid). This approach to 
the study of social phenomena means that the methodological individualism that was the 
perspective in the previous chapter is left for a perspective that acknowledges the powers of 
social structures and culture in addition to the acts of individuals in the shaping of social 
processes. I will draw on this latter perspective where I finds Ostrom’s framework to be 
inappropriate due to its methodological individualism. This especially regards Ostrom’s 
narrow focus on purposive management institutions, which I criticize in chapter 7.1. 
For analytical purposes then, the society can be divided into three analytical levels: 
Social organisation, social structures and culture (ibid). Compared to Giddens, Aase uses a 
wider and less abstract concept of structure. It becomes possible to distinguish between social 
and physical structures. Social structures are rules, norms and institutions, while physical 
structures can be understood as features in the physical environment that influence human 
action. Instead of applying the concept of agency, Aase uses the concept social organisation 
when writing about human action and praxis.  
 The relationships between the three analytical levels are dialectic in a time-space 
context, which means that a meaningful social organisation in one context, meets its 
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counterpart in another and different context. A dialectic process takes place when a thesis that 
is meaningful in one particular time-space context, appears as an anti-thesis in a different 
time-space context. (ibid). “Social change must be understood as a dialectic interaction 
between praxis, structure and culture” Aase writes (1998, 84). Analytically, one level 
represents a thesis or an antithesis at other levels in a different time- or space context. A 
synthesis is a thought stage in a process of change, which in the next turn becomes a thesis, 
which meets a new antithesis. Using this analytical methodology, it is possible to explain and 
analyse patterns of changes in a society in a space-time context. In Manang and Ngawal, the 
migration has to a certain extent been a process of local dialectic. This I will come back to in 
section 7.2.3. 
As Giddens describes (1984), social praxis might change the structures over time, and 
on the other hand, changes in the structures due to contextual changes might change social 
praxis. Both will over time change culture. According to Giddens, agency not only reproduces 
structures, but also changes them through action over time (ibid). The underlying processes 
that make agency change structures are poorly described. What Aase does is to describe this 
change as a dialectical process. When applying local dialectics in an analysis, the process 
studied must take place over time, only then do the changes becomes visible.  
Structures are more durable than social organisation, so if praxis is changed, its 
organisational principle may be unchanged and ends up as an antithesis to the actual 
organisation. But social structures cannot remain meaningful if praxis changes due to 
contextual changes over time-space. Then the social structures change, but in such a way that 
it does not conflict with the cultural meaning legitimating it.  
When applying local dialectics, social change and development can be viewed as 
dialectical processes between the three analytical levels. Studying a case, the task is to clarify 
on which level a change is taking place and to find out if, or in what way, it becomes an 
antithesis at another level.  
The local dialectics approach will be applied in analysing changes in the water 
systems in section 7.2.3. I will also apply concepts from local dialectics when criticising 
Ostrom’s framework in section 7.2. 
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5 The water supply in Manang and Ngawal 
 
This chapter aims to give a brief description of the water supply situation in the villages of 
Manang and Ngawal, and cover the empirical answers to the research question. In sections on 
the water situation in the villages I will describe the physical water availability of the villages 
and to which extent the villagers rely on rainfall or irrigation, how the villagers perceive the 
impacts from climatic change on the water supply, as well as describing my own 
observations. To provide data about the impacts from climatic change on the water supply 
would have required records from measurements of precipitation and runoff over a long time 
span, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. So I have focused on how the villagers perceive 
the development of the climate and its effect on the water supply. The chapter also presents 
the management systems for the respective irrigation- and drinking water supplies and the 
rituals connected to water.  
In this chapter the results from a household survey carried out in the two villages will 
also be presented. 
 
 
5.1 Funding and construction of irrigation projects 
As a part of the HMK Government of Nepal and donor nation’s effort to develop the rural 
areas of Nepal, a limited funding of different kinds of infrastructure development in the 
districts is provided. Irrigation is one of the important areas of this effort. In the Manang 
District, irrigation development is carried out and funded through the District Agriculture 
Office (DAO). Earlier, there used to be District Irrigation Office, but due to low activity in 
Manang, it merged with the Office in the neighbouring Lamjung District. Large scale 
irrigation project will still be handled by this office. In Manang, the DAO provides pipes, 
engineering and construction for irrigation development. 
The different villages must compete for the limited resources, and when the DAO has 
chosen its projects, the proposals go to the Irrigation Department in Kathmandu, which 
decides which projects will be carried out. The sites are selected after a cost/benefit analysis. 
The DAO has six extension offices out in the district, with staff that visits most of the villages 
in the District. The staff talks with farmers, and are supposed to identify the need for 
irrigation projects at the different places. The VDC themselves may also send a request for an 
irrigation project to the DAO. The staff at the extension offices makes proposals for project 
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sites to the main office and then there will more site inspections with staff from the main 
office before the different project sites are selected.  
A small scale irrigation project handled by the DAO is carried out in the following 
way: 
 1) Survey and extensive farmer consultants. 
 2) Identify needs. 
 3) Site selection. 
 4) Establish user group committees. 
 5) 2,5 NRS pr 500 square meter irrigated land is charged from the all the farmers. This 
 money is refunded if the farmers contribute to the construction work. 
 7) Pipelines and tanks are constructed by the users under supervision by an official 
 from the District Agricultur Office. 
 (Source: Interview with DAO officials in Chame) 
 
The DAO funds plastic pipes and necessary accessories for them, a few sprinklers and 
transportation to the District capital Chame. The farmers must fund cement for the tanks as 
well as transportation from Chame to the construction site. 
When an irrigation project is finished, the infrastructure will formally belong to the 
VDC. In 1992, the HMK Government of Nepal nationalized all the water resources in Nepal, 
and in the rural areas, the water rights was transferred to the VDCs (Dixit 2000). In Upper 
Manang, the de facto control over the irrigation systems has nevertheless always belonged to 
the users, according to the local informants. 
There is no formalized cooperation between the Agriculture Office and other actors 
involved in irrigation construction. ACAP is also involved in some irrigation projects, and 
cooperation occurs on some large projects, like the Gyanchang Khola pipeline for the villages 
of Manang and Tenki.  
The DAO might assist the user groups with repair of broken pipelines, but not if the 
pipeline is constructed by other organisations (like foreign NGOs and ACAP). The DAO does 
not train the user group in pipe joining or other types of maintenance work that might require 
some competence. 
 Only one pipeline in the study area was not built by the DAO or the previous District 
Irrigation Office. This is the Ghatte Khola pipeline for Manang village, and it was build by a 
NGO called Global Route in 1997. This organisation had Californian students working on 
different development projects in the area. They stopped all their activities after the massacre 
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of the royal family in 2000. In the spring of 2004, the pipeline was broken in a lot of places, 
and the farmers had chosen to cultivate buckwheat in the fields served by this canal, so they 
would have time to fix the pipes before the sowing. In this case, the DAO had promised to 
assist with repairs.  
 The policy regarding irrigation development that is described here is termed the 
Farmer Managed Irrigation System (FMIS) approach in water literature and is contrasted to 
Agency Managed Irrigation System (AMIS) (Banskota et al 2000). In AMIS, the users are not 
involved in the management. The FMIS approach is now widely promoted by the HMK 
Government of Nepal and by important development actors such as the World Bank (Gautam 
& Subedi 2000). This can be seen as the influence by the CPR approach on the mainstream 
development policy (Steins et al. 2000).  
 Drinking water facilities are provided by the District Sanitation and Drinking Water 
Sub-office (DSDWS). In 2004, their only project in the entire Manang District was the 
drinking water pipeline of the Gyangchang Khola project. The Gyanchang Khola project is 
described in section 5.2.1. 
 
 
5.2 The water situation in Manang 
The Manang village is situated between two streams coming down from the glaciers below 
the Chulu mountains, the Syaktan Khola and Ghotte Khola (see map 5.1)). The first one has 
been the most important for irrigation, with irrigation canals as old as the village, according to 
local informants. The amount of water in both Syaktan Khola and Ghatte Khola fluctuates a 
lot during the year, with most water during the snowmelt in early spring and the under the 
monsoon in June, July and August.  
Traditionally, the farmers have relied on moist soil from the snow melt, and somewhat 
on sporadic rainfalls, and irrigation has been used both as a supply and an option if there is 
little rain. If the soil is dry, and there is little or no precipitation, the amount of water in the 
streams that can be used for irrigation makes the difference between a failed harvest or a good 
one. 
In 1997, a new pipeline from the river Gyanchang Khola was established, which gave 
a stable supply of water for irrigation for the villages of Manang and Tenki. The Gyanchang 
Khola is a little river situated 7 km north-west of the village, with much more water than the  
two streams nearby the village. This pipeline had enormous importance, according to all the 
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informants I spoke to. It increased the safety and generally increased the amount of wheat that 
was grown in the village. 
The amount of water streams in the pre-monsoon seems to be dependent on the 
following variables: Snow melting in the Chulu Mountains, precipitation in the period, and 
melt water from glacier and ground water flow (this assumption is based on own observation 
and conversations with local informants). According to informants, the most important factor 
determining the amount of water in the streams in spring time is the amount of snow that falls 
in the winter (December to February). But even after the establishment of the Gyanchang 
Khola pipeline the agriculture is heavily dependent on rainfall in April and May to sustain a 
normal yield. The pipelines and canals do not supply enough water to make all the villagers 
Pic 5.1: The Teng Kyur pipeline ends 
and the Teng Kyur canal starts (see 
map 5.2). Annapurna II (7937) in the 
background 
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Map 5.1: Estimated decrease of glaciers in Manang 1996-2004 
irrigate sufficiently within the same period of time if there is no rain and the soil is dry before 
sowing.  
The importance of irrigation before sowing has increased in the past years, according 
to several informants. Like one of them put it:  
 
This year it is very dry. Before it used to be much more snow in the mountains, but this 
year it is very little. Normally at this time it could be difficult to cross the Thorung La 
and Kang La pass due to all the snow. This year it is easy to cross the high passes, 
because there is so little snow (Manangi farmer).   
 
The soil was often moist enough, either from recent rainfall or due to recent snow melting in 
the above lying slopes. An old informant said she “could not remember so little snow in the 
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mountains and so little rain at this time at the year ever” (Old manangi farm woman).  This 
informant feared a bad harvest this year due to this. Her problem was that her field was using 
a canal supplied by a pipe with leakages, so that they had a shortage of water in dry periods 
like now.  
On site observation made during my fieldwork in spring 2004 compared to maps and 
aerial photographs from 1996 also indicates a retreat of permanent snow cover and glaciers 
(see map 5.1, and box 5.1). The villagers of Manang on the other hand did not perceive retreat 
of glaciers as a threat to their water supply. None of the informants had any opinion of the 
development of the glaciers feeding the streams, nor of the importance these glaciers might 
have for the water supply. Most shared the opinion of the informant cited (Manangi farmer), 
that the amount of snow in the mountains and spring precipitation were the most important 
factors. Some informants found the last years to be drier than it has used to be, with less water 
Map 5.2: The canals and pipes of Manang village
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in the stream in spring time. The solution to a possible drier climate was simply more pipes, 
according to all the informants asked.   
Manang village has four canals from Syaktan Khola, one pipeline from Ghatte Khola 
and one pipeline from Gyanchang Khola (map 5.2, 5.3 and table 5.1). The canals from 
Syaktan Khola are mostly open canals, except the Teng Kyur canal of which approximately 
the half consist of a pipeline. These canals and the pipeline from Ghatte Khola bring water 
from the streams and directly out in the fields through a network of feeder canals in between 
the fields. The Gyanchang Khola pipeline on the other hand leads water to the Syaktan Khola 
and provides a stable supply of water in the lower part of this stream (see map 5.2).   
 
Box 5.1: Notes about the maps in chapter 5   
 
Unfortunately I did not have access to aerial photographs of the area at the time I made 
these maps. The maps in this chapter are created with Arc Map 9.1 using shape files from a 
digitized Nepal 1:50 000 map (sheet 2884 05) from HMG Nepal survey department and 
drawings based on my own observation. This map is based on aerial photographs from 1996. 
The entities Settlements, Large stream, Small stream and Glaciers / permanent snow 1996 I 
have digitized my self from the Nepal 1: 50 000 map. The entity Glaciers / permanent snow 
observed 2004 and all canal and pipe entities I have drawn on basis of my own observations 
plotted onto the mentioned 1: 50 000 map with the help of GPS, compass and altimeter. The 
positions of these entities are therefore to be considered as indications rather than exact 
geographical references.  The other entities in the map (Contour lines, Roads, VDC 
boundaries etc.) is digitized from the Nepal 1:50 000 map, (sheets 2884 05) by the Central 
Department of Geography, Tribuvan University in Kathmandu.  
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Table 5.1: The irrigation canals and pipelines of Manang 
 
Name Source Type Size  Establised 
Gyanchang Khola Gyanchang Khola Irrigation pipeline  Big 1997 
Gyanchang Khola Gyanchang Khola Drinking water 
pipeline 
Big 1997, 
finished 
2004 
Teng Kyur Syaktan Khola Half pipe, half 
canal 
Big Pre 1900, 
pipe 1998 
Por Kyur Syakthan Khola 100 m pipe, canal Small Pre 1900 
Mon Kyur I Syaktan Khola 100 m pipe, canal Small Pre 1900 
Mon Kyur II Syakthan Khola Canal Small Pre 1900 
Mon Kyur III Syakthan Khola Canal Small Pre 1900 
Ghatte Khola Ghatte Khola Pipeline Big 1997 
Total length major irrigation pipes  ≈  8235 m 
Total length minor irrigation pipes  ≈ 527 m 
Total length major drinking water 
pipes 
≈ 5306 m 
Total length minor drinking water 
pipes 
≈ 1717 m 
Total length canals  ≈ 4767 m  
 
Under the colonna “Size” does big refer to pipes with a diameter between approximately 15-25 cm, 
while small pipes has a diameter between approximately 10-15 cm 
 
5.2.1 The Gyanchang khola project  
The Gyanchang Khola pipeline is the largest irrigation and drinking water project ever carried 
out in the Manang District. It consists of three different pipelines from the Gyanchan Khola, 6 
km away from Manang (see map 5.3). One pipeline is for irrigation for Tenki village (not 
displayed at the map), one pipeline goes into the Syaktan Khola, which supplies several 
irrigation canals for Manang Village; and one pipeline, which is still not finished, provides 
drinking water for Manang village. The overall budget was approximately 10 million NRS. 
Approximately 50 percent of the cost was covered by the government, 10 percent by ACAP, 
four to five percent as donations from wealthy Manangis in Kathmandu, and the rest as labour 
contributed by the villagers. The irrigation pipelines were finished in 1997, while the drinking 
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water pipeline was about to be finished in spring 2004. So how were the Manangis able to get 
this project through? The villagers gathered in a meeting were they established a committee to 
work on it, and in 1995 the VDC sent a formal request to the District Irrigation Office. The 
leader of the Gyanchang Khola committee was at that time also the chairman in the District 
Development Committee, a succesfull lodge-owner from Manang village. Even if the man 
himself did not think his position at the time was a prerequisite for the project to come 
through, other informants in the village were of that opinion.  
 
There was a lot of paper work to get it through. It was very difficult. You know, it is a 
lot of corruption and this sort of things. So I had to work very hard for a long time (ex 
District Chairman). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 5.3: The pipelines of Manang village
The water supply in Manang and Ngawal  
 72 
The committee sent letters to all wealthy Manangis living in Kathmandu and Pokhara, and 
they received a little portion of money this way. The most important contribution from 
villagers of Manang was their work. All the households had to send one worker for one month  
of work. From Manang this meant 37 persons working for one month. The responsibility for 
maintaining the pipeline lies with a committee of 7-8 members elected in the village. If 
assistance from the DAO is needed, they will go to the VDC, which will send a formal 
request to the DAO.  
 
5.2.2 Maintenance of the canals - provision 
The responsibility for the management of the canals and pipelines lies within several user 
groups and committees. The farmers who use an irrigation canal form a group responsible for 
maintaining this particular canal. The groups elect a committee consisting of one to four 
persons to lead the user group and organise different activities. The committee is appointed 
among the oldest farmers, and its’ members change from year to year. The committee is 
responsible for calling one worker from each of the households that use the canal to a 
maintenance day, collecting fines from farmers who do not send a worker to the maintenance 
day, provide food to the workers on the maintenance day and to buy pipes and/or cement for 
repairing the pipelines from the fund collected from the fines.  
The irrigation canals- and pipelines are maintained every year on a maintenance day, 
which is organised by the different user groups. The maintenance day of the different 
irrigation canals are normally held approximately 15 days before it is time to sow the wheat. 
If the soil is dry, it needs to be irrigated before the farmers can start the sowing. The farmers 
of Manang village start to sow wheat from the day the sunset hits the summit of Capsu Peak  
(local name, not marked on any map), west of Gangapurna. This is around the 10th of April. 
The sowing day may be advanced in case of rainfall, because in that case, irrigation will not 
be necessary in order to start the sowing. The day before the canal maintenance day, the  
leader of the different user groups climbs on top of some of the high roof tops in the village  
and shout out that it is time for maintenance, which canal and what time it starts. And  
then this message will be spread through the village. The maintenance follows some rules:  
1) All the farmers who use a canal have to send one worker to the maintenance day of 
this canal. If a farmer uses several canals, he has to send a worker to the 
maintenance days for all the canals he uses. 
2) Both men and woman can work on the canal.  
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3) No workers under the age of 16 year are allowed. Exceptions can be made for 
workers down to twelve years of age if they bring a good tool.  
4) Farmers who do not send a worker and workers who arrive late will be given a 
fine. The fines are: 150 rupees for workers who do not show up and 75 to 50 
rupees if they are late. If workers who arrive late bring a bottle of the local booze, 
ara, they might get a reduced fine or no fine at all. Apologies and gifts do also 
reduce the fines for other kinds of rule violation.  
5) According to tradition, the workers get a ball of rice and some soup, and ara and 
shying to drink.  
6) The user group must appoint a committee for the following year. 
 
 This way of organising the maintenance was invented by the farmers themselves they claim, 
even if the concept with establishing user groups for running the irrigation system is used by 
the DAO, as part of their FMIS policy. The maintenance rules correspond to what Ostrom 
(1990) term provision rules. That the Manangi irrigation users have been able to make their 
own provision rules makes the management system robust, according to Ostrom’s design 
principles. The way the irrigation management system of Manang and Ngawal corresponds to 
Ostrom’s design principles is more thoroughly examined in chapter 6.1.2.   
 The maintenance system has not always been as it is today. van Spengen (1987) 
describes an irrigation system with extensive use of canals made of hollowed out tree trunks, 
as well as a few aqueducts. At the time van Spengen visited the area, in 1981, each of the 
village households had to provide five days labour from one worker each year for canal 
maintenance. Landless villagers also had to contribute, and their reward for the effort was free 
food and drink during the maintenance days. The food and drink was contributed by the 
villagers who owned land. They had to contribute rice or wheat for the maintenance work in 
an amount that was dependent on the size of their irrigated land.  It was confirmed by the 
villagers that they had this system earlier, 20 years ago they told me. But the villagers agreed 
to change it. They gave two reasons for changing the system: 1) Farmers found it frustrating 
to work at a canal that they did not use. 2) Introduction of plastic pipes led to less need for 
maintenance, so less workers were required to work at the different canals. “Before we had to 
go many times to maintain the canals. There was no plastic pipes, just wooden pipes”, one  
old Manangi farmer said. This informant said that it was often difficult to get enough people 
to work on the maintenance days and it required also substantially more work to maintain and 
replace the wooden pipes that were used at that time. This was before the return-migration 
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had started. So at that time, labour shortage could be a problem for maintain the irrigation 
system. Today lack of labour was not a problem for the maintenance of the irrigation system, 
according to all the Manangi informants. 
One informant believed that the current maintenance system made the farmers feel a 
stronger degree of ownership and responsibility towards the canals: 
 
When the farmers came back to work at the same canal year after year, they feel 
responsibility for this canal, and put some extra effort into doing the maintenance 
well, so there will be less work to do next year (Manangi farmer and lodge owner). 
   
A third factor that may have contributed to a change in the irrigation situation is the 
abandonment of fields. Until approximately 15 years ago, there was a continuous 
abandonment of fields, which reduced the overall need for water. “30 years ago we had to 
work hard to get fields. Now we have fields, but no one to work at them”, one farmer told. 
Migration has therefore led to higher availability of irrigation for the remaining cultivated 
fields, at the same time the reform of the maintenance system and the introduction of plastic 
pipes made it possible to sustain an extensive irrigation system with a less number of 
labourers. The fact that the appropriators were able to change the management system as 
response to contextual changes shows an ability to undertake institutional supply, which again 
confirms that the management institutions are robust, according to Ostrom (1990).  
The plastic pipes do also need maintenance. The pipes are lying on top of the surface 
or just barely buried down. They are therefore prone to damages from landslides, frost heave 
and spring thaw. Pipes normally break in the joints between the pipe-elements. To rejoin 
pipes and seal cracks, some simple equipment and skills are needed. The maintenance of the 
pipes does not require the joint effort of the entire user group, as the maintenance days, but 
skilled effort from a couple of workers. In Manang, some of the appropriators have received 
training in pipe maintenance, and they get paid for doing small maintenance on the different 
pipes. Larger damages on the pipes the villagers are not able to fix themselves, and the 
pipeline ends up being dry until the DAO provides funding for repair. Reduced capacity of the 
pipelines due to damages was perceived as a problem among many Manangis. The Ghatte 
Khola pipeline was dry due to extensive damages. Farmers using the Teng Kyur canal were 
complaining about a leakage in this canal and that nothing was done about it. These farmers 
said that they had problems getting enough water for irrigation because of this leakage. Also 
the capacity of the Gyanchang Khola pipeline was reduced due to a leakage, which annoyed 
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several of the farmers, since there was currently a water shortage. They were dissatisfied with 
the current management system because of this leakage, and placed the responsibility on the 
VDC.  
Introduction of new technology to the water system, such as plastic pipes, could be a 
challenge to the sustainability of the water management system, according to several authors 
(Agrawal & Narain 1997, Banskota et al. 2000, Ostrom 2000). These challenges regard the 
availability of the resource itself and to the management. The problems with leakage from the 
pipes in Manang could represent such a challenge. These concerns are discussed in chapter 
7.2.1. 
 
5.2.3 Water sharing - appropriation 
There is never enough water in the irrigation canals for all the farmers to irrigate 
simultaneously. The appropriation of water for irrigation therefore follows some rules, 
defined by the appropriators themselves: 
1) Everyone who has a field has a right to use the irrigation canals.  
2) If there is only enough water in the stream to serve one canal at the time, the  
uppermost canals serves first.  
3)   The succession of turns to irrigate the fields is decided in a lottery:  
a) Every user group divided into groups of 5-6 farms, which fields are 
situated close to each other. The members of the groups may irrigate 
simoultanously. 
b) Then the group draws lots to decide the succession of groups to irrigatate. 
c)  The farmers may irrigate until the fields are completed.  
4) In dry periods in the critical time around the sowing and germination, it might be 
necessary to irrigate more frequently. When all the groups have done their 
irrigation by turn, it is the first come first serve principle that applies for 
appropriators who want to irrigate more.  
5) Appropriators who irrigate without it being their turn will be fined by the VDC. 
The fines range from 200 to 500 rupees. 
 
The water sharing rules correspond to what Ostrom (1990) calls appropriation rules. 
According to Ostrom’s second design principle, the appropriation rules and the provision 
rules must correspond to each other and the nature of the resource for the management system 
to be sustainable. This is discussed in section 6.1.2. 
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Most of the canals are coming from the Syaktan Khola. And the second rule is relevant 
for the three lower canals from this stream. Besides the canals to the Manang fields, Tenki 
village also has three canals from the Syaktan Khola. The uppermost serve first rule (the 
second rule) applies for the Tenki canals as well.  
The Gyanchan Khola pipeline leads water into the Syaktan Khola. The establishment 
of this pipeline gave a significantly higher degree of predictability and a more stable water 
supply for the Tenki and Manang farmers. But even with this pipeline, there was little water 
in the Syaktan Khola during spring of 2004. This meant that only a limited number of fields 
could be irrigated at the same time, and that the farmers had to irrigate 24 hour a day for a 
limited period.  
In dry periods like this, water stealing occurs. Water theft is what happens when a 
farmer takes water upstream of a farmer who is irrigating, outside his turn. If the one who has 
the right to irrigate finds the thief, they will argue and sometimes fight, according to the 
informants. Disputes and fighting also occur when several farmers are irrigating from the 
same canal, and the lower one finds that the upper one takes too much water. One informant 
told me that there was so little water that people had started stealing water from each other. 
“When it is little water, the uppermost irrigators takes it all. Fighting sometimes take place in 
the morning when the users of the lower canals wants water” (old Manangi farm woman). 
Another informant said that when they were irrigating they used to have one worker 
hiding higher up along the canal to spot possible water thiefs.  
 
 If someone diverts water above us without turn, our worker who hides would go and 
close the opening where the thief leads water to his field (…), and perhaps confront 
the thief.(…)  If it happens several times, we might report to the VDC (Manangi farm 
woman). 
 
This informant said it rarely happened that water theft was reported to the VDC. Most of the 
time there would be an argument, and sometimes a fight. But a fight did not necessarily mean 
that the case would be reported to the VDC. But if the offended felt that the thief did not show 
respect, the case might be reported to the VDC, and the offender would probably be fined, 
according to the informant.  
The informants asked said that the current situation with water shortage was not 
normal after the establishment of Gyanchang Khola pipeline. They said it rarely happens that 
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the farmers will have to irrigate during the night, and the conflict level is much lower now 
than it used to be. As one of them said: 
 
 Now we can sleep at night. But before the Gyanchang Khola there was no sleep. We 
used to make a fire and have torches, and we got very tired. Now we can get up five –
six in the morning and go to sleep by seven – eight in the evening (Manangi farmer 
and lodge owner) 
 
Several informants talked of frequent and serious fighting in dry periods before the 
Gyanchang Khola pipeline where installed. Sometimes people used knifes, but no one was 
ever killed according to the informants. The fighting over water that sometimes occurred did 
not produce any bad relationships between the villagers. As one of them put it: “If they fight 
in the night, they have forgotten it the next day” (Manangi farmer and lodge owner). 
Irrigation is primarily done by women, and the improvement of the irrigation system 
mostly eases the labour burden of the women in the village.  
 
5.2.4 Drinking water 
In the village there are many water taps, most of them installed seven years ago by a 
governmental, UNICEF sponsored, safe drinking water project. Before that, the village only 
had one tap, according to local informants. Lack of drinking water does not occur, but 
sometimes some pipes freeze over in winter. Most of the vegetables are irrigated with 
sprinklers where the water is taken from taps. In dry periods the sprinkler irrigation might 
lead to some empty taps. In the peak trekker season the hotels also find the water situation 
marginal. There are two sources for drinking water.  When the drinking water pipeline from 
Gyanchang Khola is finished, it will improve the water supply especially for the hotels. 
Individual houses might also get running water installed.  
The maintenance of the drinking water system is different from that of the irrigation 
system. There is one technician employed by the District Sanitation and Drinking Water Sub- 
office (DSDWS) in the village, responsible for repairing taps and pipes. No collective action 
from the appropriators is therefore needed. Nevertheless, the lodge-owners are very dependent 
on a reliable water supply in the tourist season, and they therefore also take a high degree of 
responsibility for keeping the drinking water system running. The investment in drinking 
water and the maintenance system in Manang is apparently a result of successful lobbying of 
the lodge-owners towards the DSDWS.  
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 Besides the taps, a New Zealand Aid consultant group has installed a safe drinking 
water plant in the village that is targeting the trekkers. The plant is officially hosted by ACAP, 
and run by the ACAP initiated Mother Group in the village. All maintenance and funding are 
still provided by the New Zealanders, as long as ACAP is not capable of doing this.  
 
5.2.5 Water and rituals 
With the village so dependent on rainfall, it is not to wonder that rituals related to water used 
to be widespread. In Manang, the most important ritual still in use is an annually puja 
dedicated to water, in late March, a couple of weeks before it is time to sow the wheat. Under 
this puja all the villagers gather at the Bodzo Gompa, they pray and give sacrifices to the god 
Bodzo Kaebe. Bodzo Kaebe is a local god, which 300- 400 years ago was a king who ruled 
the region. He had magical powers, and was able to make rain.  
The rituals practiced in the gompas of Manang follow the Tibetan calendar Loopon 
Karma Tetdung. If there is no rain during a period of days described in this calendar, the lama 
will perform a ritual in order to make it rain. This puja shuld be performed at a sacred place 
related to water. In Manang this was the sacred lake of Kicho, situated at 4600 m a.s.l in the 
hillside above the village. The puja consists of prayers and the spraying of milk over the lake. 
An informant told the story about why the Kicho lake is sacred: 
 
Long time ago, the lama of Karken Gompa (a gompa right outside Manang village) 
went to the Kicho Lake. He went up to the lake early a clear and quiet morning. Just at 
sunrise, he saw chortens (little, square shaped pillars of stones) and statues in the lake. 
The lama then went into the lake. There he found a book and a statue. He tried to 
carry both things out, but could only get the statue. He took the statue and placed it in 
the Bragha Gompa. But unfortunately, the statue was stolen, and has never been seen 
again (Manangi farmer and lodge owner). 
 
People in Manang strongly believe that if you are a good person, you could walk to the 
Kicho lake in the early morning before sunset and the sky is clear, you must be calm and have 
a good heart, and then you might see things in the lake. People say that they see chortens and 
buildings. One informant told me that he had seen a forest with a path. These myths and the 
personal experiences kept Kicho Lake as a sacred place for the villagers of Manang. 
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A third ritual used if there were little water in the streams was that the Lama used to go to 
Syakthan Khola or Ghotte Khola and give a puja, which was to read from the Tibetan book 
and sacrifice a tormo, a little bird figurine made of yak butter and wheat flavour. Earlier, this 
used to be a real bird, but now the villagers of Manang claim to have left the practices of 
Black Bon, and a sacrifice of a bird would be counter to Buddhism. Anyway, currently there 
are no lamas who have the skill to make more water in the stream by this ritual. The lama of 
the Bodzo Gompa told that they also might perform some puja for water to chortens, but this 
is rarely done. The pujas given to streams or lakes was dedicated to the water itself, not to any 
god, according to the village lama.  
 People also pray individually to the god Loo for water. Loo is the snake god and live 
under the earth, and is the god of the domestic matters. Loo will for instance become angry if 
a house is not kept clean.  People in Manang strongly believe in Loo, which is a god both in 
Pic. 5.2: The hat of Bodzo Kaeba, 
believed to be over 300 years old. 
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Hinduism and in Tibetan Buddhism. In all the houses of Manang there a little figure of Loo 
that people worship. 
 People say that after the establishments of the Gyanchang Khola pipeline, the 
importance of the rituals have decreased. Before the Gyanchang Khola was established, one 
of the village lamas said, if there was little water, the lama used to sacrifice a bird-figure made 
of tsampa flavour and yak butter to the Syaktan Khola. This was done if there was no rain 
within a particular period described the Tibetan Calendar. One old farm woman said that it 
always comes rain and more water in the stream when this puja was performed. 
 The only ritual that is still used is the Bojo Kaeba Puja and peoples individual prayer to Loo.  
 Religion and rituals also play a more indirect role for the water management. There 
are regularly different religious festivals, some more important than others. At the most 
important one, most people would like to go. Then they must finish as much farm-work as 
possible before the festival start. This means that before a religious festival, there could be 
shortage of water for irrigation, because all the farmers wanted to irrigate at the same time. 
 The relationship between religion and the water management is more thoroughly 
discussed in chapter 7.3. 
 
 
5.3 The water situation in Ngawal 
Like Manang, Ngawal is also situated between two streams, Cheta Khola and Tonje Khola 
(see map 5.4), which are the sources of water for irrigation and drinking water. The water 
level in both streams fluctuates during the year, as response to snowmelt and precipitation. 
When I was there, the villagers said that the water level was very low.  
 From the Cheta Khola there are four irrigation canals (see map 5.5 and table 5.2), no 
plastic pipes are installed, but there are some concrete canals and wooden pipes. One canal is 
totally abandoned. From Tonje Khola there are three canals. All the canals were supposed to 
be several hundred years old, no one seemed to know exactly how old. Tonje Khola also has a 
little reservoir, build 60-70 years ago. 
Several informants in Ngawal claimed that many of the villagers were poor mainly 
because of the lack of water: “People get poor because they have these poor, unirrigated 
fields” (Ngawali farmer, immigrated from Phu). Little or no irrigation to the field results in 
poor harvests if there is little rain. The same informants also said that some people would 
sometimes experience lack of food during the winter if there was little rain during the 
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summer. Based on what the informants told, the water situation in Ngawal seems to be much 
more unstable than in Manang. “The main problem here in Ngawal is lack of water”, one 
farmer said. “The irrigation is not sufficient. Every year there is the same problem” another 
complained. When I visited Ngawal in the end of April, the share of fields that had been sown 
was much lower than in Manang. Due to the lack of rain, the wheat could not be sown before 
the field was irrigated. And because of little water, it took a long time for all the farmers to 
irrigate their wheat plot.  According to one informant, several of the fields had been 
abandoned due to lack of irrigation: “This year and last year, 18 plots have been abandoned 
due to lack of water” (ex-VDC chairman of Ngawal). 
As in Manang, the informants I spoke to had not thought of glaciers as important for 
their water supply, but when I asked, some could believe that glacier retreat might influence 
on the water supply. Nearly all of the permanent snow and glaciers marked on the Nepal 1: 50 
000 map made from aerial photographs from 1996 had all disappeared when I was in Ngawal  
 
 
 
Map 5.4: Estimated decrease of glaciers in Ngawal 1996-2004 
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in  April 2004 (see map 5.4). Several informants found that the environment had become 
drier. “Every year there is problem with water, but this year it is worse. (…) There are more 
and more problems, every year the streams get smaller” (Old Ngawali farmer). And as in 
Manang, one informant commented on how easy it was to cross the Kang La pass these days, 
compared to earlier years were there used to be a lot of snow. The informants found the 
solution to a drier climate to be quite simple: Just build more pipelines. But regardless of any 
perceived climatic change, the villagers wanted a pipeline from Jullu Khola, due to the high 
degree of uncertainty regarding the water supply from the two streams of Cheta Khola and 
Tonje Khola. Jullu Khola is a small river that flows a couple of kilometres north-west of the 
village. According to the DAO, this pipeline was already engineered and the construction was 
about to begin. But the villagers never mentioned this to me. 
Map 5.5: Canals and pipes of Ngawal
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Table 5. 2: The irrigation canals and pipelines  of Ngawal 
 
Name Source Type Size Establised 
Cheta Khola I Cheta Khola Open canal, 
460 m concrete
Small 1980-90 
Cheta Khola II Cheta Khola Canal Small Pre 1900 
Cheta Khola III Cheta Khola Canal Small Pre 1900 
Cheta Khola IV Cheta Khola Canal Small Pre 1900 
Tonje Khola I Tonje Khola Canal Small 1997 
Tonje Khola II Tonje Khola Open canal, 
300 m concrete 
Small 1980-90 
Tonje Khola III Tonje Khola Canal, stream Small Pre 1900 
Total length canals ≈ 3508 m 
Total length concrete canals ≈ 760 m 
Total length irrigation pipelines ≈ 220 m 
Total length drinking water pipelines ≈ 1030 m 
 
 
5.3.1 Maintainance of irrigation canals - provision 
As in Manang, all the major irrigation canals are maintained before the wheat is sown. There 
are maintenance days, and the system seems quite similar to the old one in Manang. The 
farmers are organised in a canal committee. The rules are as following: 
1) All the households have to send one worker to all the maintenance days.  
2) Those who do not send a worker to the maintenance day will be fined. Same fines 
as in Manang. If the workers bring ara or have a good explanation for why they 
arrive late or do not show up the fine will be reduced. 
3) Everyone can work at the maintenance day as long as they bring a good tool. 
 
There is no provision of food during the work. The feeder canals are not the responsibility of 
the entire community and must be maintained on ad hoc basis by its appropriators. If a canal 
needs special effort beyond the maintenance day, it is the VDC who calls people to work.  
Even if none of the canals are very long, some are situated on slopes and are often 
damaged by small landslides, according to some informants. Therefore some farmers 
regularly have to go out and repair the canals after rainfall. Some of the canals have sections 
of wooden pipes, and these need to be replaced every tenth year. The problem is that to make 
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the wooden pipes is very labour intensive, and because the forest is protected, the farmers 
have problems finding appropriate materials for making them. And according to one 
informant, the wooden pipes deteriorated due to lack of male labourers. On the other hand, 
another informant said the general canal maintenance did not suffer from lack of workers. 
A lot of the fields around Ngawal are abandoned due to out migration, but this is land 
that for most of the part was unirrigated, according to the informants. Still, it is possible to 
imagine that the overall uncertainty related to the dependency of rain has decreased compared 
to the situation where a substantial portion of the fields were unirrigated, since now most of 
the fields are irrigated. I found some abandoned canals that were connected to cultivated 
fields. These were abandoned due to their dependency on wooden pipes. In the case of 
Ngawal, lack of male labour may lead to a lower standard on the maintenance of the irrigation 
system, at the same time as migration has not lead to a better availability of water due to 
abandonment of fields.    
The government had provided some plastic pipes, but too little and of too small 
dimensions according to several informants. The government has also provided some cement, 
but too little for it to matter, according to one informant. According to one informant, the 
strategy of most of the farmers “is to do as little maintenance as possible and pray for rain 
while they wait for pipes from the government” (Young female Ngawali lodge owner).  
 
5.3.2 Water Sharing - appropriation 
The appropriation of water for irrigation follows some clearly defined rules in Ngawal. The 
rules are crafted by the appropriators themselves. None of the informants knew if the rules 
were written down. 
1) The succession of the irrigation of the fields are decided on a first come – first 
serve basis. 
2) An appropriator who wants to irrigate has to put a little stone in a particular place 
along the canal she wants to use, under witness by another appropriator. The next 
one to irrigate is the one who put a stone after the first irrigators’ stone.  
3) The appropriator might irrigate until she has finished with one plot. 
4) Appropriators have to sleep in their own house the night before they are going to 
irrigate. If someone sleeps out in the fields in order to be the first to irrigate, it 
regarded as cheating and the person will be fined.  
5) The appropriators from the Tonje Khola canals must stop irrigating between four 
p. m. and six a.m., so the downstream village of Ngawal Beshi can use the stream 
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for their mill. If a Ngawali farmer wants to irrigate during this time at the day, he 
must pay the farmer who is going to use the mill 350 to 400 rupees. 
6) The appropriators  of the uppermost Cheta Khola canal are not allowed to divert 
more than 2/3 of the water in the stream into the canal when they are irrigating. If 
they do they will be fined with 50 to 200 rupees.  
7) Water theft reported to the VDC will first be sanctioned with a warning. If the 
water stealing continues, the thief will be fined. By apologize or provide ara to the 
insulted, the thief might not be fined, or the fine will be reduced. 
 
In 2004, there was too little water in the streams to allow the farmers sufficient irrigation, 
even if the farmers irrigated during the night. Fighting occurred all the time in this period, 
according to all the informants. Most of the fights were solved on the spot while more serious 
disputes had to be settled by the VDC chairman. The conflict over water took many shapes. 
One frequent source of dispute occurred when the next appropriator in the line started to take 
water before the first one had finished. Another frequent problem occurred if someone took 
water without it being their turn. Some informants complained that the rich people took all the 
water, while the poorer always lost the disputes over water. The appropriators of the Tonje 
Khola also found it very frustrating to stop irrigating because of the water mill in Ngawal 
Beshi. At the same time, the mill in Ngawal was not functioning because there was too little 
water in Cheta Khola, so the farmers in Ngawal had to grind their grain at the Ngawal Beshi 
mill.  
 According to my survey (see table 5.3) Most Ngawalis were generally dissatisfied 
with the irrigation management system, had problems with water shortage and had been 
involved in fights over water. The water supply situation in Ngawal seemed to be much 
poorer than in Manang. Is this due to differences in available water resources, and in that case, 
are the appropriation rules not tailored well enough in relation to the resource attributes? And 
why have the Ngawalis not been able to self-organise for collective action in order to improve 
their water supply? In chapter 6.2 I will highlight the differences between Manang and 
Ngawal by looking at the factors and variables Ostrom (1990) uses in her model of collective 
action. 
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5.3.3 Drinking water 
There are a lot of taps in Ngawal installed at the same time as the taps in Manang in 1997 
under the UNICEF safe drinking water project. The taps get water from a pipe to Chetta 
Khola. This pipe is two years old and was installed in order to replace a pipeline from Tonje 
Khola that had broken. However, the taps were very often dry, because the villagers had 
trouble maintaining the new pipe as well. In summertime the intake was jammed by leafs and 
pine needles, and in winter it sometimes froze.  
There is no committee in the village responsible for maintaining the drinking water 
system, and the DSDWS transfers the responsibility for the system to the village when they 
finish a project. According to what many villagers said, it is not difficult to clean the drinking 
water intake for leaves, but since it was no one’s responsibility, it was not done and the taps 
could be dry for long periods of time, according to the informants. Some of the irrigation 
canals ran through the village, and many villagers therefore took their drinking water from the 
irrigation canal running through the village trail (see pic. 3.2). This water was often muddy. 
Several informants were complaining over the fact that this canal went dry if upstream 
farmers were irrigating. There was also a spring on a meadow some 200 meter outside the 
village, where many villagers went to fetch drinking water. One informant had this comment 
to why many villagers were satisfied drinking water from ditch in the street: “The villagers 
are uneducated and lazy, therefore they prefer to take water from the street instead of fixing 
the drinking water pipeline” (Young female Ngawali lodge owner).  
The drinking water system in Ngawal is unmanaged; the Ngawalis have not been able 
to undertake collective action in order to secure their own drinking water supply. This diplays 
a classic problem of collective action. The underlying factors and possible explanations for 
the deteriorated state of the Ngawali drinking water system I will discuss together with the 
other differences between Manang and Ngawal in chapter 6.2. 
 
5.3.4 Water and rituals 
As in Manang, rituals for water were an ordinary part of the daily life. And as in Manang, 
most people worshipped the snake god Loo for water. If the streams had little water, the 
village lama would go to the source on a meadow east of the village and perform a puja by 
spraying yak milk and reading from the Tibetan book. In opposition to Manang, this ritual 
was regularly practiced. In Ngawal they did not worship Bodzo Kaeba. This god is obviously 
only worshipped in Manang and Tenki Manang.  
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The villagers said that the drier it was, the more people would pray for water, and make 
the puja to the stream. “This year we have already made two pujas for rain, and now we soon 
are going to make one more” one informant said, and added that in the village of Pisang, 
where they totally lacked irrigation, they completely relied on prayers for rain to secure the 
harvest.  As described in section 5.3.1, one informant said that villagers preferred to pray for 
rain and wait for the government to provide pipes instead of trying to improve the canals with 
the means they had. This latter phenomenon could indicate a rent seeking attitude among the 
Ngawalis, and that could certainly hamper their ability to cooperate in order to achieve 
collective action, according to different case studies cited in Ostrom (2000), as well as a 
fatalistic attitude towards development and resource management.  
 
 
5.4 Results from households survey 
A household survey measuring the villagers’ relation to the irrigation systems and details 
about the household members was carried out during the fieldwork in April 2004 with the 
help of interpreters. Number of respondents in Manang are 32, in Ngawal 25.  
 
Table 5.3: The appropriators’ relation to the irrigation systems the five last 
years 
 
Question (Y/N) Results Ngawal, 
percentage positive 
answer 
Results Manang, 
percentage positive 
answers 
Problems with water shortage? 96% 53% 
Poor harvest due to lack of 
irrigation? 
88% 56 % 
Involved in fight over irrigation ? 80 % 45 % 
Satisfied with irrigation 
management system? 
12 % 69 % 
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Table 5.4: Demographic data 
 
 Ngawal Manang 
Percentage of 
householdsmembers living 
outside village 
33 % 
Of these are 21 % men, 12 
% women 
 22 % 
Of these are 16% men, 6 % 
women 
Percentage of households 
having members living 
outside village 
68 % 60 % 
 
There were some problems with this survey; these are mentioned in chapter 3. Nevertheless, 
the survey supports the general picture of the difference in water supply between Manang and 
Ngawal. Nearly all of the respondents in Ngawal had problems of water shortage. When I 
asked the respondents some “whys” about their answers, it was evident that the respondents 
considered there to be water shortage if they had to irrigate during the night. That was a sign 
of water problems. And more evident; it was a problem and the respondents were dissatisfied 
if the water shortage could threaten their yield. In Manang, those farmers who were not able 
to utilize the canals supplied by the Gyanchang Khola pipeline had more problems and were 
less satisfied with the irrigation management system than the rest of the villagers. But overall, 
almost twice as many of the Ngawalis than the Manangis answered that they had problems 
with water shortage and were dissatisfied with the water management system. When I asked 
why, the response tended to be “we need more pipes”.  
  
 
5.5 Summary 
The results presented in this chapter can be summarized according to the research questions: 
- Manang is generally much better off regarding both irrigation and drinking water 
supply than Ngawal, even though it is evident that the farmers also had problems if 
there was lack of rain, particularly those who could not take advantage of the 
Gyanchang Khola pipeline. The results from the household survey showed that nearly 
all the respondents in Ngawal were dissatisfied with the irrigation system, had 
problems with water shortage and had been involved in fights over water, while 
roughly half of the Manangi respondents answered yes to these questions. 
- Both in Manang and Ngawal, the use and maintenance of irrigation were 
institutionalised by rules. The level of organisation seemed to be higher in Manang 
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than in Ngawal, with dedicated user groups, and more rules regarding provision. In 
Manang, the maintenance of the drinking water system was formalised by employing 
a technician. In Ngawal, the drinking water system was unorganised. 
- Migration influences the water supply in two ways: 1) Permanent out-migration leads 
to abandonment of fields, which increases the availability of irrigation water on the 
cultivated plots left. This happens directly if the abandoned plots used to be irrigated 
and indirectly if farmers can swap their un-irrigated plots with the irrigated abandoned 
plots. 2) Out-migration might lead to a shortage of male labour. In Manang, this was 
insignificant, while in Ngawal, it seemed like the maintenance of the irrigation 
systems suffered from lack of male labourers. In-migration might also have effects on 
the water management, this aspect I will discuss in sections 6.2 and 7.2.3  
- Technological change has first and foremost been through the introduction of plastic 
pipes, which has both increased the overall water supply and reduced the need for 
labour for maintenance. Similarly, pipes require different models for maintenance than 
canals. Several broken irrigation pipelines in Manang and the problem with the 
drinking water system in Ngawal indicate that this is a challenge to a long term 
sustainable water supply.  
- Climatic change was not a topic among the villagers in Manang and Ngawal. But 
according to several informants in both villages, the climate had become drier. Their 
solution to meet this challenge was simply to build more plastic pipes, eventually pray 
when there was little rain and little water in the streams. 
- Both in Manang and Ngawal did rituals and prayers for water take place, but the 
frequency of rituals seemed to depend on the water supply. In Manang, pujas for water 
rarely took place except for one annual ritual, while in Ngawal pujas were performed 
quite frequently. One informant said that the Ngawalis preferred to pray for rain 
instead of work to improve their water supply. 
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Pic. 5.3: A Ngawali woman is washing clothes in an irrigation canals that goes through the 
 village.  The canal is here seen coming through a chorten where it drives a prayer wheel. 
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6 Is the water management sustainable?  
 
In both Manang and Ngawal, the irrigation system and to a certain extent the drinking water 
system were managed by its appropriators. The water resources can therefore be said to be 
managed as commons. The appropriation from the irrigation canals and the provision to its 
maintenance were institutionalised as rules. Therefore the irrigation management institutions 
are also common pool resource (CPR) management institutions. The drinking water was also 
a CPR, but appropriation and provision were only to a limited extent institutionalised. The 
aim is to analyse the water supply situation in general, not only irrigation, and therefore I 
include the drinking water, even though this chapter mainly focuses on the irrigation system.  
 In order to analyse how the communities of Manang and Ngawal are managing their 
water supply, I will analyse the management institutions using Ostrom’s framework (1990). 
The aim is to discuss whether the management institutions of Manang and Ngawal will 
provide long term sustainable use of their water resources and whether they are able to change 
their management institutions in order to adapt to contextual changes. The previous chapter 
revealed that there were differences in the ability of the Manangis and the Ngawalis to sustain 
their water supply. These differences I will also discuss by using Ostrom’s framework. 
Ostrom’s framework does not aim to be a general theory of CPR management, but it presents 
factors, conditions and principles that characterises long term successfully managed CPRs 
(ibid). This chapter aims to provide an answer to the first of the two theoretical research 
questions - how Ostrom’s CPR framework can be used to analyse the water management 
institutions of Manang and Ngawal. This question also implies a critical attitude towards this 
framework (ibid), and where the framework has its limitation I will look at more recent 
contributions to CPR theory and criticism of the entire CPR approach.   
  
 
6.1 The design principles and the water management in Ngawal 
and Manang 
In this chapter I will to some extent follow the same structure as section 4.3, by first briefly 
repeat the puzzles, or dilemmas, that the Manangi- and Ngawali irrigation appropriators meet. 
Then I will see how Ostrom’s definition of robust institutions as nested rules fits with the 
management institutions of Manang and Ngawal before comparing these institutions with the 
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design principles. In chapter 5.2 I will discuss why there are differences between how the 
villagers in Manang and Ngawal are able to sustain their water supply by looking at the 
factors and variables that Ostrom (1990) finds to influence the ability to undertake collective 
action. 
 
6.1.1 The puzzles of the irrigation systems 
The appropriators of the water resources in Manang and Ngawal face the same dilemmas as 
most appropriators of CPRs. These are first order dilemmas regarding use of a CPR, and 
second order problems connected to how institutions can be crafted to avoid the first order 
dilemmas (Ostrom 1990). The potential first order dilemmas that face the water appropriators 
in the Manang Valley can, by still using Ostrom’s terminology (ibid), be divided into 
provision- and appropriation problems. The provision problem regards how to make the 
appropriators contribute with labour, materials or money to the construction or maintenance 
of a CPR. To build and maintain a traditional canal irrigation system is labour intensive and 
requires the joint effort of the villagers. But why bother to provide if it will be possible to 
free-ride and appropriate water anyway? It is difficult to exclude users from irrigation canals, 
irrigation canals therefore share the characteristics of a public good. According to the Non-
contribution Thesis, no rational individual will contribute to a public good voluntarily because 
of the free-rider problem (Olson 1965). The challenge to the Manangi and Ngawali institution 
makers were to make rules that made the providers to the irrigation system confident that free 
riding should be avoided. The providers need to be confident that their individual benefit will 
be increased only if they contribute to the irrigation system. The motivation to contribute, 
given that free-riding is avoided, should be quite strong in Manang and Ngawal, where 
agriculture without irrigation would involve a high risk of failed or reduced harvest. 
Appropriation problems regard how to achieve sustainable use of a resource. 
According to the Tragedy narrative (Hardin 1968), rational self-interested behaviour for the 
individual will be to extract as much as possible of the resource, which again produces a 
collective sub-optimal result. Water is a non-extractable and renewable resource and is 
therefore less vulnerable to overuse than the pasture described by Hardin (ibid). But the 
capacity of the irrigation canals is limited, so it is possible for the upstream users to 
appropriate all the water, leaving nothing for the downstream users.  
To overcome the first order dilemma of appropriation- and provision problems, the 
appropriators of the irrigation systems in Manang and Ngawal need to have rules that regulate 
provision and appropriation of the irrigation system. But there are second order dilemmas 
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associated with the process of establishing rules for resource appropriation and provision, 
because these rules have the features of a public good. The determination of to what extent 
these puzzles have been solved in Manang and Ngawal is the topic for the next chapter. 
 
6.1.2 The management institutions analysed 
Before comparing Ostrom’s design principles to the irrigation management systems of 
Manang and Ngawal, I will discuss how the management institutions in the two villages 
match Ostrom’s definition of robust management institutions. 
 According to Ostrom, robust institutions consist of different interconnected layers of 
rules (see section 4.3.2), where the appropriators must be involved in the decision-making 
process at all levels. In the case of Manang and Ngawal, it is demanding to find all the three 
levels of rules. The operational rules are the most easy to identify, they are the rules 
mentioned in sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, the maintenance rules and the water 
sharing rules of the irrigation system. These rules have evolved over time, crafted by the 
villagers themselves in village meetings, the Panch Chong. The procedures for these meetings 
would correspond to the collective choice rules. The collective choice rules can be said to be 
tradition and procedures for the village meetings, the constitutional rules then become the 
principles for how seniority is achieved and the fundamental traditions that underlie all 
governance in the two communities. It is thus possible to look at the irrigation management 
institutions as nested rules, but at the collective choice level and at the constitutional level, it 
ceases to be purposive irrigation system rules. A further analysis of these aspects of the 
irrigation systems goes beyond Ostrom’s framework, because her framework does not include 
non-purposive institutions in management of CPRs. In chapter 6.2 I will return to this.  
The design principles that Ostrom defines (1990) concern the operational rules of the 
management institutions. If the CPR management institutions meet these principles, they are 
likely to provide long-term sustainable utilization of the CPR.  
I will now compare the rules and features of the irrigation management systems in 
Manang and Ngawal through Ostrom’s design principles (1990): 
 
1) Clearly defined boundaries 
a. Manang: The boundaries in the irrigation system exist so that the right to 
appropriate water from the irrigation canals is regulated and limited through 
the water sharing rules. The resource is the irrigation pipelines and canals and 
the water provided through these installations. The appropriators include all 
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the villagers who have irrigated fields. In this sense the resource system has 
boundaries, and the users form a defined group.  
b. Ngawal: Same as in Manang 
 
2) Congruence between appropriation and provision rules  
a. Manang: All the appropriators of the canals have to participate in maintenance 
of the canals. In order to be allowed to appropriate water, it is required that the 
farmer also contributes to the provision. The support for the provision and the 
contribution to the maintenance days, seemed to be very good, which indicates 
that the cost of provision was matching the benefits from appropriation. In an 
irrigation system, free riding is to take water without being a provider to the 
system. In this sense, the free rider problem was little or non-existing in 
Manang. The appropriation rules matched the attributes of the resource by 
specifying in which way the water sharing should take place. 
b. Ngawal: As in Manang, the appropriators are obligated to provide to the 
irrigation system by contribution of labour to the canal-maintenance. The 
appropriation rules were also aimed at matching the attributes of the resource, 
by specifying how the water should be shared. But since these rules were 
frequently broken, the question is whether they were good enough. Perhaps 
they were designed for a situation with more water than there was when the 
study was conducted. Due to the frequent rule-breaking, it is reasonably to 
claim that the appropriation rules do not match the resource attributes very 
well. 
 
3) Collective Choice arrangement 
a. Manang: The management rules in Manang are rooted in an old tradition of 
village meetings, where all the farmers meet, agree on decisions and appoint or 
elect leaders. In Manang, the appropriators have been able to change the rules 
regarding both provision and appropriation. 
b. Ngawal: The appropriators themselves make the rules for both appropriation 
and provision in village meetings, as in Manang. But there had not been any 
changes in the management system. 
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4) Monitoring  
Monitoring is one of the two most important prerequisites for ensuring commitment to 
the rules (Ostrom 1990). Due to the high support for the provision rules in the 
irrigation system of both Manang and Ngawal, water theft could not be termed free-
riding, but just rule infringement. Monitoring can therefore not be said to be important 
to avoid free riding. But the support for the appropriation rules were due to its nature 
more contingent, the temptation to take water beyond ones right might be very strong 
in times of water shortage. Under such circumstances monitoring became crucial in 
order to avoid breakdown of the system. The rule breakers must know that the chance 
of getting caught is high, so they are less tempted to break the rules. The contingent 
behavior also depends on sanction towards those who get caught for rule infringement.  
a. Manang: Monitoring of the use of the irrigation canals was not specified by 
any rules. On the other hand could monitoring in most circumstances easily be 
carried out by the appropriators while they were irrigating or doing other work 
in the fields. In times of water shortage, it was practiced that the irrigator who 
had the turn had one person to guard the upstream part of the canal. The 
motivation to monitor under this circumstance was obviously strong: If there 
were no one to look after the canal, the risk that someone would take water 
upstream without turn was high. Monitoring thus had low cost, and possessed 
no second order problem.  
b. Ngawal: Neither here was monitoring institutionalised. Most of the canals 
could easily be monitored by the appropriators during irrigation. It was 
widespread to use extra manpower to guard the canals, and the motivation to 
do so was the same as in Manang in times of water shortage. Water shortage 
was widespread, and some informants complained that they always needed to 
use costly labour power to watch the upstream part of the canal during 
irrigation. And even so, water theft was widespread. Due to the persisting 
water shortage, the temptation to break the appropriation rules was strong 
among a high number of the appropriators. So even the high risk of getting 
caught and having to face a fight or a fine did not stop rule infringement. 
 
5) Graduated sanctions  
In Manang and Ngawal, the breaking of both appropriation rules and provision rules 
was sanctioned with a warning or fine. For the appropriators to apply sanctioning 
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implies a second order problem of collective action. The carrying out of a sanction has 
a cost for those who do it. In both Manang and Ngawal it seems like they overcame 
this second order problem by delegating the task of sanctioning to institutions. 
a. Manang: Sanctioning of breaking of provision rules were applied by the canal 
user groups themselves. Since this institution had sanctioning of non-
contributors as one of its purposes, the sanctioning itself possessed no second 
order problem. The fines were low and graduated. Breaking of the 
appropriation rules or water theft was sanctioned by the VDC. Also these 
sanctions were gradual, from a warning to fines of different size. This design-
principle is therefore fully met in Manang. 
b. Ngawal: Sanctioning of both provision- and appropriation rule-breakers were 
applied by the VDC. The sanctions in both circumstances were gradual.  The 
question in Ngawal is rather to which extent monitoring and sanctioning 
provided compliance with the rules.  
 
6) Conflict resolution mechanisms  
In both Manang and Ngawal, the conflicts that existed in the water management 
system were always related to water sharing. These conflicts were either solved on the 
spot between the counterparts, or it was taken to the VDC. The VDC was therefore the 
formal conflict resolving body. More principal questions were discussed on Panch 
Chong. Regarding the Panch Chong, I did not find any cases related to water 
management, but there were one remarkable incident in Manang regarding poaching: 
Two poachers were caught killing protected muskdeers. Instead of turning the 
poachers over to the police and ACAP, the villagers arranged a meeting were they 
decided to give the poachers large fines (700.000 rupees and 300.000 rupees). The fine 
could therefore be kept by the VDC, instead of ACAP. 
 
7) Minimal impact of rights to organise 
Both in Manang and Ngawal, the irrigation systems were self-invented and self-
organised. Even if the governmental irrigation offices prescribed a management model 
for small irrigation system (the FMIS-model), as part of their support to the 
construction of irrigation pipelines, it was not necessary to implement this in Manang 
and Ngawal due to their existing institutions. Because of this, no external authorities 
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were directly involved in the management of the irrigation systems, neither in rule-
making, monitoring or sanctioning.  
 
To summarize: In Manang, all the design principles are met, but some problems with 
obedience to the appropriation rules in times of water shortage might occur. In Ngawal, they 
meet the design principles to a large extent, but had still huge problems with breaking of the 
appropriation rules. The appropriation rules were possibly not tailored well enough to match 
the resource attributes, more specifically the regularity and flow of the resource. There were 
also some problems with the provision, and it is possible that the motivation for undertaking 
provision could be lowered due to the appropriation problems, thereby creating a mismatch 
between provision and appropriation.  
If the design principles are met, the resource utilisation should be sustainable, 
according to Ostrom. But is the irrigation system in Ngawal sustainable? It might be, but they 
have a problem with non-obedience to the rules. Did the monitoring and sanctioning not 
work? And why had they not been able to get themselves a better water supply? The distance 
to the nearest stream (Jullu Khola) with a more stable water flow was much shorter than in 
Manang (see map 5.1 and 5.4). The next chapter addresses these questions by looking at the 
two communities’ ability to undertake collective action. 
 
 
6.2 Is it the ability to take collective action that matters? 
In order to discuss the two communities’ ability to self-organise for sustainable use of their 
water resources and highlight the factors that can help explain this ability, I will look at the 
differences in how the Manangis and the Ngawalis manage their water systems. In this 
chapter I will look at the water management in general, not only the irrigation system. I will 
apply the factors and variables presented in section 4.3.3, that Ostrom finds to influence the 
ability to achieve institutional supply, and discuss whether these are relevant as explanatory 
factors for explaining the differences in how Ngawal and Manang are able to sustain their 
water supply.  
According to my survey (see table 5.1), the Ngawalis fought a lot more over water, 
had more water shortage problems and were much less satisfied with their water management 
system than in Manang. These differences are connected to four major differences in the two 
communities’ water systems: (a) In Ngawal, water shortage is usual in the spring season, and 
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appropriation rules are frequently violated due to water theft; (b) the Manangis have been able 
to organise themselves in order to construct the Gyanchang Khola pipeline and two other 
pipelines, and thereby solved their worst water shortage problems; (c) the Ngawalis have not 
been able to organise maintenance of drinking water system and it is therefore failing; (d) the 
Ngawalis has some problems with maintaining their traditional irrigation system (the wooden 
pipes) due to lack of qualified labour and materials; (e) and finally, the Ngawalis performed 
more rituals and prayers for water than the Manangis. Is it really because the Ngawalis rely on 
prayers for rain that they have no piped water? In this chapter I will just briefly discuss rituals 
and religion in relation to the ability for collective action, but I will discuss the relationship 
between the water supply and rituals more thoroughly in section 7.3.  
Are these differences just a matter of differences in available resources? Or is it a 
matter of ability to undertake collective action? For the appropriators of the irrigation systems 
to be able to sustain a long term management of their water supplies, they need to be able to 
change the management institutions or supply themselves with new rules as responses to 
social or environmental changes. Institutional supply takes place both as initial establishing of 
management institutions and as incremental changes to adjust the management institutions as 
responses to contextual changes. The last aspect is important when explaining how CPR 
appropriators are able to adjust their management system in responses to contextual changes. 
Therefore the ability for institutional supply is important for sustained, long term CPR 
management.   
The ability for institutional supply is a question of self-organisation, according to 
Ostrom (1990). Different case studies give a vast number of different factors influencing the 
ability for self-organisation for collective action purposes. I have focused on the ones Ostrom 
emphasises (1990, 1994, 2000). The design principles aim to provide sustainable long term 
use of the CPR, while the factors and variables mentioned in section 4.3.3 are found to be 
important for determining whether or not a CPR management regime can be installed by self-
organisation and how likely it is that it can be changed. It is this last aspect that is the topic of 
this chapter. I highlighted the following factors and variables: (1) Strong shared norms; (2) 
Expected benefits and (3) costs; (4) the discount rate in use; (5) The total number of decision 
makers; (6) the heterogeneity of the participants; and (7) the presence of participants with 
substantial leadership or other assets (Ostrom 1990, 1994, 2000). 
But also other factors, not emphasized in Ostrom’s framework, might be relevant for 
the case of Manang and Ngawal, and they will be mentioned in the following discussion.   
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Both in Manang and Ngawal, the irrigation management institutions did to a large 
extent correspond with the design principles. That institutions exist for sanctioning and that 
monitoring is practiced means that the cost associated with undertaking these activities is 
small. There is little involvement in the water management from external authorities and the 
number of participants in both Manang and Ngawal is quite small, both of which are factors 
that facilitate collective action (Ostrom 1990). Both in Manang and in Ngawal, the 
appropriators have utilized the resource for a long time, and they live together in the same 
villages. According to Ostrom, this should make their discount rate to the resource low. The 
presence of self-invented CPR management institutions shows that the CPR-appropriators in 
Manang and Ngawal are able to undertake demanding collective action tasks. So this 
discussion will focus on how the other factors mentioned are related to the differences 
between Manang and Ngawal. 
 
6.2.1 What are the differences between the two villages? 
In the following section I will briefly repeat some features of the two communities in order to 
look at differences that can help explain the differences to take collective action. 
 In Manang, the population mainly consists of native Manangis. The Manangis have 
strong community ties, according to the informants. There were considerable differences in 
income and wealth, because several successful Manangi businessmen had resettled in Manang 
and built hotels. But according to most informants, wealth did not play a crucial role for status 
as a Manangi, they seemed to be proud to have an egalitarian community. I also several times 
observed the wife of a wealthy hotel owner irrigating in night-time. The villagers of Manang, 
and thus the appropriators of the irrigation system, can be considered a quite homogenous 
group in terms of ethnicity, but not in wealth. The presence of the resettled businesspersons 
who have started hotels means that the village has many resourceful people who can provide 
leadership. This was crucial when Manang got the Gyanchang Khola pipeline, which to a 
great extent was achieved through the effort of one Manangi hotel owner. The establishment 
of the Gyanchang Khola also displayed that social relations or network to decision makers in 
the District administration matters. Social relations that can be utilized for achieving certain 
benefits can be termed Social Capital. Social capital has a lot of definitions, but here I will 
apply Bourdieus definition: “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of 
mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1985 (in Portes 1998, 4)). Through the 
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possession as District Chairman one of the hotel owners in Manang was able to draw on 
substantial social capital when the Gyanchang Khola pipeline was established.  
The resettled Manangi businessmen can also be termed entrepreneurs, as they have 
been able to explore and take advantages of the commercial opportunities that arose with 
tourism. According to Rogers, the entrepreneurs of Manang have  
 
(…) insight, innovative vision, confidence in one’s own abilities, a willingness to take 
risk and some experience or knowledge or at least intuition about how to undertake a 
business venture (Rogers 2004, 65).  
 
Rogers also find the entrepreneurial attitude to be characteristic for the Manangis as a group, a 
characteristic that requires social systems of reciprocity and cooperation that support 
individuals to engage and succeeds in business ventures (ibid).  
 That there are few resettled businessmen in Ngawal is related to the relative poorer 
business opportunities there compared with Manang. Manang is along the main trekking 
route, Ngawal is not. The potential for tourist related business is therefore better in Manang.   
 The Manangis claimed that the irrigation system had existed for hundreds of years and 
they have been able to change the management as respons to contextual changes. Even if the 
fines for not contributing to the maintenance of the canals were insignificant for several of the 
relatively wealthy appropriators, they still contributed. And they have been able to get the 
Gyanchang Khola pipeline. These things indicate strong shared norms regarding the resource 
use, and together with leadership provided by the resettled business men and the 
entrepreneurial spirit found in the community. Manang did also have a variety of collective 
solutions like the the Panch Gong, a variety of religious festivals and different committees 
and groups for different purposes. These are factors that underlie the Manangis ability to 
undertake demanding collective action tasks.  
Ngawal has a higher proportion of immigrants than Manang. My household survey 
indicates that the proportion of non-Manangis is higher in Ngawal than in Manang (16% in 
Ngawal and 3 % in Manang). Also in the opinion of the Ngawali informants, the immigrants 
from Nar-Phu and Dolpo were significant parts of the population in Ngawal. These peoples 
share much of the same Tibetan influenced culture and they are Buddhists. Still, they are not 
allowed to buy land or houses in the village, and intermarriage is not very popular among the 
native Ngawalis. They are therefore not gaining the same status as the native Ngawali 
inhabitants. The immigrants do not necessarily share the same norms regarding the resource 
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use, and the native inhabitants do not necessarily trust the immigrants as they trust other 
natives. In opposition to Manang, heterogeneity in respect to wealth could also matter in 
Ngawal, because some informants said that the rich dominated the poor when it came to 
conflicts over water. In Manang none of the informants complained about this. So I find it fair 
to suggest that the ability to collective action could be weakened due heterogeneity in 
Ngawal. This heterogeneity is a result of immigration. Migration has also been mentioned by 
Ostrom as a factor that might weaken the ability for collective action (2000), but she does not 
include this factor in her framework. The importance of migration therefore has to be 
discussed more thoroughly. This I will do in section 7.2.3. 
There is also a higher proportion of household members living outside the village in 
Ngawal than in Manang (22% in Manang, and 33 % in Ngawal, according to my survey), and 
of those the majority are men (21% of the male household members in Ngawal, according to 
my survey). Also according to both my own observations and to my informants, there were a 
lot more women than men in the village. The male out-migration might also weaken the 
irrigation management because it deprives labour from maintenance work, which can help 
explain why some informants complained about problems of maintaining the wooden pipes in 
the irrigation system, also one of the mentioned differences between Manang and Ngawal. 
This is also a factor related to migration, which will be discussed more thoroughly in section 
6.3.2.  
The amount of people who have resettled in Ngawal after successful business ventures 
is much smaller than in Manang. Ngawal therefore have considerably fewer “big men”, 
entrepreneurs that can take leadership and initiative. Ngawal therefore also lacks people with 
social capital that can be utilized for purposes like getting pipes. But fewer returned 
businessmen also means that the differences in wealth among the Ngawalis are smaller than in 
Manang.  
The presence of different collective arrangements, as Panch Gong, and various village 
committees, seemed weaker in Ngawal than in Manang. They were never referred to during 
conversations with informants, and the ACAP-initiated committees were ineffective 
according to the informants. Most of the power seemed to be within the VDC, and the VDC 
chairman was not even living in the village, but in the neighbour village Ngawal Beshi. 
 To sum up, the differences between Manang and Ngawal in aspects of the 
communities seems to be in presence of leadership, population heterogeneity, migration and 
perhaps the number of different collective arrangements. The next chapter focuses on these 
differences and the differences in ability to sustain the water supply. 
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6.2.2 The water conflict in Ngawal 
In Ngawal, the appropriators who did the monitoring were as likely to see that the other 
appropriators were breaking the rules as to see that the rules were followed. This was a 
noticeable difference between Manang and Ngawal. This phenomenon might be discussed 
looking at several of the factors and variables mentioned: The expected benefit from 
following the rules must be higher than the cost. In times of water shortage, the temptation to 
break the rules is very high because the yield might be destroyed if the appropriator does not 
get enough water. The short term benefit from breaking the rules might be that the harvest is 
secured, this is an individual benefit. The long term cost from breaking the rules is a lower 
collective output from a non-functioning water allocation system. This is shared among all the 
appropriators. The logic is the same that Olson describes in the classic dilemma of collective 
action (1965), and by Hardins’ Tragedy narrative (1968). But there are also other costs by 
breaking the rules, not described by Olson and Hardin. These are the sanctions the rule-
breakers face and the loss of reputation. Loss of reputation is connected to norms. Ostrom 
finds that appropriators living together in small, homogenous communities near the resource 
tend to develop strong shared norms regarding the use of the resource over time, due to their 
collective fate connected to the state of the resource, the importance of reputation and high 
levels of trust and reciprocity (ibid). Only in time of crisis will the temptation to break the 
rules be so strong that it actually occurs. So do the Ngawalis not share strong norms? They 
live close to the resource, live in the same village, do other activities together and have 
utilized the resource for a long time. All this should indicate that they have strong norms 
regarding the resource use. But there are many immigrants in Ngawal. The question is 
whether these share the same norms, and are trusted like native Ngawalis.  This leads to factor 
(5), the level of heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in ethnicity might weaken the presence of strong 
shared norms, and it might therefore indirectly be a factor that can help explain the frequent 
rule infringement in Ngawal. The heterogeneity is a result of a contextual factor not 
mentioned in Ostrom’s framework, migration. I will come back to the implications of 
migration later in section 7.2.3.  
Or is the reason why the appropriators in Manang so frequently break the 
appropriation rules rather that the water situation is in a permanent state of crisis, a permanent 
state of exception? According to many Manangi informants, there was a lot of fighting over 
water in Manang too before the Gyanchang khola pipeline was established. And there were 
still sporadic incidents in times of shortage. Similarly, in Ngawal, the appropriation rules were 
followed as long as not all the appropriators needed to irrigate simultaneously. According to 
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Ostrom (1990) did rule infringement take place now and then in times of crisis in most of her 
reviewed case studies. Absolute rule conformity is unrealistic, she argues (ibid). This is also 
why the sanctioning fines are low, because robust systems must tolerate some rule 
infringement in times of crisis (ibid). The fines for breaking the appropriation rules are low in 
Ngawal. If they were higher, they could possibly have resulted in a lower degree of rule 
infringement. But similarly could this have had devastating effects on the appropriators’ 
economy, which again could undermine the support for the management system in general. 
That the rule-infringement occurs as a consequence of water crisis raises doubts over the 
conclusion that the Ngawalis frequently break the appropriation rules due to weak ability for 
collective action.  
 
6.2.3 Why there is no pipes in Ngawal 
The second difference between Manang and Ngawal is that the Manangis have been able to 
secure their water supply by building the Gyanchang Khola pipeline. The Manangis has also 
replaced several old open canals with pipes. Why have the Manangis been able to construct 
these pipelines and the Ngawalis not? Before the pipes were introduced, I assume that the 
water situation in Manang and Ngawal were quite similar, due to the situation of the villages 
and the fields in proximity to natural streams. Manang is a much larger village, approximately 
four times as big as Ngawal, and therefore possesses larger resources. On the other hand, the 
distance from the nearest river to Ngawal, Jullu Khola, is approximately a third of the 
distance between Gyanchang Khola and Manang (see map 5.1 and 5.4). The question is if the 
reason why Ngawal does not have a pipeline from Jullu Khola is related to the ability for 
collective action.  Ngawal lacks the businessmen found in Manang. In Manang it was 
precisely one of these men who took the initiative to establish the Gyanchang Khola pipeline. 
So the presence of leadership and entrepreneurship is a relevant factor for explaining the 
difference between Manang and Ngawal. 
The third difference between Manang and Ngawal, the inability of Ngawalis to 
maintain their drinking water system might also be a result of the same collective action 
problem as the lack of appropriate irrigation water supply. It seems strange for an outsider 
that the cost associated with walking the 20 minutes from the village to the intake tank for the 
drinking water pipe and remove the leaves from the filter were higher than the unpleasantness 
by walking outside the village in order to fetch water. Or fetching water from the nearby 
irrigation canal, where the water was dirty and garbage and dung might float. A young female 
lodge owner said that the villagers preferred to take water from the irrigation canals instead of 
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fixing the drinking water pipe, and that the villagers preferred to pray instead of trying to 
improve their water situation. The lack of maintenance represents a classic example of a 
problem of collective action. The individual cost of investing time and effort maintaining a 
public good is higher than the individual benefit from the same good (Ostrom 1990). The 
problem is that the Ngawalis has not achieved making any rules regarding the maintenance. 
Since the pipes are new technology to the water system, and the maintenance demands a new 
kind of management, this could be an explanatory factor for failing of the maintenance. 
Technology is a contextual factor not mentioned in Ostrom framework, but she mentions it as 
a possible threat against collective action (2000). The importance of technological change to 
the water system is more thoroughly discussed in section 7.2.2. 
 
 
 
6.2.4 Prayers and collective action 
Both in Manang and Ngawal, people strongly believe that prayer and rituals could influence 
the amount of rain and water in the streams. The Ngawalis did perform more pujas and 
prayers for water than the Manangis. According to one Ngawali informant, the Ngawalis 
preferred to pray and wait for the government to provide pipes instead of improving their 
existing irrigation system.  A tempting hypothesis is that the Ngawalis did not bother to 
construct a better water supply due to their strong expectations of external help from the 
government or external donors and belief in the effects of pujas and prayers. How a strong 
Pic 6.1: The drinking 
water intake in 
Ngawal. It is 
jammed by pine 
needles. 
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religious faith influenced the ability to undertake collective action is a different question. 
Religion is not included in Ostrom’s framework or other important CPR approaches. It is not 
evident how it should influence the ability for collective action either. A puja is a collective 
undertaking, while prayers are personal and individual activities. But the individual cost of 
participation and contributing to a puja, as well as to pray, is different than having to work for 
weeks in order to construct a big pipeline or participate in a rule-making process.  
The most likely reason why the Ngawalis prayed more than the Manangis is simply 
that they had more water shortage problems. Both in Manang and Ngawal, there were 
regularly pujas for different purposes, and each puja normally calls on a joint effort by a 
group of village women for preparing food and tea. It can obviously be assumed that when 
villagers perform rituals together, it strengthens their shared norms and sense of belonging, 
which again is one of the factors found to strengthen the ability for collective action (Ostrom 
1990).  
 
6.2.5 Migration and lack of leaders with the “right connections”  
To summarize the factors I find most likely to explain the differences in the Manangis and the 
Ngawalis ability to undertake collective action I will emphasise the following: The lack of 
resourceful persons that provide leadership and the migration that still take place in Ngawal. 
These are factors that can explain why the Ngawalis have not improved their water supply 
and not organised the drinking water maintenance. But it would be a simplification to blame 
all the difficulties the Ngawalis face on weak ability for collective action. The breaking of the 
appropriation rules may indicate a problem of collective action, since they do not change the 
appropriation rules. But the rule-infringement may also take place because the Ngawalis find 
the water situation to be in a state of crisis.  
There are of course also other factors that contribute to the difficult state of the water 
situation in Ngawal that are not are related to collective action problems: (1) The size of the 
village and thereby less resources in terms of labour; (2) and the presence of villagers with 
connections to authorities who provide funding for pipelines.  
The only difference between Manang and Ngawal that can solely be explained as a 
result of different abilities for collective action is the problem with the drinking water system 
maintenance. For the other differences, the reasons were complex and collective action is only 
one of several possible explanatory factors. 
And as a closing remark to this chapter: Now it also appears that Ngawal will have 
their new pipeline from Jullu Khola, according to both the VDC chairman in Ngawal and the 
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DAO officials. However, none of the villagers in Ngawal told me about this. The question is 
now whether the villagers of Ngawal will contribute with the labour required to get the pipe 
installed.  
The next chapter addresses aspects of the water management system in Manang and 
Ngawal where I find that Ostrom’s framework comes short. It takes a broader perspective on 
the discussion of how the villages are able to sustain their water needs than just that suggested 
in the CPR approach. In addition to that approach, it is necessary to look at the wider 
implications of migration, technological change, climatic change and religion.  
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7 Beyond the CPR framework 
 
The presence of a lot of empirical and theoretical work on the conditions and factors behind 
successful management of CPRs and the ability for collective action are still not forming a 
coherent theory. The factors and conditions mentioned by Ostrom amount to fifteen, eight 
design principles plus seven factors which influence on the ability for collective action. And if 
this is not enough, several of the last factors are dependent on other variables. Additional 
factors not mentioned by Ostrom but by other writers such as Balland & Platteu (1996) and 
Wade (1988) make the list even longer. Agrawal finds that the mentioned authors jointly 
identify 36 important factors (Agrawal 2001). And they do only to a limited extent emphasise 
the same factors. Still the list of factors is not exhaustive. In most cases there will be factors 
and variables that are dependent on context or are contingent on other factors and variables. 
Agrawal sees the various CPR approaches emphasize similar and different explanatory factors 
as an indication that the CPR-literature still has to come up with a coherent theory of CPR 
management:  
 
When a large number of causal variables potentially affect outcomes, the absence of 
carefull research design that controls for factors that are not the subject of 
investigation makes it almost impossible to be sure that the observed differences in 
outcomes are indeed a result of hypothesized causes (Agrawal 2001, 1661). 
 
Agrawal points at to a weakness with the existing CPR approaches that also is relevant 
for this case study. The list of factors and variables mentioned in the literature that might be 
relevant, is too long for making a careful examination of each factors’ importance. Similarly 
there are factors not emphasised in Ostrom’s framework that I have found to be important. 
Nevertheless, since Ellinor Ostrom currently is the author with the most comprehensive 
approach to a theory of CPR management, I have so far based my analysis on her framework. 
Still it is evident that it has certain limitations when applied to this case study. These are: (1) 
The focus on purposive management institutions, in this case the aspects that Ostrom terms 
collective choice and constitutional levels of institutions, which overlooks the fact that 
institutions involved in resource management may be multi-purpose institutions; and (2) the 
neglect of emphasis on non-local contextual factors, in this case migration, technology and 
climatic change; as well as the local, contextual factor religion. The first problem also 
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uncovers some problems with the rational choice theory and methodological individualism 
that Ostrom’s framework builds upon. 
I will address each point in the following chapters. Further I will address the importance 
of religion to the water management system, an aspect I have not treated yet.  
  
7.1 Management outside purposive institutions 
Ostrom’s focus is upon purposive management institutions, and she defines institution as 
nested rules on an operational layer, a collective choice layer and a constitutional choice layer 
(1990, 51). But in the case of Manang and Ngawal, the water management institutions, or 
more correctly the irrigation management institutions, did only manifest themselves as 
purposive institutions on the operational level, as the canal user groups and the appropriation 
rules and provision rules. The two upper layers can also be identified, but not as the collective 
choice- and constitutional choice layers of purposive institutions, but as social structures in 
the villages that guide different kinds of practises, not only irrigation.  
In Manang and Ngawal, the collective choice level manifests itself at the village 
meeting, Panch Chong, that are assemled by the VDC when important matters need to be 
discussed. When the irrigation management system in Manang was changed it was in a Panch 
Chong. Panch Chong is not a purposive management institution in the sense Ostrom refers to 
(see section 4.3.2), it is a multipurpose institution. If I should follow Ostrom’s three analytical 
levels of rules, the constitutional level would correspond to the rules that regulate the Panch 
Chong. Both these rules and the Panch Chong is part of the parampara. The rules, or 
traditions, that govern the Panch Chong resemble the traditional social structures of the 
village, legitimated in the culture of the villagers. Only men can participate, and their 
influence is determined by age and clan. To propose that rules governing both constitutional 
and collective choice can be “artificially” designed and implemented in these circumstances 
does therefore not make sense. Cleaver comes to the same conclusion: 
 
The evolution of collective decision-making institutions may not be the process of 
conscious selection of mechanisms fit for collective action task (…) but rather the 
outcome of individuals acting within bounds of circumstantial constraints (Cleaver 
2000, 366).  
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Cleaver finds that the institutions involved in natural resource management often are 
created as routinized practices in daily lives, with a lot of borrowing of accepted patterns of 
interaction from other sanctioned social relationships (ibid). 
Mehta et al. (1999) criticize Ostrom and the CPR approach for the conception of 
purposive management institutions, and claim that it draws the attention away from how other 
aspects of a community shape the management. Mehta et al. claim that resource management 
occurs within several institutions, which not merely serve economic or rational ends, but also 
symbolic constructs and meaning. They can therefore not be viewed only in purposive terms 
(ibid). Institutions must be viewed as social practices, shaped by social processes and power 
relations, they argue. “In many respects, natural resource management institutions and 
practices are synonymous with people’s everyday life practices and ways of viewing the 
world” (Mehta et al. 1999, 30). This critique is relevant for Manang and Ngawal, in the sense 
of what Ostrom terms the collective choice- and constitutional choice levels of the 
management institutions, are general social structures and the culture of the villages. Instead I 
propose to apply Aase’s concept of society as three analytical levels: social organisation, 
social structures and culture (1998). 
  In Manang and Ngawal, it is impossible to view the water system management as 
solely taking place within isolated purposive institutions. Rather, it should also be viewed as 
processes taking place at both the social organisation level, which is how people actually use 
the water and contribute to the maintenance; and social structures, which are the rules, norms 
and institutions regulating the use of water. What Ostrom terms collective choice and 
constitutional choice rules are also social structures that among other things govern how the 
management rules should be altered, and which persons that are eligible to do so. These social 
structures are legitimated in culture. This way of looking at resource management institutions 
is more fruitful than Ostrom’s definition of robust, purposive management institutions, 
because it sees the water management in a broader perspective, interrelated with other social 
processes in the community. To investigate how changes in the different analytical levels 
influence the water management system is the topic of section 7.2.3.  
The presence of such institutions as the Panch Chong is also an important factor for 
explaining the ability for collective action, as it is an institution whose main purpose is to 
make the villagers undertake collective action tasks. Looking at other manifestations of 
collective action might produce a better understanding of the processes underlying collective 
action in the community. In Manang and Ngawal, collective action solutions exist for a 
variety of tasks, like preserving the forest or cleaning up the village. At the core of these 
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events is a decision taken by the Panch Chong. To understand collective action in the villages 
requires an understanding of the Panch Chong.  
 But the framework of Ostrom and other CPR-literature does not capture the 
importance of this non-purposive institution, at least not directly.  This is because the 
underlying rational-choice foundation on which Ostrom builds her framework implies 
methodological individualism. Institutions are seen as set of rules created through a process of 
bargaining between rational, self-interest actors, where the actors evaluate benefits and costs 
on a basis of limited information. This bargaining process can be modelled as a game. This 
means that only acts of individuals matter. But Panch Chong is a manifestation of social 
structures that by guiding the acts of individuals actually enables and creates social processes. 
That social structures have the power to both enable and constrain individual acts is neglected 
by the rational choice theory.  
As long as the concept of collective action builds on methodological individualism, it 
fails to capture the power of social structures and culture as explanatory factors for why a 
community might be able to manage their CPR with success or with failure. By applying 
concepts and method of local dialectics, aspects beyond those of Ostrom’s’ framework can be 
identified. This I will do in chapter 7.2.3 
 
7.2 Contextual changes and the water supply 
Migration and introduction of new technology have had great importance for the development 
of the water management systems in Manang and Ngawal. These are contextual factors not 
emphasised in Ostrom’s framework, and so far just briefly discussed in the analysis. In this 
section I will also mention the impact of climatic change, since this also is a contextual factor 
with implications for the water system. 
Edwards & Stein define contextual factors as: “Dynamic forces constituted in the user 
groups’ social, cultural, economic, technological and institutional environment” (Edwards & 
Steins 1999, 207). It is evident that migration, technological change and climatic change have 
implications for both the ability for collective action and the water supply situation. The lack 
of emphasis on contextual factors in Ostrom’s’ framework is criticized by Agrawal (2001), 
Steins et al. (2000); Edwards & Steins (1999) and Mehta et al. (1999).  Migration, new 
technology and climatic change are non-local, external factors to the water systems. In 
Ostrom’s’ framework, only design-principle seven, that external authorities should not 
interfere in the CPR-appropriators management system, refers to a non-local factor. Also the 
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factors and variables in Ostrom’s collective action model (section 4.3.3) are local and 
endogenous. On the other hand is the problem of creating a list of general contextual factors 
apparent. I already mentioned how many general factors Ostrom and other CPR-authors have 
found to be important. Should the list be even longer, there would be enormous analytical 
problems to conduct a case study.  Besides from this does the importance of contextual factors 
to a much greater extent vary from case to case than endogenous factors. Not to mention case-
specific contingent factors. Still a framework that overlooks the importance of contextual- and 
case-specific contingent factors will come short. Agrawal and other critics address the need of 
including case specific and contingent factors in analyses of CPR management (Agrawal 
2001, Edwards & Stens 1999). What Agrawal suggests is to have a systemic test of the 
relative importance of contextual factors on the CPR management, while Edwards & Steins 
(1999), suggest that contextual factors must be surveyed for each case, and their relative 
importance tested. Still these two approaches are just suggestions, and do not explain how the 
relative importance of contextual factors can be tested.  
In the conclusion, chapter 8, I will present my thoughts to meet the mentioned 
challenges that the CPR approach face. So far my response has been to discuss the importance 
of migration, technological change and climatic change. The focus is on how it influences on 
the water supply situation in general, not only how it may influence on the ability for 
collective action. In chapter 7.2.2 I also apply the methods of local dialectics (Aase 1998), to 
get a broader frame for the processes and dynamics of migration in Upper Manang and its 
consequences for the water supply. 
  
7.2.1 Climatic change and the water supply 
Climatic change is a contextual change that affects the water supply in Manang and Ngawal. 
It does not fit directly into Ostrom’s framework and I have therefore included this topic in this 
section. Still I will use concepts from Ostrom’s framework in the forthcoming discussion, and 
it is thus not “beyond the framework” as the other sections in this chapter.  
Climatic change in the Himalayas is generally experienced as a drier and warmer 
climate, but there are large local variations (Chalise 1994 (in Banskota 2000)). The glaciers 
are shrinking, and the permanent snow line is moving upwards. It is also possible to identify 
this general pattern in Manang. The most noticeable change was the lack of snow in the 
mountains at the time of year when it normally used to be a lot of snow left in the mountains, 
according to the informants in Manang and Ngawal. Retreating glaciers were on the other 
hand not perceived as a problem for the water supply. 
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 The consequences for the water supply from a drier climate are apparent – less water.  
Due to lack of precipitation data and recordings of past observations of the actual glaciers and 
snow cover, it is not possible for me to give any answer to whether and how climatic change 
has reduced the water supply in Manang and Ngawal. So what I tried to do was to study the 
consequences for the social organisation of the water management and possible strategies that 
the people of Manang and Ngawal can choose in order to cope with a situation of less water. 
This I have done in section 6.1 and 6.2.  
CPR-theory has not been concerned with climatic change as a factor that influences the 
ability for collective action or long-term sustainable management of CPR. Nevertheless, it is 
not a difficult task to identify factors and variables that a drier climate can change: The 
amount of water is a crucial variable for the sustainability of the water management system, in 
more general terms: It regards the availability, variability and size of the CPR. These factors 
are not emphasised by Ostrom, but she found them to influence on how participators in an 
institutional supply bargaining process would evaluate benefits for committing themselves to 
the proposed rules (Ostrom 1990). This is related to design principle two, which says that the 
appropriation- and provision rules must reflect the resource characteristics in order for the 
management institutions to be sustainable (ibid).  As seen in Ngawal, lack of water leads to 
conflict, and the question is whether the level of conflict threatens the water management 
system or whether the appropriators are able to deal with the water shortage through 
institutional or physical adaptations. In Manang, the improvement of the water supply was 
mostly a response to increased demand, not from decreased supply due to climatic change. In 
Ngawal, people say that they have always had problems with lack of water. According to 
Ostrom (1990), conflict could occur in times of crisis in all of her reviewed case studies. That 
a management system could tolerate sporadic conflicts without collapse means that it is robust 
(ibid). That the Ngawali water management system did not collapse hence the prevailing 
conflicts should then suggest that the system was robust. But then they should also be able to 
adapt to the situation with water shortages. But according to my survey, most of the 
respondents were dissatisfied with it (table 6.2). The only possible change of social 
organisation as response to a drier climate was fighting. But then this was not a new 
phenomenon. Institutional adaptations or changes in social structures to a situation with less 
water were not possible to identify in Ngawal. But on the other hand, changes in social 
organisation will over time change the structures. The fighting and rule infringement in 
Ngawal could then over time lead to changes in the irrigation management institutions. In 
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Manang they had changed the management system as a response to new technology and 
migration, not to a drier climate.  
As in Manang, the Ngawalis wanted to respond to the need of increased water supply by 
constructing more pipes. And as a result of the pipes, the management institutions would need 
to change. This is one aspect where climatic change may change social structures. 
The effects of climatic change on social practices and institutions are topics that have 
received little attention, even though the predictions mentioned in the introduction, the 
“meltdown” narrative (Hasnain 1999), should call for massive research on the responses and 
strategies that affected communities choose. If I should try to draw some conclusions from 
my findings, it must be that the strategies associated with a possible drier climate in Manang 
and Ngawal seem to involve more prayers and more pipes. 
 
7.2.2 The black revolution:  Pipes 
To address the implications of technological change on the water management system is also 
an attempt to include contextual factors in the analysis. In this sense this discussion goes 
beyond Ostrom’s framework. But on the other hand it continues to use concepts from the CPR 
approach. 
The introduction of the polyurethane water pipes is by far the single most important  
component in the modernisation of the agriculture in Upper Manang and outweighs traditional 
green revolution components like fertilizer, pesticides and improved seeds (my observation 
and informant statements). While Manang has a high proportion of pipes in their irrigation 
system, Ngawal has approximately only 200 meter, besides some hundred meters of concrete 
canals.  
Pipes reduce the maintenance needs and water leakage where it replaces open canals. 
More importantly, pipes have made it possible to lead water from rivers and streams that were 
out of reach from traditional technology due to difficult terrain.  
 There are two major implications of the new technology to the water system. The first 
relates to concerns expressed by various authors (Agrawal & Narain 1997, Mollinga et al. 
2000) of the danger of modernisation of the water supply, first and foremost piped water, 
makes the traditional water harvesting techniques disappear. If the pipes get dry, entire 
villages end up with no water, because the traditional water harvesting techniques are 
abandoned (Agrawal & Narain 1997). As experienced in a large number of development 
projects, infrastructure installed by state or NGOs face deterioration when no adequate 
maintenance institutions are in place. The second implication relates to how the new 
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technology affects the management institutions. According to Agrawal (2001), rapid 
technology could affect the ability of sustained collective action, because it alters the needs of 
provision to the resource, and this might again alter the cost-benefit ratio of utilisation of the 
CPR. Ostrom also mentions this effect of new technology to a CPR (2000). The introduction 
of new technology to a CPR is therefore likely to call for a change in the management system. 
This might again require a period of adoption, trial and error learning (Agrawal 2001). 
 So what have been the consequences of the pipes in Manang and Ngawal? It is 
important to emphasise that in the case of these two villages, the modernisation that the pipes 
represent for the irrigation system does not replace other traditional means of water supply. It 
is an upgrading and addition to the existing water harvesting system. And regarding the 
drinking water, it means that it can be taken from taps in the village instead of from the 
irrigation canals. So the problems mentioned by Agrawal & Narain (1997) are not taking 
place in Manang and Ngawal. 
But pipes need maintenance. Due to careless installation, the pipes in Manang often 
have a lot of damages after each winter (see pic 7.2). Maintenance of pipes does not fit into 
the traditional maintenance system. To repair a broken pipe requires some training and simple 
equipment. It does not require the effort of a lot of workers, but only of a few skilled ones. 
The Manangis have apparently solved a potential first order problem of collective action 
Pic. 7.1  Pic. 7.2 
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regarding the maintenance of the pipes by paying workers instead of letting the maintenance 
be the responsibility of the entire user group. Still several informants complained about 
leakages in two of the three major irrigation pipelines in Manang, and the third, Ghatte Khola 
pipeline, was not in use at all due to massive damages. So the question is whether this system 
worked well enough. The drinking water pipelines in Manang were the responsibility of a 
technician employed by the district Drinking Water Office, and there were no complaints 
about this system. So also here a potential collective action problem was avoided, simply by 
avoiding a collective action solution to the maintenance. 
Even if the pipes still represent challenges of maintenance, there is no doubt that the 
water situation in Manang is dramatically improved because of these pipes, and that the 
challenges connected to new technology that is mentioned in the literature (Agrawal 2001), 
are to a great extent coped with or avoided in Manang. Both social structures and social 
organisation changed as a response to the contextual changes. 
In Ngawal, there was no institutionalised maintenance of pipes. The problems with the 
drinking water supply were described in section 5.2.3. The drinking water pipes were often 
malfunctioning due to lack of maintenance. If the drinking water system could have been 
maintained with a collective effort as with the irrigation canals, and not by an individual, it 
might have proved easier to organise. Thus the difficulties with maintenance of the drinking 
water could be said to be partly related to technology.  
The ability to organise the maintenance of pipes seems apparently to be better in 
Manang than in Ngawal. The Manangis have solved a potential collective action problem for 
maintaining their irrigation pipes, while the Ngawalis have not achieved this for their drinking 
water pipes. Even if Manang due to its size is able to have a paid maintenance worker, the 
Ngawalis could easily have maintained their drinking water system themselves, without a 
hired technician. This was because the system was simple, and to clean the intake tank of 
leaves and pine needles really does not require skills or equipment. The factors that could help 
explain the weaker ability of collective action in Ngawal was discussed in section 6.2, and 
what I suggested there was the lack of leadership and heterogeneity in the community. 
If the problems of maintenance are solved, there is no doubt that more pipes is the 
obvious solution to a better and more reliable water supply in both Ngawal and Manang. But 
in order for pipes to be a long term sustainable improvement of the water supply, appropriate 
management institutions must be in place. The solution chosen in Manang might also be what 
is needed in Ngawal. But the challenge is how they can raise the funds necessary to pay for 
the maintenance.  
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7.2.3 The local dialectics of migration in Upper Manang 
In this chapter, the adaptations and changes that have occurred in the communities as 
responses to contextual changes, namely migration, will be reviewed and discussed by 
applying concepts from local dialectics.  
The way the water supply in both Manang and Ngawal has been maintained is closely 
related to the agricultural, social and technological development in the villages. This 
development is closely related to the history of the people in Upper Manang in the 20th 
century.  
 Abandoned land and houses tell of a past with significantly higher farming activity 
than that at present. The seventies and eighties saw a widespread out migration from Upper 
Manang, due to business opportunities in Kathmandu and other major cities in South East 
Asia (van Spengen 1987). Then in the nineties, some villages in Upper Manang experienced 
return migration, due to stagnation in the business opportunities in Kathmandu and 
sharpening of visa policies all over South East Asia. Simultaneously the business 
opportunities in Upper Manang increased due to tourism. This out- and in-migration naturally 
had its effect on agriculture and irrigation. Until the out-migration started, the communities of 
Upper Manang applied a range of strategies in order to check the population growth. 
Similarly, there was a pressure on agriculture fields, and marginal, un-irrigated land was 
cultivated. Extensive irrigation systems were maintained. This was possible due to a sufficient 
supply of labourers. Then, in the late sixties, the out migration started. Houses and fields were 
abandoned as entire households migrated. Similarly, the traditions that made young men leave 
the villages prevailed. And during the eighties, modern family planning reached Upper 
Manang. The birth rates dropped. In the late nineties, the average family had three to five 
children, while they fifteen years earlier had around ten, according to local informants. 
Institutions and infrastructure, designed to serve a much larger community, deteriorated. In 
the late eighties and beginning of the nineties, lack of labour was suddenly a problem for 
maintaining the traditional agriculture (van Spengen 1987, Rogers 2004). This also included 
the irrigation system.  
If applying concepts from local dialectics, as it is presented by Aase (1998), I would 
say that at one stage in history, the social structures that made young men leave the village, 
were the thesis. This thesis was legitimated by the need of population control. Then, at a later 
stage in history, the entire population decreased due to out-migration of households and drop 
in birth rates. This leads to labour shortage and also makes the irrigation system deteriorate. 
The social structures that make young men migrate are at this stage in history antithetical to 
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the social organisation of the farming system.  But in Manang, this situation did not prevail. 
Introduction of plastic pipes reduced the need for labour to maintain the irrigation system. 
The return migration started in the nineties, and currently lack of labour was not perceived as 
a problem in Manang. In Ngawal, the development has been different. Ngawal faced the same 
out-migration as Manang. But they still face a situation of insufficient labour power, and there 
has not been the same degree of return migration. There has, on the other hand, been 
immigration mainly from the neighbouring Nar-Phu region and the more distant Dolpo. 
People from these places do not have status as native villages, and their presence makes the 
community more heterogonous, which was discussed in section 6.2. 
Hence the immigration from neighbouring districts, the share of abandoned houses and 
land seemed higher in Ngawal than in Manang. In Ngawal, people also experienced lack of 
labourers to maintain the few existing wooden pipes in the irrigation system, and these pipes 
are being abandoned. As opposed to Manang, Ngawal has no significant return-migration of 
out-migrated villagers, and they have not been able to develop the irrigation infrastructure, in 
other words install piped water, that to a certain extent could have compensated for the lack of 
male labourers. These matters I discussed in chapter 6.2.  
In Ngawal it is evident that social structures that make young men leave the village, 
has become an obstacle to the development of the irrigation infrastructure. This social 
structure was the thesis when out-migration was needed to sustain a livelihood for the 
remaining population. Under today’s situation, it becomes the antithesis to the social 
organisation of the farming system. In Manang, this was met by modernisation of the 
irrigation system, by introducing several pipelines. The modernisation of the irrigation system 
was the result of the massive effort done by some of the returned villagers, who are 
resourceful, both in respect to wealth and initiative.  
In Manang, the social organisation seems to have changed: Young men do not longer 
migrate. This is a response to contextual changes - the change in business opportunities, and 
not to changes in the social structures. The Manangis have shown that they are flexible in 
changing their social structures in respect to changes in social organisation. A social structure 
does not stay antithetical to the actual social organisation for long, before the social structures 
change, and turn into a synthesis. This tendency is displayed in how the Manangis have 
changed their irrigation management system, as described in chapter 5.2.2, as response to the 
changing demand from the irrigation system, which again was a result of the pipes and a 
smaller number of labourers. The legitimating principle for the social structures, the 
maintenance institutions, was to be found in the physical context, not in culture, and it was 
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therefore easy to change for the Manangis. When the social structures became an antithesis to 
the actual social organisation, they simply changed them. 
The relationship between contextual changes and changes in social organisation and 
social structures has importance for how the communities are able to steward their water 
resources and displays that processes beyond that of collective action matters for the water 
management, and thus the water supply. It displays how contextual changes generate 
processes of local dialectics that influences on the water supply situation in the villages. The 
ability to sustain the water supply is thus not only a question of collective action, but of how 
contextual changes lead to changes in social organisation, social structures and perhaps 
culture. This last aspect I will discuss in the next section. 
 
 
7.3 Religious practices and modernisation of the water system 
The higher the dependency on rain, the more the villagers in Upper Manang rely on prayers 
and rituals for rain and water in the streams. The role of religion for the different strategies for 
water supply is one of the research questions of this thesis. Religion is also a kind of a 
contextual factor to the water systems in the two villages, in the sense that it may influence on 
the water management without being an endogenous factor to the water system. In section 
6.2.4 I discussed the importance of religion for the ability of collective action. This chapter 
addresses the dialectical relationship between contextual changes, water supply and religion.  
The poorer the irrigation system, the higher is the dependency on rain, and the more the 
villagers pray. The dependency on rain has decreased in both Manang and Ngawal as a result 
of abandonment of unirrigated land, which again is a result of out-migration. In Manang, the 
dependency on rain has further decreased as a result of pipelines, especially the new 
Gyanchang Khola pipeline. But even with irrigation, the fields require rain if the harvest shall 
not fail. During the critical weeks around the sowing, people were frenetically praying for 
rain. In Ngawal the lama of the village performed the puja prescribed by the Tibetan  
Calendar, by spraying yak milk at particular source of water. The frequency of rituals 
connected to water thus reflects the vulnerability from lack of rain. But even if it seems like 
many farmers in Manang and Ngawal have faith in the effects of pujas, it does not mean that 
they put all their faith in prayers and rain instead of making an effort to get more irrigation 
pipelines. Even if more rain falls than expected, irrigation will still give higher yield. 
 As  I wrote  in chapter  5.3.4, one  informant  in  Ngawal  found  that  the  villagers  in  
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Ngawal preferred to wait for the government to supply pipes, and pray for water in the mean 
time instead of making an effort trying to improve the irrigation and drinking water facilities. 
If this is the case, it is the only instance where religion is directly influencing the water 
supply, and it displays a fatalistic attitude towards the management of the water supply. This 
fatalism I will elaborate further in the conclusion, in section 8.1, as the discussion around this 
topic builds on the forthcoming analysis. 
Culture can be viewed as systems of symbols, and the symbols assign meaning to the 
physical environment (Coward 1986). Through culture we relate to nature. In this sense also 
religion is a mode of adaptation to the environment, a way of prescribing meaning to events 
outside the control of human beings. The performance of religious rituals as pujas and prayers 
is a crucial part of the everyday life of most people in Upper Manang. Religion gives meaning 
to a lot of social structures and practices. The rituals for water are probably legitimated both 
in pragmatic strategies for sustaining a livelihood and for maintaining a religious identity, 
though in the mind of the Manangis, there is no such dualism. The pujas are performed if it is 
necessary. It is evident that some of the rituals for water are not being practiced if its purpose, 
like getting more water, is not needed. This suggests a clear pragmatic legitimating of at least 
Pic. 7.3: Village women in Manang turning the prayer wheels during a puja in May 2004 
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these rituals. Their meaning derives from need of water, not from religion. The practices of 
water rituals are generated by water needs and not by religion.  
 When pipes are installed, the frequency of water pujas and prayers goes down. The 
relationship is clear. In Manang, water pujas are rarely performed, while in Ngawal they are 
performed all the time. This shows how contextual changes like the introduction of pipes, 
changes the social organisation – in this case religious practices, and eventually the social 
structures. The question is if it also over time will change the culture.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
This study has revealed how people in a remote corner of the Himalayas are able to sustain 
their water supply under a situation marked by climatic change, technological change and 
migration. I have tested the validity of a theoretical approach to CPR- management by 
applying the study of the water management in the two villages. Here is a summary of my 
most important findings: 
- By comparing the water management institutions in Manang and Ngawal with 
Ostroms design principles, I have found out that the water management institutions are 
sustainable, but Manang copes far better than Ngawal due to different impact of the 
contextual changes. 
- Contextual factors and changes affect the ability for the two villages to sustain their 
water supply: My observations and statements from my informants could indicate a 
climatic change to a drier climate, which would lead to more conflicts over water, 
more prayers and probably more pipes. Technological change in the form of pipes 
radically improves the water supply, given that they are followed by adequate 
management institutions. Migration has had different impact on the communities 
through history. Out-migration of men coupled with immigration from other districts 
weakens the ability of the villagers of Ngawal to undertake collective action tasks as 
installing pipes and maintain their drinking water system. Similarly do return-
migration of businessmen to Manang supply this village with resourceful 
entrepreneurs, which have had an important role in getting pipes to this village (the 
contextual changes and their consequences for the water supply is outlined in section 
8.1.1, 8.1.2 and 8.1.3). 
- Based on my empirical findings I criticise Ostrom’s CPR approach on its 
methodological individualism and neglect of contextual factors (outlined in section 
8.2). 
 
In this chapter I also bring in some new analytical elements from cultural theory that is 
derived from the empirical analysis I have done. This I do in the next section. In section 8.2.1 
I also suggest a new model for CPR-research, based on my critique of Ostroms CPR approach 
and my empirical findings. 
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8.1 Coping with water supplies in the two villages 
So why did Manang cope better than Ngawal with sustaining their water supply? As in 
Manang, did the irrigation management system of Ngawal meet most of the design principles, 
but the lack of obedience to the water sharing rules could indicate that the rules were not 
tailored to fit the resource attributes. Given a better water supply, the management institutions 
of Ngawal would probably also provide sustainable management. The irrigation management 
system in Ngawal was under constant pressure due to the continuing infringement of the 
appropriation rules. The system did not break down, but neither did it seem to change as a 
response to the pressure.    
I would like to emphasize one difference between Manang and Ngawal; namely the 
more fatalistic attitude among the Ngawalis which I did not encounter in Manang. Thompson 
discusses in his cultural theory (1995) how fatalism relates to natural resource management. 
According to Thompson people tend to cope with uncertainties in the natural surroundings by 
socially constructed myths of nature that support their ways of life (Thompson 1995).  
According to Thompson, how people construct these myths can be deduced by “recurrent 
regularities within the managed ecosystems (…)“ (1995, 32). Thompson identifies four myths 
of nature: Nature as perverse/tolerant, ephemeral, benign and capricious. Each myth of 
nature is supported by a certain way of life: Hierarchic, egalitarian, individualist and fatalist 
(Thompson et al. 1990, Thompson 1995). A way of life is “a viable combination of cultural 
biases and social relations” (Thompson et al. 1990, 1). According to Thompson et al. (ibid) 
the myths of nature are provided by our institutions, and are thereby determined from our way 
of life.    
- The hierarchist’s myth is represented by aid agencies and governments. Thompson 
exemplifies this by the Food and Agriculture Organisation, FAO. The hierachist view 
nature as perverse/tolerant, and advocates hierarchical structures for resource 
management.  
- The egalitarian’s myth is represented by deep ecologists, who ascribe moral 
subjectivity to nature. The egalitarians view nature as ephemeral. Human impact on  
nature might therefore have unpredictable and disastrous consequences. 
- The individualist’s myth is represented by the radical market-oriented economist Lord 
Bauer. The individualists view nature as benign, and do therefore advocate a resource 
management where all individuals should be allowed to exploit nature for their own 
benefit without any regulation imposed by hierarchical institutions.  
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- The fatalist’s myth is represented by the hill farmers of Himalaya. The fatalists view 
nature as capricious. They know that anything can happen; their resource situation can 
get worse or better. Nothing the farmer does can influence upon this situation, and to 
try to improve that situation is therefore meaningless.  
In cases where the state of the world is uncertain, the supporters of each way of life tend to 
choose the state that supports their myths of nature. Where the egalitarian sees natural 
resources, the individualists see raw materials. 
The farmers in Ngawal seem to support the fatalist myth. To pray for rain or appeal to 
the government for pipes is part of the same logic. Events - be it rain or installation of pipes, 
is not under the control of the Ngawali farmers, but by remote powers; gods and the 
government. To try to improve their water situation by improving the existing canals is 
meaningless. Next rainfall will make landslides destroying the canals anyway.  
The entrepreneurs in Manang on the other hand support the individualist myth of nature. 
Nature is seen as benign, with abundance of resources. The task is just to get optimal 
utilisation. There are enough water resources available, the task is just to be able to utilize it. 
In the case of Manang this means installing pipes.   
 But could not the fatalist myth among the Ngawalis and the individualistic myth 
among the Manangis be said to be dependent on partly the same contextual factors that I have 
examined in this thesis? Before I discuss this I will first give a short summary of how I found 
the contextual changes to influence the communities and their ability to sustain their water 
supply. 
  
8.1.1 Climatic change – the answer is pipes 
The fear that the rapid shrinking of the glaciers in the Himalayas will dry up some of the most 
important rivers in the world as well as the communities dependent upon their water, is  part 
of the backdrop of this thesis.  
 According to local informants, the climate in Upper Manang has become drier the last 
years. I observed a higher snowline and retreating glaciers, and my informants told about less 
snow in winter and less water in the streams. But the most critical variables for water for 
irrigation were the snowmelt and precipitation during the spring, according to the local 
informants. I also wanted to look at the social consequences of a drier climate. The situation 
in Ngawal gave a clue to what would occur: Fighting and frequent rule breaking. These are 
changes in social organisation. I Ngawal I did not reveal any changes in social structures. As 
mentioned did the irrigation management institution in Ngawal stay unchanged despite the 
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prevailing rule infringement. A more thorough investigation of what happens to resource 
management institutions under pressure is thus a question for further research. 
But if pipes are seen as a response to a drier climate, it is evident that institutional changes, or 
changes in the social structure, are likely to take place. This is the topic of the next section. 
 
8.1.2 Technological change – challenge and solution 
Technological change in the form of pipes is the most important way of improving the water 
supply situation in Manang and Ngawal.  
The introduction of pipes has social and cultural consequences for the communities. In 
Manang, the farmers had successfully changed the irrigation maintenance system partly as a 
response to the introduction of pipes, and thus it can be held that the pipes had consequences 
both for the social organisation and social structure, while the villagers of Ngawal where not 
able to organize maintenance of the drinking water pipes, or get more irrigation pipes 
installed.  
In Manang, the frequency of prayers and pujas for water has declined as the water 
supply has been improved by pipes.  
To install more pipes is an obvious way for improving the water supply of the villages 
in Upper Manang, and the most important strategy for the farmers to cope with a drier 
climate. But without adequate institutions for maintenance, the pipes surely will deteriorate 
and the entire effort will be worthless. 
  
8.1.3 Migration  
Both historically and at present migration has had great influence on the water system in 
Manang and Ngawal. Permanent out-migration frees irrigated land and makes more water 
available for the households who remain in the village. But permanent out-migration of 
households and trade migration deprive the communities of labour. During the eighties, the 
irrigation system deteriorated due to lack of labour (van Spengen 1987). In Manang, the 
return migration through the latter half of the nineties, had again made the village well 
supplied with labour, and the introduction of pipes has reduced the need of labour for 
maintenance. In Ngawal, male labour is still scarce, and parts of the irrigation system 
continue to deteriorate. Both Ngawal and Manang experienced immigration from other 
districts and neighbouring areas. This immigration has made Ngawal more ethnically 
heterogeneous than Manang, and it might help explain why the Ngawalis have not been able 
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to improve their water supply and why they are not able to maintain their drinking water 
system. 
In order to analyse how migration influences the social organisation and the social 
structures in the villages, and how these changes again influenced the farming system in 
general and the water system in particular, I applied the method of local dialectics. It 
demonstrated how the changes have occurred through a dialectical process between social 
organisation and social structures, most notably between the cause and effects of migration to 
the communities, which again had its effects on the water supply. In one stage of the history 
of Upper Manang, migration of young men was a necessity to sustain living – it was the thesis 
in my analysis. But when the population dropped, the social structures that made young men 
migrate lead to deterioration of the water systems due to lack of labour. The same social 
structures then becomes antithetical to the actual social organisation. In Manang people 
confronted the lack of labour by installing pipes and by changing the irrigation management 
system; the social structures changed.  
By applying local dialectics I have shown that to study the ability of farmers in a 
mountain community to sustain the water supply is not only a question of collective action, 
but also a question of how contextual changes lead to changes in social organisation, social 
structures and perhaps culture. To sum up the discussion of my second theoretical research 
question, local dialectics proved useful for studying the effects of migration on the water 
supply, by providing the methodology and concepts that extended the perspective beyond that 
of the CPR approach.  
 
8.1.4 The contextual factors and the myths of nature 
The Manangis do not display a fatalistic attitude towards natural resource management, but 
rather an individualistic one. This I ascribe to the presence of the entrepreneurs, the return-
migrated business men of Manang, which attitude seems more to be that of an individualist in 
Thompson’s term (1995). Similarly might the ethnic heterogeneity and the fact that “just 
women and the poor are left”, as one Ngawali farmer put it, help explain the fatalistic attitude 
in Ngawal. The fatalistic attitude might derive from the fact that the Ngawalis are not able to 
get anything done; no pipes and no drinking water management.  
 The contextual change that first and foremost has influenced this difference in way of 
life and myth of nature is migration, as described and discussed in section 2.2.4, 7.2.3 and in 
the previous section. This suggests that the way of life and myth of nature held by different 
groups not necessarily is determined from internal properties of a group, as Thompson seems 
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to presume (1995), but is dependent on the space and time context that their resource 
management occurs within. The Manangis could as well have held the fatalist’s myth of 
nature in the eighties, before the return migration started, and poor Manangi farmers might 
very well still have a fatalist way of life. 
 A question for further research could be to conduct a more thorough study of the 
different village’s myth of nature, how these myths are constructed and how they are 
articulated in the natural resource management in the villages. 
 In the next section I will introduce my own model for research on CPR management,  
that can also be seen as a way to reveal how the myth of nature held by CPR managers are 
constructed.  
 
8.2 Theoretical implications 
I have based most of the analysis in this thesis on Ostrom’s CPR framework.  It proved to be 
useful for conceptualising the water management, for analysing the water management 
institutions in the two villages and to highlight different factors that can help explain the 
differences in how the two villages ability to sustain their water supply. But I found two 
problems with applying Ostrom’s framework:  
- The first relates to its methodological individualism, which makes it overlook the 
importance of social structures and culture for the villager’s ability to change or craft 
CPR management institutions. 
- The second problem relates to its neglect of contextual factors. 
 
8.2.1  An integrated approach 
Besides the need of a CPR approach that includes social structures and culture, the question is 
how contextual factor could be included in an analysis of CPR systems, without having to 
make an endless list of internal and contextual factors. Theoretical models simplify the reality 
in order to help us understand it. When levels of details are too high, the models get too 
complicated to help in this understanding. If the models then should be made useful, the level 
of abstraction must be higher. There is a need of a CPR framework at a higher level of 
abstraction that still can guide research. This framework should also take a perspective that 
recognizes the power of social structures and culture in enabling and constraining social 
processes and thereby the management of CPRs and the evolution of CPR management 
institutions.  I find it useful to keep Ostrom’s distinction between analysis of institutions for 
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CPR management and analysis of the CPR appropriators ability to craft and change 
management institutions.  In this study, I first and foremost found that it was the latter that 
needed to be presented in a more abstract manner. I have made one suggestion, fig. 8.1, which 
is an attempt to apply the insights I have gained through the studies in Upper Manang to make 
a general model that includes social structures and culture as well as context. 
In the entity social structures I include institutions (inclusive CPR management 
institutions) and norms. Practice refers to the acts and intentions of individuals, and 
corresponds to Aase’s concept social organisation. This entity includes the actual resource 
use and management, as well as cost – benefit evaluations that an individual undertakes when 
deciding to comply or not to the CPR management rules. Individual choice is thereby 
included in this entity. This is why I have chosen to term this entity practice and not social 
organisation. Resource characteristics are attributes of the resource like size and regularity. 
The arrows indicate the flow of influence. Arrows in both directions between entities suggest 
a dialectic relationship. Local dialectics are displayed as arrows in both directions between 
practice, social structures and culture. The resource characteristics affect the management as 
the management may influence on the resource characteristics. For instance will over-use 
affect the resource size. Contextual change, like technological change, affects practices like 
maintenance of the irrigation system in Manang, which again results in changes of the 
maintenance institutions - social structures. The core variable in the model, ability to change 
or craft CPR management institutions, is practice, and is thereby enabled and constrained by 
social structures, culture and the resource characteristics. Under the various aspects in the 
model, known factors and variables, like the design principles and the factors found to 
influence on collective action that are mentioned in this thesis, can be included. The challenge 
Contextual change Practice
Resource characteristics
Ability to craft and change 
CPR management 
institutions 
Social structuresCulture 
Fig. 8.1: The relationships between the factors that influences on CPR appropriators ability to craft 
or change CPR management institutions.  
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is to include the context. How to know which contextual factors to look for? Each case study 
would need a careful examination of which contextual factors might have importance. Just 
because they are not explicitly identified in a theoretical model, it does not mean that they 
should be left out from the research.  
 I contend that this model also could help explain the myth of nature held by the CPR 
managers. The triangle practice-social structure-culture can be seen as a representation of 
Thomspsons concept of way of life. The myth of nature manifests itself in the resource 
management (practices), in the management institutions (social structures), and in the values 
and beliefs that legitimates these (culture), and thereby it reflects the way of life. The model 
thus displays how the myth of nature, as well as way of life, are influenced and changed by 
contextual changes. 
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Appendix  
 
Questionnaire for Household survey 
 
1) Number of household members in your household? 
2) Number of household members living outside the Manang District 
  a. Number of females? 
  b. Number of male?   
3) Other kind of occupation besides farming (Y/N)? 
4)  Have you experienced problems with getting enough irrigation the last five years 
(Y/N)?  
5) Have you experienced getting a bad harvest due to lack of irrigation the last five  years 
(Y/N)?  
6)  Have you been involved in fight over irrigation the last five years (Y/N)? 
7) Are you satisfied with the irrigation management system (Y/N)? 
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Glossary 
 
English Nepali Nyesheng 
 
Agriculture 
  
Barley  Kahru 
Beer Shying  
Buckwheat   Kepra 
Canal  Kyur 
Liqour Raksi Ara 
Potatoes  Alo  
Porridge flour   Tsampa 
River, Stream Khola Kyu 
Water  Kyu 
Wheat  Shou 
   
Social structures and culture 
Advisor to the village Headman  Falasing 
Cairn  Chorten 
Figure made of wheat flour and yak butter for 
ritual purposes 
 Tormo 
Monastry  Gompa 
Religious ritual  Puja 
Tradition Parampara  
Vice village headman  Lensing 
Village headman (now VDC chairman)  Khamba 
Village meeting  Panch Chong 
White stranger  Filing 
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Abbreviations 
ACA Annapurna Conservation Area 
ACAP Annapurna Conservation Area Project 
AMIS Agency Managed Irrigation System 
CPR Common Property Resource 
DAO District Agriculture Office 
DSDWS District Sanitation and Drinking Water Sub-Office 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FMIS Farmer Managed Irrigation System 
HMK His Majesty the King 
IPCC International Panel on Climate Change 
ICSI International Commission on Snow and Ice 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
NRS Nepali Rupees 
VDC Village Development Committee 
VCDC Village Conservation and Development Committee 
 
